CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Richard Leonard Jaramillo appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder. (Pen. Code, 664, 187, subd. (a).)[1]As to both counts, the jury found true the allegations that appellant and/or a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which caused great bodily injury and death ( 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)); that appellant and/or a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm ( 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)); and that appellant and/or a principal personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)). The jury also found true as to both counts that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote criminal conduct by gang members. ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
Court affirm with modifications.

This case involves an attempt by plaintiff and appellant Hugh D. Schurtz to enforce a criminal restitution order under the Enforcement of Judgments Law, Code of Civil Procedure sections 680.010 et seq. The trial court denied Schurtzs application for an order for sale of a dwelling under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.750, on the ground that the Probate Code, rather than the Enforcement of Judgments Law, applied because the judgment debtor was deceased; therefore the restitution order is only payable in the course of administration of the deceaseds estate. The trial court was correct. Accordingly, Court affirm the order denying Schurtzs application.

Defendant Alan Casden appeals a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of his former law firm, plaintiff Howrey LLP, finding Casden liable for unpaid attorney fees, as well as costs and interest, totaling approximately $5 million, plus interest until the judgment is paid. The arbitration award arose because Casden had failed to pay Howreys bills for several legal matters that Howrey handled for Casden and his related companies.
Court affirm because the arbitrators decision was well within the scope of his authority under the parties arbitration agreement, which encompassed the arbitration of any dispute concerning [Howreys] representation, including disputes regarding the amount of fees or the quality of [Howreys] services. Casden argues the defense of accord and satisfaction, and he claims a lack of joint and several liability with his companies and thus Casdens purported lack of individual responsibility for the legal fees incurred. However, Casden is precluded on appeal from relitigating issues within the scope of the arbitrators authority.

Plaintiff Richard Peterson (plaintiff) appeals the judgment of dismissal entered against him and in favor of defendant Carson Trailer (defendant). We find no error, and Court affirm.

On May 10, 2007, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that Savino H., 17 years old, had committed second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. On September 17, 2007, at the adjudication hearing, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the allegations of the petition were true and declared Savino a ward of the court. The court placed Savino on probation in his parents home, imposed various probation conditions, and declared a maximum confinement period of five years.

Edward Dwayne Lester appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of nolo contendere to carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, 12020, subd. (a)(4)) and his admission that he previously had been convicted of a felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Lester to four years in prison. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury found Jonathan Colt guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)[1]), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1)), and hitting a vehicle and leaving the scene of the accident (Veh. Code, 20002). Colt received a suspended sentence and three years probation with the condition that he serve a one-year jail term.
On appeal, Colt contends the judgment must be reversed because evidence of uncharged misconduct was erroneously admitted at trial. Colt further contends that the trial court erred by ordering that Colts California Drivers License be permanently revoked. We affirm the judgment but remand this case so the lower court can take the steps necessary to ensure that the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) permanently revokes Colts license.

Cross-defendant Leroy Moyers appeals from the order denying his anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16)[1] to strike the cross-complaint of Joseph, Kathleen, and Charles Grosser. The Grossers were sued by Kevin Kimes, whose pet cat Pumkin was shot and wounded with a pellet gun. Kimes blamed the Grossers for the shooting, and contacted Moyers, a representative of an organization called Voices for Pets, which responds to violence to animals. Moyers prepared flyers offering a reward from Voices for Pets for information leading to the conviction of the responsible party. The Grossers cross-complained against Moyers for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from publication of the flyers, which they contend implied that they were responsible for the shooting. The court denied the motion to strike on the ground that the Grossers causes of action did not arise from conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP law. Court agree with that determination, and affirm the order.

In a cross-median traffic collision, four men were killed and another injured. The injured man, and family members of the deceased, sued public entities in charge of the road upon allegations that the road was dangerous because it lacked a median barrier. The trial court granted summary judgment to the public entities on the basis of design immunity. (Gov. Code, 830.6.) Court affirm the judgments.

John Morra filed a petition for probate of his father Louiss estate after his stepmother, Bobbye Morra, claimed control over the entirety of the couples community assets. The probate court rejected Bobbyes claim and ordered the estate to be funded with Louiss 50 percent share of the community assets, a decision we affirmed in an earlier appeal. (Estate of Louis Morra (Feb. 15, 2008, A117804) [nonpub. opn.] (Morra I).) Thereafter, the special administrator declined to include as an asset of the estate Louiss interest in one parcel of real property. While the couple had executed an agreement characterizing that property as community property, the special administrator elected to disregard the agreement because the property had originally been held in joint tenancy. The probate court approved the petition for settlement excluding this property interest and declined to reimburse any of the attorney fees incurred by John Morra in pursuing the probate petition. Court reverse these two holdings.

A.F. (Mother) appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights to S.T. (the minor) under Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition. Mothers sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court erred by failing to consider S.T.s sibling relationship (see 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)) with her two older brothers, A.T. and M.T. Court affirm the judgment.

Counsel for appellant has filed a brief raising no specific issues and asking for our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has also notified appellant of this filing and of his right to inform the court of any appellate issues. Court have received a letter dated August 31, 2003, from appellant asking this court to dismiss the appeal. Court decline to do so, exercising our discretion under California Rules of Court, rule 8.316(b)(2) to proceed. Having conducted the requisite review, Court conclude no arguable issues exist on appeal and affirm.

In this action for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conversion, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint after sustaining all five defendants demurrers without leave to amend. It also granted two of the defendants special motions to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly referred to as the anti SLAPP statute.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the anti SLAPP statute is inapplicable because the claims do not arise from the exercise of free speech or the right of petition, and that the demurrers were erroneously sustained without leave to amend. We reject his contentions except as to the granting of the special motion to strike the conversion claim against defendant Melody Sternoff Meyers. The order granting Meyerss anti-SLAPP motion is reversed as to the conversion claim and affirmed as to the remaining claims. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Respondents, a closely-held corporation and its majority shareholders, sued appellants, the minority shareholders, for declaratory relief to resolve a dispute regarding the scope of a supermajority voting provision. Appellants, in turn, filed a related action against respondents. After both actions were consolidated, all three parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted respondents motions, denied appellants motion, and entered judgment for respondents. Court affirm the judgment.