CA Unpub Decisions

Vernon Royal, Jr. (defendant), pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)), and was placed on probation pursuant to Penal Code section 12101.1. The court also imposed $180 for a laboratory analysis fee and $520 for a drug program fee, including penalty assessments. (Health & Saf. Code, 11372.5, subd. (a); 11372.7.) After a contested hearing on a probation violation, the court revoked probation and sentenced defendant to three years in state prison. Without objection the court also increased the aggregate amount of the laboratory analysis fee and penalty assessments to $232.50, and the drug program fee and penalty assessments to $697.50. Court vacate the penalty assessments and remand to the trial court to recalculate the amounts, and to consider defendants claim that he is entitled to additional custody credits. In all other respects, Court affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Defendants James E. Santana and Edgar Franco timely appealed their convictions. Both defendants were convicted of one count of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder.[1] Santana was also convicted of one count of unlawful firearm activity, and Franco was also convicted on one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. After a bifurcated trial, the jury found gang allegations to be true. Santana was sentenced to a total of 15 years to life, and Franco was sentenced to a total of 16 years to life. Defendants raise several issues including a claim the court erred in admitting a photograph of them holding weapons not used in the instant crime. Court affirm the judgment against Franco and affirm the judgment against Santana as modified.

Moses Michael Grageda appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of three counts of resisting an executive officer and one count of possession of a controlled substance. (Pen. Code, 69; Health & Safety Code, 11377.) The trial court found Grageda had a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) and sentenced him to a prison term of five years. Court conclude that, on the facts presented, Grageda was entitled to instruction on the lesser included offense of resisting a peace officer in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). (People v. Lacefield (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 249, 259.) Consequently, we reverse the convictions of resisting an executive officer by force or violence and remand with directions to reduce these convictions to violations of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), and to resentence Grageda accordingly, unless the People elect to retry Grageda on the greater offense.

Appellant Robert Butler (Butler) sued respondent DIRECTV, Inc. (DIRECTV) for disability discrimination. On appeal, Butler challenges the summary judgment entered in favor of DIRECTV. Court agree with the trial court that Butler failed to present a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Ravinder S. Grewal and Narinder Singh Grewal appeal the trial courts order awarding attorneys fees to Ai Ping Lu. They argue that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the fee award, and raise numerous contentions of procedural errors. Court affirm.

Jayson Johnson[1]appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of one count of attempted second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, 664 & 211.)[2]Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the allegation that he had served three prior prison terms pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) and admitted that he suffered two prior convictions for petty theft with a prior conviction pursuant to section 666 and one for grand theft pursuant to section 487, subdivision (c). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of five years in state prison, which included a two year term for the attempted robbery conviction and three consecutive one-year terms for the prior prison terms. On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had served three prior prison terms as a result of three prior felony convictions.

Roberto Drilon appeals an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant High Desert Cable (HDC). Drilon sued HDC on a theory of respondeat superior after HDCs employee, Jose Chavez, struck Drilon in a crosswalk on the morning of February 16, 2006. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of HDC based on its finding the special errand exception to the going and coming rule is not applicable to the facts of this case. Court agree and affirm the order.

Appellant T. W. (hereafter, father) appeals an order terminating his parental rights as to his daughters K. C. and S. W. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.) Father contends the juvenile court violated his right to due process by denying his request to call seven-year-old S. W. as a witness. Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that K. C. and S. W. would not benefit from a continued relationship with him. Father also asserts the juvenile court failed to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Court conclude the ICWA notice was deficient and reject fathers other contentions. Court reverse and remand for the sole purpose of ensuring compliance with ICWA. In all other respects, the order terminating fathers parental rights is affirmed.

Defendants and Appellants Chun Hee Kim and Tae Woon Kim appeal from a judgment entered after trial by jury. Finding substantial evidence to support the jurys verdict, Court affirm.

Appellant, the mother of minors C. and A., appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating jurisdiction over the children and ordering there be no contact between appellant and the children until appellant is able to prove she can protect the children. Appellant contends that the court should have maintained jurisdiction to ensure the children would be safe and their needs met and that the court abused its discretion in ordering no visits. Court affirm.

Thomas T. (father) appeals the juvenile courts order terminating his parental rights to E.T. (minor). According to father, the juvenile court erred when it declined to apply the parental contact exception (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). Court find no error and affirm.

Appellant Jerrold E. Coleman challenges a trial court order denying his motion for relief from default. Relying upon Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), appellant contends that the trial court should have set aside the default judgment entered against him.
Court agree. Based upon the uncontroverted evidence that appellants failure to attend a hearing was the result of a calendaring error, the trial court should have set aside the order setting arrearages entered against him. Thus, the trial courts order denying appellants motion for relief is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new hearing on the matter of arrearages.

Parents E.S. (Mother) and M.J. (Father) appeal the order terminating their parental rights to their daughter J.J. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 366.26. Specifically, Mother argues that the court erred in terminating her parental rights in light of her bond with her daughter. Father, the non-offending parent, argues that the court erred in terminating his parental rights because: (1) no substantial evidence support the courts finding at the disposition or at any other point in the proceeding that he was an unfit parent or that it would be detrimental to place the child with him; and (2) he was not provided with reasonable reunification services. The parents claims lack merit. As set forth below, Mother failed to carry her burden to establish beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights and the court had sufficient evidence to support its order terminating parental rights. Concerning Fathers claims with respect to parental fitness we conclude that he forfeited any challenge to the courts finding of detriment at the dispositional stage and that sufficient evidence supported the courts findings of unfitness/detriment during the proceedings. Court further conclude the court did not err in finding the services provided to Father by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) were adequate in view of the circumstances of the case. Court, therefore, affirm.