CA Unpub Decisions

In case No. VA094486, Gabriel Escobedo, also known as Guadalupe Gonzalez (defendant), appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial resulting in his conviction of second degree robbery with a finding of the use of a firearm. (Pen. Code, 211, 12022.53, subd. (b).)[1] At sentencing, defendant entered into a plea bargain that disposed of the bifurcated prior conviction allegations in the above case (No. VA094486) and involved guilty pleas in two unrelated cases that were pending at sentencing, People v. Escobedo, Nos. VA095320 and VA094765. Defendant entered pleas of guilty in case No. VA095320, to the grand theft of personal property ( 487, subd. (a)) and in case No. VA094765, to resisting an executive officer ( 69). In each case, he admitted that he had a prior serious felony conviction that made him eligible for a five-year enhancement and sentencing pursuant to the three strikes law ( 667, 1170.12) and that he had two prior convictions for which he had served a separate prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)). As part of the plea bargain, the parties agreed to the imposition of an aggregate state prison term of 21 years eight months. Court affirm the judgment.

Trancas-PCH, LLC (Trancas-PCH) filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate and traditional mandate against the City Council of the City of Malibu (Council) and the City of Malibu (City). In its first cause of action, Trancas-PCH asked the trial court to direct the Council to set aside its March 24, 2003, decision in Resolution No. 03-15 denying Trancas-PCHs final subdivision maps (final maps) for a proposed development. According to Trancas-PCH, the Council committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion because the final maps were in substantial compliance with the tentative maps when the final maps were filed in 1993. In its second cause of action, Trancas-PCH sought an order directing the City to approve the final maps. The trial court sustained a demurrer based on the collateral estoppel effect of Trancas Property Owners Association v. California Coastal Commission (Dec. 18, 2001, B142315) [nonpub. opn.] (Trancas II) and dismissed the petition. On appeal, Trancas-PCH contends that the collateral estoppel doctrine does not bar the first or second causes of action, the first cause of action is not barred by the 90-day statute of limitations, and the second cause of action states sufficient facts. Contrary to the Councils position, we conclude that whether the collateral estoppel doctrine or the 90-day statute of limitations apply involves factual issues that cannot be resolved on demurrer. Further, we agree that the petition alleges sufficient facts to demonstrate that the City has a present, ministerial duty to approve the final maps. Court reverse.

Mother appeals from termination of her parental rights in her sons, B. and B.A. Court affirm.

Following a jury trial in which defendant Cory Juan Braden was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (c)(1)), imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on five years probation conditioned upon serving 365 days in jail. He now appeals that conviction. His sole contention on appeal is that the trial court prejudicially misinstructed the jury regarding the issue of defendant having come into possession of the firearm without planning or preparation. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Zachary Tyler Jones was convicted by a jury of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459). Defendant appeals his conviction claiming evidentiary error and ineffective assistance of counsel. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Abelino Gonzalez Nunez of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)) and possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378). After finding defendant had previously been convicted of possessing a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (c)), the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years in state prison, calculated as follows: the upper term of four years on the transportation count, plus three consecutive years for the prior conviction. The court stayed the midterm of two years on the possession for sale count pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
Defendant appeals, claiming the trial court committed prejudicial error by: (1) not instructing the jury on his mistake of fact defense; (2) not conducting a sufficient inquiry on his two Marsden motions;[1]and (3) imposing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 40 the upper term sentence based on factors that were not tried to a jury. Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs, prospective real estate purchasers, sued the intended sellers for specific performance or breach of contract after a real estate purchase fell through. They also sued defendants Ray Axton (Axton) and Ward Real Estate and Foreclosure Services, Inc. (Ward) and others for fraud and various other torts. After plaintiffs settled with L & M Partners (L & M), the intended seller, and rescinded the purchase contract, Axton and Ward brought a nonstatutory motion to dismiss, contending the settlement agreement eliminated any damages. The trial court granted the motion and plaintiffs appeal.
Court reverse.

In 2004, defendant pled no contest to possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5) and admitted a prior conviction for the same crime (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed an eight-year state prison sentence but suspended execution of the sentence and granted probation. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by
(1) imposing the suspended term without obtaining a supplemental probation report and (2) imposing duplicate restitution fines. Court conclude that one of the restitution fines must be stricken but find no other prejudicial error. Accordingly, we modify and affirm the judgment.

In the current appeal, Marilyn T., mother of the minors, appeals from orders of the juvenile court entered at a status review hearing continuing the minors in long-term foster care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.3, subd. (d), 395.) Appellant once again generally asserts denial of due process in the proceedings. Court affirm.

In this family dispute over control of a business and its assets, the trial court granted a motion to arbitrate. The trial court found appellant herein, a limited partnership controlled by family members, was subject to the arbitration agreement. Appellant challenged that order by way of a petition for a writ of mandate, which Court denied. That order is not appealable.

Shelly B. appeals a judgment terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Aaliyah J. and Destiny R. (the minors), under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Shelly challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's findings that the minors were adoptable. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant L.E. (mother) appeals from the juvenile courts order denying her reunification services and visitation as to her son A.M. at the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing held on March 11, 2008. Mother argues the court abused its discretion when it denied her reunification services because services would have been in A.M.s best interest. Mother also argues the court violated her due process rights because it denied her visitation with the minor even though the Department of Childrens Services (DCS) did not give her prior notice that it would recommend denial of visitation. Finally, mother argues sufficient evidence does not support the courts order denying her visits with A.M. For the reasons discussed below, Court affirm the juvenile courts rulings.

A modification decision.

The California Supreme Court granted review in this case and transferred it back to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 (Towne) and People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 (Sandoval). Court affirm.