CA Unpub Decisions

On October 2, 2006, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging appellant, Roman G., received stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)). Roman admitted the offense as a misdemeanor on October 24, 2006. On November 7, 2006, the juvenile court committed Roman to the Juvenile Justice Campus and continued him on probation. After independent review of the record, Court have concluded no reasonably arguable legal or factual argument exists.

Defendant John Valdez Briones was convicted of carjacking (Pen. Code, 215, subd. (a); all further references are to this code unless otherwise stated), second degree robbery, ( 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), recklessly evading a police officer (Veh. Code, 2800.2), taking a vehicle having suffered a prior conviction ( 666.5, subd. (a); Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), and possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found he personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b), 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to a total of 24 years consisting of the upper term of 9 years for carjacking plus a 10-year consecutive term for the firearm enhancement; a consecutive 1-year term for robbery plus an enhancement of 3 years, 4 months for the firearm; and a consecutive 8 months for the reckless evading. Finally, both defendants appeal the consecutive sentences for the carjacking and robbery as a violation of section 654. The Attorney General concedes this was error and we modify the judgment to stay the sentences on the robbery convictions.

Michael P. (minor) contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding he inflicted serious bodily injury. He also claims both the prosecutor and the court erred in not following the procedures required for a deferred entry of judgment. Court affirm and remand to permit the court to consider Welfare and Institutions Code section 790.

There is sufficient evidence in the record to support defendants convictions. If the court erred in its evidentiary ruling, the error was harmless. The court did not err when it sentenced defendant to prison and denied probation. Court affirm.

E.M. (mother) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights as to her daughters Jasmine R. and Jennifer R. She relies on the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii)[1]exception, claiming the court erred in failing to ascertain the wishes of Jasmine, who was 12 years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing. Substantial evidence supports the courts implied finding that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) exception was inapplicable. Mother has failed to meet her burden to show that exception applies. Court affirm.

J.H. (Mother) seeks extraordinary relief from the juvenile courts order terminating her reunification services at the 18 month review hearing and referring the case to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency hearing. Finding the petition without merit, Court deny relief.

This appeal arises from a dispute arising out of the sale of two skilled nursing facilities, together with the real property upon which each facility is located. The dispute was resolved by a settlement agreement under which appellants, the sellers, were to recover ownership of one of the properties upon their fulfillment of certain conditions, and respondents, the buyers, were to receive clear title to the other property upon payment of certain debts. The settlement was never consummated, and this litigation ensued. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in ruling they had failed to fulfill their obligations under the settlement, and by awarding clear title to both nursing home properties to respondents. Court reject appellants contentions, and affirm the judgment.

Anthony Pharr (appellant) appeals his conviction by jury trial of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) with personal and intentional use of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)).[1] Appellants sole contention is that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting hearsay testimony by the victims mother. Court reject the contention and affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Robert Jay Ormsby of one count of committing a lewd act upon a 14-year-old child more than 10 years younger than appellant (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (c)(1)) and the court placed him on probation.[1] Appellant appealed from the order granting probation. In an unpublished opinion, this court struck the probation revocation fine but otherwise affirmed the probation order. (People v. Ormsby (July 10, 2006, A110726) [nonpub. opn.].) The court later modified appellants probation to require him to complete a polygraph examination. During the examination, appellant invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer all but one of the questions. The court revoked appellants probation and sentenced him to two years in state prison.
Appellant contends: (1) the polygraph examiner asked incriminatory questions that he had a constitutional right to refuse to answer; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation based on his exercise of that right. We disagree. As we explain below, the seven questions posed during the polygraph examination had no potential to incriminate appellant. The questions related to the crime of which appellant had been convicted and, as a result, answering them would not have exposed him to a prosecution for a different crime. A court may not revoke probation as a penalty or sanction where the probationer validly invokes the Fifth Amendment. The key, however, is that the invocation must be valid, i.e., there must be a realistic possibility of incrimination before a probationer can invoke the privilege and decline to answer questions posed during a polygraph examination. And where there is no realistic possibility of incrimination, a probationer may not refuse to answer questions posed during a polygraph examination. Accordingly, Court affirm.

In the years since 1987 when respondent Vallejo City Counsel (City Council)[1]adopted a specific plan for a new residential/recreational community which identified a hilltop parcel as a restaurant site, no plan to develop a restaurant or any other use has been advanced by anyone in the chain of title of that parcel. In the meantime, phases of development within the planned community have occurred, and the City long ago approved a subdivision map for a residential enclave on the land currently owned by real party in interest and respondent Triad Communities, L.P. (Triad). Recently, Triad submitted a revised subdivision map to the City which reduced development within the subdivision.
It is the approval of Triads modified subdivision map and adoption of a mitigated negative declaration with respect to Triads project that appellant Arsalan Darmal challenged below and on appeal. He raises issues of consistency with the specific plan as well as violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA),[2]as these matters pertain to provision of vehicular access and water service to his property. Court reject appellants complaints and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court denying appellants petition for writ of mandate.

E.R. appeals a dispositional order of the Contra Costa County Juvenile Court, entered January 24, 2008, which continued him as a ward of that court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. He challenges the courts denial of his motion to dismiss the underlying supplemental petition. As discussed below Court find no prejudicial error and affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Derek Johnson, appeals from the judgment entered following a remand for resentencing after he appealed his convictions for premeditated attempted murder, aggravated mayhem and carjacking, with great bodily injury, dangerous weapon use and prior serious felony conviction findings (Pen. Code, 664/187, 205, 215, 12022.7, 12022, subd. (b)(1), 667, subd. (a)-(i)). Sentenced on remand to state prison for 58 years to life, Johnson claims there was sentencing error. The judgment is modified in part and affirmed as modified.

Prentiss Griffin appeals from the judgment entered after his murder conviction, contending that a prosecution witness who testified after refusing to take the oath and declined to identify Griffin as the perpetrator was improperly impeached with a prior inconsistent statement where he did identify Griffin. Because any objection based on the witnesss failure to take the oath was waived, Court affirm, but modify the judgment to correct a sentencing error.

Defendants and appellants, Sabrina Elizabeth Fuqua and Pilar Mendoza Armenta, appeal from the judgment entered following their convictions, by jury trial, for sale of cocaine, with prior prison term findings (Fuqua only). (Health & Saf. Code, 11352; Pen. Code, 667.5). Fuqua was sentenced to prison for six years. Armenta was sentenced to three years probation. Defendants contend there was trial error. The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.