CA Unpub Decisions

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,[1] finding true the allegations that the minor, Anthony P., had committed an assault and a battery and that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1), 242, 243, subd. (a), 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(B) & (d).) The minor was committed to the enhanced ranch program for six to eight months. On appeal, the minor contends that the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion to determine whether the offenses were felonies or misdemeanors. Court remand the matter for the juvenile court to make this determination.

Defendant Penisimani Tomas Schneider was charged by information filed March 16, 2007, with three felonies, attempted murder (Pen. Code, 664, 187;[1] count 1), assault with a deadly weapon, a knife ( 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), infliction of corporal injury on a spouse ( 273.5, subd. (a); count 3), and five misdemeanors, child endangerment ( 273a, subd. (b); count 4), trespassing ( 602, subd. (m); count 5), petty theft ( 484, 488; count 6), battery ( 242, 243, subd. (a); count 7), and obstructing an officer ( 148, subd. (a)(1); count 8). The information further alleged that defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a knife, during the commission of the offenses in counts 1 and 3 ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that the offense in count 1 was premeditated ( 189). The judgment is affirmed.

C.A., the presumed father of G.B., appeals from two orders generated by the San Francisco Juvenile Court when it terminated G.B.s dependency: (1) a custody order prohibiting him from visiting G.B., and (2) an amended restraining order prohibiting him from contacting either G.B. or the childs mother. C.A. contends that the juvenile court erred in proceeding when it had not been shown that respondent San Francisco Department of Human Services (Department) had complied with the tribe notifications requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. (ICWA)). He also contends that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the orders prohibiting him from visiting G.B. Court conclude that these contentions are without merit, and Court affirm.

Defendant William Emmitt Hembree appeals after the trial court revoked probation and imposed a prison sentence. Court affirm.

This case is before us on remand from the California Supreme Court. Pursuant to the Courts instructions, we are to vacate our previous opinion in this case and reconsider the cause in light of Mays v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 313. Court do so and, on reconsideration, affirm the judgment of the superior court.

Mother C. Q. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. She argues the juvenile court failed to adequately examine the adoptability of her three children. Mother also argues the courts finding, that the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights codified in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) does not apply, is not supported by substantial evidence. Court find no error in the courts determination that the children are adoptable. Substantial evidence supports the finding that the beneficial relationship exception does not apply.

Parvin Patty Olfati appeals a judgment against her awarding $221,452 in attorney fees and costs to defendant State Board of Equalization (BOE) after her complaint against the BOE and three individual employees of the BOE (defendants) was resolved against her on motions for summary judgment, summary adjudication, and demurrer. Olfati claims her notice of appeal, in which she appeals specifically the judgment of fees and costs as well as all previous and subsequent orders of the trial court should be liberally construed to allow her to raise issues regarding the trial courts underlying judgment of dismissal and resolution of the motions for summary judgment, summary adjudication, and demurrer. Defendants move to dismiss the portion of the appeal relating to these latter matters.
Court shall liberally construe the notice of appeal, deny defendants motion to dismiss, and consider the issues raised by Olfati. Upon such consideration, Court affirm both the underlying judgment of dismissal and the judgment awarding fees and costs.

Joshua E., a minor, pleaded no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, which was reduced to a misdemeanor. The minor was continued as a ward of the court and placed in the custody of his mother. Following a contested hearing, the minor was found to be jointly and severally liable for victim restitution in the amount of $54,074.50.
On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion ordering him to pay restitution for injuries not shown to have been caused by his conduct. Court reject the claim.

Plaintiff Judith Topol, operator of the Lighthouse Shopping Center in Tahoe City, California, is the lessee of an adjacent parcel owned by defendant Safeway Stores, Inc. (Safeway). The lease contains an option to purchase the undeveloped part of the parcel as an additional parking lot at any time during the term of the lease. Court agree with the reasoning of the court and will affirm the judgment.

Defendant James F., the natural father of Kaitlynn F. and Alexander F. (jointly, the children), appeals from a judgment under Probate Code[1]section 1516.5 terminating his parental rights. Section 1516.5 allows the termination of parental rights in a guardianship proceeding if the parent does not have legal custody of the children, the children have been in the physical custody of the guardian for at least two years, and the court finds the children would benefit from being adopted by the guardian. James contends section 1516.5 is unconstitutional on its face, in violation of substantive due process principles, because it permits the termination of parental rights without a showing of current parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. Court disagree and therefore will affirm the judgment.

Defendants, cross-complainants and respondents Lee S. Monroe and Barbara Monroe as Trustees of the Monroe Family Trust dated 10/4/99 (the Monroes) own a house in the Point Loma section of San Diego. Their property and the property of two neighbors is burdened by an easement allowing access to the houses of plaintiffs, cross-defendants and appellants Kathryn Maas Crippen as Trustee of the Kathryn Crippen Trust dated 1/15/92, Frank V. Arrington and Linnea Arrington as Trustees Under Declaration of Trust dated 1/12/88, Donald A. Spanninga and Peggy J. Spanninga as Trustees of the Spanninga Family Trust dated 10/7/98, and Brian Arrington and Colby M. Arrington as Co-Trustees Under Declaration of Trust dated 9/19/2000 (together, Plaintiffs). As recorded on August 22, 1938, the grant of easement was 30 feet wide, 15 feet on the Monroes' property and 15 feet on their westerly neighbors' property. However, for much, if not all, of its history, the roadway over the easement was approximately 12 feet to 15 feet wide, and travel in both directions at the same time was not possible. The judgment is reversed. For the reasons stated in this opinion, Court conclude the intent of the original grantor and grantees was for the improvement and use within the 30 foot wide easement of a 20 foot wide roadway, located equally on each side of the easement centerline. Court therefore do not decide any other issue or issues between the

In this breach of contract case, New Hampshire Indemnity Co., doing business as AIG Specialty Auto (AIG), appeals a summary judgment for Professional Claim Services, Inc. (PCS), an independent company that administered third party claims against AIG's insureds. AIG contends the court erred by finding (1) an indemnity clause in the parties' contracts that required PCS to hold AIG harmless from "claims" does not apply to claims made against its insureds, and (2) its damages for PCS's alleged negligence in failing to promptly investigate and settle claims within policy limits and exposing AIG to potential bad faith liability are speculative, in that they consist of the amounts of voluntary settlements AIG made in excess of policy limits. Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs and appellants Christine Aranda, Ed.D., and Alice De La Torre (together, appellants) appeal the trial court's denial of their writ of mandate brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (a). The trial court reviewed the administrative record and independently concluded the weight of evidence supported the finding of defendant and respondent Teachers' Retirement Board of the State of California (Board) that a retroactive salary increase of 14.84 percent, paid by the San Ysidro School District (SYSD) only to appellants just weeks before they each retired, was for the principal purpose of enhancing their retirement benefits under the Defined Benefits Program (DB Program). Relying on Education Code[1]section 22119.2, subdivision (a), the court affirmed the Board's decision to exclude appellants' increased salaries in calculating their retirement benefits under the California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS).We independently conclude the Board erred in applying the outdated version of section 22119.2 to appellants, but, like the trial court, we further conclude that error was harmless. We also conclude substantial evidence supports the finding that appellants' salary increases were for the principal purpose of enhancing their retirement benefits, a practice known as "spiking." Court thus affirm the judgment.

Petitioner N.O. (father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile courts order denying him reunification services as to his child, M. (the child) and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. He argues that the court erred in denying him reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), since he has made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the childs sibling. Court deny the writ petition.