CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Lenore Weinstein appeals from the denial of her motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to vacate the dismissal of her premises liability complaint. The trial court denied the motion because Weinsteins motion, although accompanied by her attorneys declaration of fault, addressed only one of the two grounds upon which the dismissal was based. Court affirm the order denying the motion.

After plaintiff and appellant Stephen Harris failed to comply with trial court orders to respond to discovery requests made by defendants and respondents City of Culver City (the city) and Walton Auto Wrecking & Towing (Walton), the trial court dismissed the action. Harris appeals from the order of dismissal. Court affirm.

This appeal arises from a civil action in which one of the parties attempted to introduce a claim for quiet title by way of a cross-complaint. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal on the ground that the quiet title claim belonged (if anywhere) in family law court because the property at issue was a marital residence which was then a subject in a pending divorce action. Court affirm.

Curtis Brown appeals from the trial courts order denying his petition for leave to file a late claim against public entity. (Gov. Code, 946.6.)[1] The trial court denied the petition because it found that appellants failure to file a timely tort claim with the County of Ventura (County) was not excused by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. ( 946.6, subd. (c)(1).) Court affirm.

Father R. D. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights as to his sons R. D. and P. F., claiming the court erred in finding that the boys were adoptable. The boys maternal grandmother, G. R., appeals from the order denying her petition for modification. Court find no error and affirm the orders. Grandmother also purports to appeal from a later order denying her petition for disclosure of the record. Court dismiss grandmothers appeal from that order for lack of jurisdiction.

Robert Edward Standard appeals the judgment entered following conviction by jury of first degree burglary, receiving stolen property and driving a vehicle without the owners consent. (Pen. Code, 459, 496d, subd. (a); Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a).)[1] Standard admitted a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and admitted two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Standard to a term of 16 years and 4 months in state prison. Standard contends the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of first degree burglary. Court agree and order the burglary conviction reduced to second degree burglary and remand the matter for resentencing. Based on this resolution, we need not reach Standards further claim the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of an inhabited dwelling.

Appellant K.A. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights as to the minor P.M. and appellant T.M. (Father) appeals from the order terminating his parental rights as to the minor K.M. Under In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, Court dismiss the appeals.

Miguel Angel Pinzon appeals from the judgment entered following his no contest plea to one count of committing oral copulation with a person under the age of 16 years, contending that, by reviving his time-barred prosecution, Penal Code section 803, subdivision (f), violates federal and state constitutional guarantees against ex post facto laws. Court affirm.

On December 6, 2007, Sheriff Antonio Guillen and his partner received several calls of numerous people hanging around the area [of 7933 Morton Avenue], using and selling drugs. When the officers got on the street, Sheriff Guillen saw several males hanging around a Honda. As the officers approached the area, the males around the Honda tried to disassociate themselves from the vehicle by walking away. When the officers got closer to the Honda, Deputy Guillen observed two other individuals inside the vehicle, both of who began to slide down in their seats as to try to hide. Based on the activity he had witnessed, and his knowledge that there had been arrests in area for narcotics, vehicle thefts, and gang crimes, Sheriff Guillen and his partner contacted the two people in the Honda, one of who was E.J. Sheriff Guillens partner engaged in a small conversation [with E.J.] . . . like whose car [is this], who lives here, and then asked E.J. if he had anything illegal. E.J. answered that he had a little bit of weed. Deputy Guillens partner then searched E.J. in Deputy Guillens presence, and the officers recovered a plastic bag containing marijuana from E.J.s right front pants pocket, along with $104. The judgment is affirmed.

Jason Hilton appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court granted Hilton probation for a period of three years. Court affirm.

Defendant Saul Gurrola Luna appeals from the trial courts denial of his motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5, subdivision (b). He contends that he was not informed his guilty plea would cause him to be excluded from the United States, thus the advisement did not comply with the requirements of section 1016.5, subdivision (a). Court conclude the advisement substantially complied with the statute and affirm the trial courts order.

Kimberly C. (mother) appeals from the juvenile courts order finding jurisdiction over two of her daughters under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). She contends there was insufficient evidence that her daughters were at substantial risk of physical harm. Court find no basis for jurisdiction and reverse.

A jury convicted defendant Jerry Wayne Perryman of lewd acts with a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a);[1]count one), attempted lewd acts with a child under age 14 ( 288, subd. (a), 664; count two), failure to register as a sex offender (former 290, subd. (g)(2) [now 290.018, subd. (b)]; count three), and failure to provide notice of a change of location (ibid.; count four). The jury found he had suffered a 1982 robbery conviction and two 1990 lewd acts convictions. He was sentenced to state prison for a determinate term of 10 years plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 150 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance during trial, thereby violating his federal due process and fair trial rights. Court shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Juan Peyton Menendez was found guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a))[1]and assault with a firearm. ( 245, subd. (a)(2).) With respect to the murder count, the jury found true the special circumstance that defendant intentionally committed the murder while lying in wait within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15) and the enhancement allegation that defendant had intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). With respect to the assault count, the jury found true the enhancement allegation that defendant had personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). In the sanity phase of defendants trial, the jury found defendant was legally sane when he committed each offense.
Court affirm the judgment.