CA Unpub Decisions

Jose Ramos Ibarra appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of guilty to the sale or transportation of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)). The trial court granted Ibarra three years probation on the condition he serve 180 days in county jail. Court affirm the judgment.

On January 12, 2007, Tellez received advice of and waived his constitutional rights, and pleaded nolo contendere to the making of criminal threats. (Pen. Code, 422.) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Tellez five years of formal probation, with terms and conditions that included treatment in a residential rehabilitation program. The judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner T.B. seeks extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating reunification services with her daughter, Mary S., and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Court deny the petition.

S.B., also known as S.S., mother of nine year old Destiny C., and seven year old Dominique C. appeals from the disposition order of the juvenile court. She contends that the court erred by not ensuring proper notification pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 224 et seq.). Court hold, based on the procedural posture of this case, that the ICWA notice requirements have not been triggered. Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Daryl Bowen appeals from the judgment following a no contest plea to dissuading a witness by force or threat (Pen. Code, 136.1, subd. (c)(1)).[1] Pursuant to the negotiated plea, the trial court dismissed two counts of felon in possession of firearm ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5) and one count of possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359) which included prior drug convictions (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (a)) and prior prison term enhancements ( 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant was sentenced to an agreed upon term of four years state prison. Court have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441; People v. Kelly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 125-126.) The judgment is affirmed.

Mother, M.R., contends that the court erred in terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.[1] She contends that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile courts findings that reasonable reunification services had been offered, and that returning the children to the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. Mother also contends that the court abused its discretion in rejecting her claim that her unique circumstances and special needs justified extending reunification services beyond 18 months. Court conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts findings, and that the court did not abuse its discretion. Court therefore affirm the order.

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the department), J.H. and F.H., de facto parents, appeal from a juvenile courts orders and findings of July 21, 2008, granting the Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 388 modification petitions filed by the five childrens attorney. The department argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by: giving the relatives preferential consideration for placement; ordering the removal of the children from their de facto prospective adoptive parents and placement with paternal relatives; and, determining that placement with the paternal relatives would be in all of the childrens best interest. Appointed appellate counsel for the youngest child, I.C., who is two years, five months, joins in the departments position. Court reverse the order granting the modification petition only as to I.C.

Plaintiffs Alyssa Strong (Strong) and Scott Carmack (Carmack) appeal from an order of the trial court quashing service of the summons and complaint on over 40 subsidiaries of defendant JCM Partners, LLC (JCM). The court concluded the subsidiaries were not properly substituted into the action as fictitious defendants. Court agree and affirm the order.

Convicted of sexual offenses against his grandson and granddaughter, defendant appeals, claiming, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for crimes against his grandson, the jury was improperly instructed, and his sentence on one misdemeanor conviction must be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Convicted of sexual offenses against his grandson and granddaughter, defendant appeals, claiming, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for crimes against his grandson, the jury was improperly instructed, and his sentence on one misdemeanor conviction must be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.

Defendant Larry Robinson was convicted by a jury of one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1))[1]and one count of making criminal threats ( 422). He was sentenced as a three strikes felon to two concurrent state prison terms of 25 years to life, with the possibility of parole, plus a determinate 15-year term on prior felony enhancements. Eschewing any semblance of discretion in choosing his arguments, defendant inundates us with a plethora of claims ranging from the plausible to the ridiculous, including evidentiary and instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing errors. Court shall reverse two of the trial courts strike findings and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a negotiated settlement, defendant Robert Stanley Parnell, Jr., pled guilty to one count of infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)). He was placed on felony probation for five years, conditioned upon, inter alia, service of 120 days in the county jail. Fines of $200 were imposed in accordance with Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1202.44.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. In July 2002, defendant Charles Glen Carver rented a house from Heesook B.[1] Heesook B.s Citibank credit card statement continued to be mailed to the house, and in August 2002, she received a credit card statement reflecting charges she did not make, including a $1,500 charge to Pacific Bell. According to Pacific Bell, defendant had charged $1,500 to Heesook B.s credit card to advertise his business, House of Iron, in the telephone book and used the rental address as his business address. The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend section 7 of the abstract of judgment to reflect that defendant was ordered to pay Elsie H. $1,450 and to forward a copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Deputies from the Butte County Sheriffs Department were summoned to the home of a juvenile, Chris T., after the juveniles father found him in possession of stolen property. Chris eventually told deputies he obtained the stolen property from defendant, David Allen Homan, Jr., after defendant told Chris he acquired the property from a house he had burglarized. Deputies contacted the victim, who confirmed the property in Chriss possession was indeed the property that had been stolen from the victim.
The judgment is affirmed.

Allegretti & Company (Allegretti) appeals from an order dismissing its first amended verified petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel respondents Jurg Heuberger in his capacity as Director of the County of Imperial Planning Department, the County of Imperial, and Board of Supervisors members Victor M. Carrillo, Hank Kuiper, Joe Maruca, Gary Wyatt and Wally Leimgruber (collectively County) to issue a conditional use permit to reactivate a water well. The trial court had sustained County's demurrer without leave to amend on grounds Allegretti's petition was barred by the 90-day statute of limitations prescribed by Government Code section 65009[1]and alternatively the petition could not state a claim in traditional mandamus to compel issuance of the permit. Allegretti contends the court erred by sustaining County's demurrer because its petition was governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, not Government Code section 65009; that even if section 65009 applied its petition was timely; and County's failure to include the statutory language in section 65009 as to the content of public notice prevents it from relying on that section. Allegretti further contends it pleaded all of the necessary elements to support issuance of a traditional writ. Because we agree Allegretti's petition was not timely served within the 90 day statute of limitations, Court affirm the dismissal order.