CA Unpub Decisions

Amber L. appeals the findings and orders entered at the permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error. In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) Court therefore deny her requests to review the record for error and to address her Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)

P.G. appeals denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error. P.G .'s counsel also requests leave for her to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied. The appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff Richard Wurtele filed suit against defendants Michael and Janet Castaos. Defense counsel retained orthopedic surgeon Raymond Vance to perform an independent medical examination on plaintiff and serve as an expert. Plaintiff noticed Dr. Vance's deposition and requested documents including the doctor's medical office appointment book. Dr. Vance was deposed on September 10, 2008, but refused to produce his appointment book on grounds that production would violate his right to privacy and the right to privacy of patients not involved in the litigation. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its December 12, 2008 order granting the motion to compel, and reconsider the motion once it has been properly noticed and served on the doctor. Dr. Vance is entitled to costs in the writ proceeding. This opinion is made final immediately as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(3).) The stay issued December 30, 2008, is VACATED.

A jury found defendant guilty of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459)[1](count 1) and petty theft with a prior conviction (666) (count 2). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of two years in state prison with credit for time served. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard in its predeliberation charge to the jury; and (2) the matter must be remanded for resentencing, as the court failed to properly pronounce judgment. We find no instructional error, but even assuming there was error, we find it harmless. Court agree, however, that the matter must be remanded for resentencing.

On July 5, 2007, the District Attorney of San Bernardino County filed a felony complaint which charged defendant, Miguel Angel Fierro, with one count of possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (Pen. Code, 12316, subd. (b)(1),[1](count one)), and in count two with possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). On July 11, 2007, pursuant to section 859a, defendant, represented by counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to both counts. The negotiated disposition also included defendants admission to a violation of probation in case No. FVI023301. The disposition included credit for time served in the InRoads program and it was ordered to run concurrent with the sentence in the probation violation. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted appellant, Anthony Keith Horn, of transportation of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)), possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11350 subd. (a)), misdemeanor evading a police officer (Veh. Code, 2800.1, subd. (a)), misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, 11364), misdemeanor driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, 14601.1, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor driving without a valid drivers license (Veh. Code, 12500, subd. (a)). In a separate proceeding, Horn admitted allegations that he had two prior convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law. On February 21, 2008, the court sentenced Horn to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. On appeal, Horn contends the court erred in admitting certain evidence. Court will affirm.

California's Aircraft Repair Lien Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 9790 et seq.) regulates repairs and services provided to owners of noncommercial aircraft. Pertinent to this appeal are provisions of the law which create a lien in favor of a repairperson on the repaired aircraft. Section 9795 provides in part: "All work done by a repairperson, including all warranty work, shall be recorded on an invoice and shall describe all work done and parts supplied. [] ... [] One copy of the invoice shall be given to the customer and one copy shall be retained by the repairperson." (Bus. & Prof. Code, 9795.)[1] Section 9798.1, subdivision (a) provides for the creation of the lien and states that the lien "shall be in an amount equal to the agreed upon value of the labor and material furnished, or in the absence of any agreement, for the reasonable value thereof." ( 9798.1, subd. (a).) Subdivision (h) of this same statute provides that "[t]he statutory lien created pursuant to subdivision (a) shall not exist unless the repairperson has complied with all provisions of Sections 9793, 9794, 9795, ... and 9798." ( 9798.1, subd. (h).) In the case before us, the trial court refused to issue an order allowing the repairperson to sell the repaired aircraft at auction to satisfy the repairperson's purported lien on the aircraft. The court ruled that because there was no "invoice" which "describe[d] all work done and parts supplied" ( 9795), the repairperson had not complied with the provisions of section 9795 requiring the providing of such an invoice, and thus under subdivision (h) of section 9798.1 the statutory lien did "not exist." ( 9798, subd. (h).) DISPOSITION: The superior court's November 15, 2007 order denying relief and its February 7, 2008 order denying Flight Test's motion to vacate judgment, motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed.

Appellant Ronald Lee Allen pleaded no contest to unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, admitted a prior strike conviction and a prior prison term enhancement, and received a second strike term of seven years. He has filed an appellate brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. He also filed a letter brief and asked this court to review the trial courts denial of his motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). Court affirm.

Appellant N.R.'s son was taken into protective custody because she left the child with a relative who was using cocaine. Appellant had already lost custody of several older children because of her own cocaine addiction. The juvenile court denied reunification services and terminated parental rights. On appeal, appellant contends the court's finding that the child was adoptable is not supported by substantial evidence because of the possibility the child could be HIV positive. Appellant also contends the court should have found that termination of parental rights would be detrimental because there was evidence of a strong parent-child bond. Court affirm.

C.C. appeals from orders terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to his son C. Appellant contends the courts finding that his son is adoptable was not supported by substantial evidence. Court disagree and will affirm.

Defendant Trevor Anthony Johnson was convicted of forcible rape (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)). The jury found true a one strike allegation that the rape was committed during a burglary with the intent to commit rape. (Pen. Code, 667.61, subd. (a),(c), (d).) The court found true a one strike allegation that defendant had a prior rape conviction and that he had two strikes under the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (d), (e)). The court sentenced him to 75 years to life. He challenges admission of testimony of a police officer who interviewed the victim and an expert who based her opinion on what the victim said to an intake nurse, claiming they were or relied on inadmissible hearsay statements and violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Court find no error and affirm.

Arturo Bernabe Benitez was convicted of carjacking (Pen. Code, 215 subd. (a)),[1] evading police (Veh. Code, 2800.2), assault on a peace officer ( 245, subd. (c)), and receiving a stolen vehicle with a prior felony conviction for the same offense ( 666.5, subd. (a), 496d, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to a total term of seven years in prison. Benitez filed a timely notice of appeal. He asserts the court committed prejudicial error by failing to properly respond to the jurys question regarding the meaning of the word force as used in the carjacking instructions. Finding no error, Court affirm the judgment.

Fisher Investments, Inc., and Kenneth Fisher (collectively and singular Fisher Investments, unless the context indicates otherwise) appeal from orders denying their motion to compel arbitration and their special motion to strike a complaint filed by Thomas Casper.[1] Fisher Investments argues the trial court erroneously denied the motion to compel arbitration because it did not waive its right to arbitrate. It also contends the court erroneously denied its special motion to strike because the challenged causes of action arise from protected activity, Casper did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on those causes of action, and the challenged statements are protected by the litigation privilege. As we explain below, we conclude the court properly denied Fisher Investments motion to compel arbitration, and the court properly denied the special motion to strike one of the causes of action, but erroneously denied the motion as to other causes of action.
We affirm the trial courts order denying Fisher Investments motion to compel arbitration. Court affirm that part of the courts order denying Fisher Investments special motion to strike Caspers second cause of action, and reverse that part of the courts order denying the special motion to strike the first, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against the client, but advised the court no issues were found to argue on defendants behalf, and requests this court independently review the entire record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, counsel discussed possible claims appearing in the record.Defendant was given 30 days to file written argument in defendants own behalf. That period has passed, and Court have received no communication from defendant. Court affirm.