CA Unpub Decisions

In April 2007, defendant Kelly Charles Jeffers grabbed his girlfriend, Jenney ONeal (Jenney), by the throat and pulled their infant son from her arms. After recovering possession of the child, Jenney took him to the bedroom and sat down on the bed. Defendant followed, grabbing Jenney by the hair and pulling her to the floor. Defendant held her on the ground and threatened that she would never see her son again. He was arrested and charged with misdemeanor battery. Jenney bailed him out of jail after he promised to never hurt her again. However, when defendant returned home, he threatened to kill her. The threat prompted Jenney to move out. Defendant was ultimately convicted of misdemeanor battery and placed on probation with conditions including a restraining order prohibiting him from contacting Jenney. Defendant appeals, having obtained a certificate of probable cause ( 1237.5). He contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his no contest pleas. Court disagree and shall affirm the judgment.

In June 2006 the San Diego County District Attorney charged Eli Jordan Anderson with felony hit and run resulting in death, under Vehicle Code[1]section 20001, subdivisions (a) and (b)(2). In the first trial in October 2006 the jury was unable to reach a verdict, voting seven-to-five in favor of acquitting Anderson, and the court declared a mistrial. In December 2006 a second trial commenced and the jury found Anderson guilty.
On appeal, Anderson asserts the court committed prejudicial error by (1) excluding evidence the victim was suicidal and expert testimony on "fight or flight" syndrome, which the court had allowed him to present in the first trial; (2) refusing his proposed instructions on constructive knowledge; (3) failing to sua sponte give a unanimity instruction; (4) instructing the jury under CALCRIM No. 2140; (5) refusing to allow him reopen his case following closing arguments; and (6) ordering restitution as a condition of probation. Court affirm.

Joseph T. appeals an order declaring his minor son, Nicholas T., a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (e). Joseph challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's findings denying visitation with Nicholas.

Allen H. appeals the findings and orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) Court therefore deny his requests to review the record for error and to address his Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
The appeal is dismissed.

Patricia V. appeals following the six-month review hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21 at which the juvenile court made custody and visitation orders and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny her requests to review the record for error and to address her Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.) Patricia V.'s counsel also requests leave for her to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.

Hilda S. seeks writ review of orders terminating her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institution Code[1] section 366.26 hearing regarding her son, N.N. She contends the court erred by issuing these orders because she was participating regularly in reunification services and had made substantive progress with the provisions of her case plan. Court deny the petition.

This lawsuit arises from the failure of defendant Oscar Home Care, Inc. (defendant) to pay plaintiff G.H. Prestidge (plaintiff) commissions and other compensation as agreed under two written contracts. Under the contracts, plaintiff set up and managed a network of sales representatives who solicited orders of defendants air freshener products.
Plaintiff appeals the default judgment to the extent the trial court rejected his claim for treble damages and attorneys fees under the California Independent Wholesale Sales Representative Contractual Relations Act (Civ. Code, 1738.10 1738.16)(the Act). The trial court concluded the Act did not apply to plaintiff because he was not a wholesale sales representative. Plaintiff also objects to the trial courts rejection of his claim for recovery of commissions earned in 2006.

Defendant was convicted of several crimes arising from a home invasion robbery. On appeal, defendant contends (1) his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice was violated when the trial court refused to allow him to substitute a fourth attorney on the eve of trial; (2) his sentence to consecutive terms for all the counts of conviction violated the prohibition against dual punishment (Pen. Code, 654); and (3), the court improperly sentenced defendant to the middle term of six years, doubled, on the robbery count, where a six-year term which may only be imposed where the robbery was committed in concert with two or more other persons. (Pen. Code, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
The People agree that the sentence for the false imprisonment count should have been stayed, and concede that the court erroneously imposed the term for robbery in concert where the current offense did not involve two or more other persons. Court agree that one of the consecutive sentences resulted in dual punishment, although Court are of the opinion that the criminal threats count should have been stayed, not the false imprisonment count. Court also agree that the sentence for count 1 must be modified, but otherwise Court affirm.

A jury found defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine, a controlled stubstance, (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)) (count 1) and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)) (count 2). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant had previously sustained three prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).[1] After the court denied defendants motion to strike one or more of his prior strike convictions, defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life on count 1 and a concurrent 25 years to life on count 2. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike one or more of his prior strike convictions. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant seriously injured his three-year-old daughter. A jury convicted defendant of child abuse, including a finding that defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury on a child under five years of age. ( 273a, subd. (a); 1192.7, subd. (c); and 12022.7, subd. (d).) The court found defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction and had not remained free of prison custody for five years. ( 667, subds. (a), (b), & (e); 667.5, subd. (b); and 1170.12, subd. (c).) The court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 19 years.
Court reject defendants claims of error and affirm the judgment.

Following a court trial, defendant was found guilty of cultivating marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 11358), and possession of marijuana. ( 11357.) In reaching its decision, the trial court rejected the theory that defendant was authorized to possess more than six mature plants under the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), and the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP). ( 11362.5, 11362.7, et seq.) On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in finding he cultivated more than six mature plants ( 11362.77); (2) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine defendants treating physician as to the diagnostic methods used; (3) the trial court erred in ignoring evidence that defendants doctor recommended more than the baseline allowance of marijuana plants; (4) the court erred in ignoring defendants statutory immunity from criminal liability; and (5) the trial courts reasoning in finding defendant guilty was based on its erroneous conclusion that defendant was required to prove a medical need for the amount of marijuana possessed. Court affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights (Welf. & Inst.[1]Code, 366.26) respecting her now five year old son, Z.P. She contends that the juvenile court of Kern County, where jurisdiction was originally established, erred in finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA, or the Act) did not apply, without complying with the notice provisions of the Act. She also has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to present additional evidence of mothers Indian heritage. Court agree that the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not apply without any investigation by the social services agency, so Court do not need to consider evidence outside the record. Court reverse and remand with directions solely to ensure compliance with ICWA.

Appellant F.L. is the biological father of dependent child, Baby Boy M., whom the Kern County Superior Court has freed for adoption (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26).[1] In his appeal from the order terminating his parental rights, appellant challenges the constitutionality of section 293, which sets forth the notice requirements for a juvenile dependency status review hearing. In pertinent part, the section requires notice to [t]he presumed father or any father receiving services. ( 293, subd. (a)(2).) At the time of the status review hearing in F.L.s dependency, appellant was considered the childs alleged father and he was not receiving services. Appellant contends section 293 unconstitutionally deprived him, as an alleged father, notice of the status review hearing as well as his right to counsel and the opportunity to be heard. On review, Court affirm.

Sensient Technologies Corporation (Sensient) petitions for a writ of review contending the Workers Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) erred by applying the wrong permanent disability rating schedule, by awarding temporary disability during a period when the employee had retired, and by awarding reimbursement to the Employment Development Department (EDD). (Lab. Code, 5950, 5952; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.494.) Court deny the petition and remand the matter to the WCAB to award supplemental attorney fees. ( 5801.)