CA Unpub Decisions

Ma.G. (mother) appeals an order terminating her parental rights as to her three children. Court reject her claims of error and affirm the order.

At petitioner Anthony L. Tarkingtons 1998 trial for murder, DNA evidence was introduced. A jury convicted him of second degree murder. In 2004, about six years after his conviction, Tarkington asked to have counsel appointed to prepare a motion for further DNA testing, under Penal Code section 1405. Counsel was appointed for Tarkington, and he filed a declaration concerning further DNA testing. Based on that declaration, the motion was denied. Then, in 2008, Tarkington filed renewed requests for appointment of counsel and for DNA testing under section 1405, which the trial court denied. He therefore filed this petition. Court issued an order to show cause. Court now discharge the order to show cause and deny the petition.

On October 12, 2007, defendant Joshua Lee Buck was caring for his five-month-old son, Izaya. The baby was crying and fussing. Defendant got frustrated and tried to throw Izaya onto a pile of clothing, four feet away. He missed. Izaya hit his head on the bottom of the dresser. Izaya died the next day of blunt force trauma injuries to the head. The judgment is affirmed.

This case pertains to California's home solicitation contract law (Civ. Code, 1689.5 et seq.), which Aladdin violated by not including in its contracts for emergency and restoration services notice of the buyers' rights of cancellation. Brian and Lynn Chichi appeal a judgment in which the court decertified its initial class certification on their cross-complaint's cause of action for violation of California's unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200), and dismissed the matter, as the Chichis suffered no loss of money or property in conjunction with Aladdin's violation of the law and thus lack standing to prosecute a UCL claim on behalf of themselves or others. Aladdin also appeals the judgment, contending the court improperly denied it contractual attorney fees on the cross complaint. Court affirm the judgment in all respects.

Rico Flowers appeals from a judgment convicting him of murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, with true findings on enhancements for discharging a firearm causing death and committing a felony for the benefit of a gang. He contends his due process rights were violated because the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of gang activity when evaluating witness credibility. Court reject his argument and affirm.

Leutenant House pleaded guilty to one count of forcible rape (Pen. Code,[1] 261, subd. (a)(2)), two counts of lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 ( 288, subd. (a)) and one count of incest ( 285). House also admitted the applicability of a sentencing enhancement that denies the possibility of a suspended sentence or probation to a person who violates section 288 and in so doing "has substantial sexual conduct with a victim who is under 14 years of age." ( 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).). Court find these contentions to be without merit and affirm.

In this case the plaintiff had a security interest in both the intangible and tangible assets of a bar which was no longer operating and in fact had been padlocked by the landlord. Without the plaintiff's consent, the owner of the defunct bar agreed to transfer his right to operate the bar to the defendants. As consideration for the transfer, the defendants paid, on behalf of the owner, $30,000 in delinquent sales taxes and unpaid rent. In the absence of those payments, regulatory authorities and the landlord would not permit the bar to reopen. The defendants made the required payments, made improvements to the bar, reopened it and began operating it. After the defendants successfully operated the bar for a number of months, they finally closed an escrow on their purchase of the bar. Because the bar had no compensable goodwill at the time the defendants began operating it, the plaintiff could not establish that her security interest in the bar had any greater value than the value of the bar's tangible assets. Nonetheless, the trial court awarded plaintiff $120,000 on her conversion claim against the defendant purchasers of the bar. That amount far exceeded the value of the bar's tangible assets, which in any event the defendants contend they did not convert. Thus we must reverse the judgment with instructions to the trial court that it determine whether the tangible assets were converted and, if they were converted, their value.

In 1993, Floyd Lee Wiedrich entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to robbery and was committed to a state hospital for about eight years before being released. After his conditional release was revoked, the People petitioned for and obtained an order extending his involuntary commitment to the Department of Mental Health (DMH) under Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b).[1] On appeal from that order, Wiedrich contends the trial court prejudicially erred by allocating to him the burden of proving that he was not dangerous while on medication and that he would continue to take his medication in an unsupervised environment. Court disagree and affirm the recommitment order.

D. R. was adjudged a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, based on findings he made a criminal threat within the meaning of Penal Code section 422,[1] stalked a person within the meaning of section 646.9 and threw an object at a vehicle within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 23110, subdivision (a). All findings were treated as misdemeanors, a commitment to the Short Term Offender Program was stayed, D. R. was granted probation and placed in his mother's custody. He appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the true finding on the criminal threat and stalking allegations. He also contends a probation condition prohibiting association with certain individuals and the wearing of particular items was vague and over broad.

A jury convicted Reggie Ray Williams of forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code,[1] 288a, subd. (c)(2)), false imprisonment by violence or menace ( 236, 237, subd. (a)), resisting a peace officer ( 148, subd. (a)(1)), battery ( 242), violating a protective order ( 273.6, subd. (a)), and two counts of inflicting injury on a cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition ( 273.5, subd. (a)). In a subsequent proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that Williams was on bail when he committed certain of the offenses ( 12022.1, subd. (b)), that he previously had been convicted of inflicting injury on a cohabitant ( 273.5, subd. (e)(1)), and that he previously had been convicted of a serious felony ( 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7) and a strike offense ( 667, subds. (b)‑(i), 1170.12, 668). The trial court sentenced Williams to 11 years four months in state prison. Williams appeals. He argues that his convictions must be reversed because the trial court: (i) violated his right to a fair trial by admitting a prosecution witness's testimony after she had been placed in custody pending trial; and (ii) violated his Fifth Amendment rights by admitting Williams's audiotaped statement to police even though Williams was intoxicated when he made the statement. Williams also argues that his conviction for resisting a peace officer must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence. As discussed below, Court find Williams's contentions to be without merit and affirm.

Plaintiff Auf Mustafa appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendant Anderson Appraisal Services, Inc. (Anderson) on Mustafa's law suit alleging that Anderson issued a false or misleading real estate appraisal report on certain property, inducing him to purchase the property and suffer damages when it was later placed in foreclosure. Mustafa contends he raised triable issues of material fact as to his causes of action for fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy. We conclude Anderson has not established it is entitled to summary adjudication of Mustafa's causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation and conspiracy. We uphold summary adjudication of Mustafa's remaining causes of action. Court reverse the judgment with directions set forth below.

In December 2004, automobile dealer Steve Lyman purchased a Mercedes-Benz SL 65 (the Mercedes) manufactured by defendant Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC (Mercedes-Benz). In December 2006, Lyman filed a complaint against Mercedes-Benz and others in which he alleged that the Mercedes suffered from "continuing nonconformities." One of the causes of action in Lyman's complaint was a claim pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song Beverly Act) (Civ. Code, 1790 et seq.),[1]in which he sought either a refund or replacement of the Mercedes. On appeal, Lyman claims that the trial court violated his right to due process by the manner in which the court determined whether the Mercedes constituted a "new motor vehicle" as defined in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2). Lyman also claims that the court erred in concluding that the Mercedes did not constitute a "new motor vehicle" as defined in the statute. ( 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).) Court affirm the judgment.

The parties were married in April 1989 and separated in May 1999. During the marriage, Luntz, an engineer, earned about $86,000 annually. DeBoer, an elementary school teacher with a master's degree, earned about $48,000 annually. In 1996 DeBoer stopped working as a teacher after injuring her back in an automobile accident. In 1999 and 2001 she underwent back surgery, but continued to experience ongoing back problems. The order is affirmed.

Phil Carter, Jr. appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrers filed by James P. Baldwin; XR Promotions, LLC (also doing business as Championship Off Road Racing, Inc.); Otay Ranch Three, LLC; Carl Renezeder; Rimrock Construction, Inc.; Rimrock CA, LLC; and Lucas Oil Products, Inc. Court conclude that the trial court properly sustained the demurrers and that it did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.