CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and appellant Teresa Cortez appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent the City of Huntington Park (City). Appellant sued the City for damages after she tripped on a sidewalk. The trial court ruled that summary judgment was warranted on the grounds that the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law and that the City lacked notice of any defect. Court affirm. The undisputed evidence showed that the one half to three fourths inch height differential in the sidewalk was a trivial defect and, alternatively, that the City lacked notice of any defect.

Defendant and appellant Felix Ramirez Ruiz (defendant) pleaded guilty to three counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211[1]) and one count of child abuse ( 273a, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the robberies ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)); that he suffered a prior felony conviction alleged to be a serious felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and section 667, subdivision (a); and that he suffered four prior convictions for which he allegedly served separate prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of 21 years, eight months as follows: a term of 10 years for one of defendants robbery convictions the upper term of five years doubled to 10 years under the Three Strikes law (the trial court imposed concurrent terms for defendants two additional robbery convictions); a consecutive term of two years, eight months for defendants child abuse conviction (one-third of the middle term of four years doubled under the Three Strikes law); a consecutive one-year term for defendants personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)); a consecutive term of five years for defendants prior serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a)(1); and three consecutive terms of one year for three of defendants four prior convictions and prison terms under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court stayed imposition of the one year term for defendants fourth prior qualifying conviction under section 667.5, subdivision (b) because that same conviction served as the basis for the five year term under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Court remand for resentencing.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant defendant David Ross (defendant) of one count of selling cocaine base. (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a).) On appeal, defendant asks this court to review whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order disclosure of all relevant peace officer personnel records pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). Court have reviewed the relevant records and found no abuse of discretion. Court therefore affirm.

Danmar Retirement Villa, Inc. (Danmar) appeals from the trial courts denial of its motion to compel arbitration of a personal injury lawsuit brought against it by James L. Tolbert (James), by and through his guardian ad litem, Marie R. Tolbert (Marie). The trial court found that Danmar failed to produce any evidence that Marie had authority to enter into an agreement binding her husband to arbitration. Court agree and affirm.

Latoria C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Mariah C. Mother suffers from schizophrenia and bipolar disorder and has anger management problems, along with mental retardation. She contends the dependency court erred in failing to appoint, sua sponte, a guardian ad litem for her. Court affirm.

Defendant Emilio Carrillo entered a plea of guilty to a violation of Penal Code section 653w, subdivision (a), which prohibits the failure to disclose the origin of a recording or audiovisual work. Carrillo was placed on probation for a period of three years, with conditions requiring him to report to the probation officer, pay fines and fees, and complete 90 days of work at the tree farm. Carrillo has not filed a brief with this court. We have independently reviewed the record and find no arguable appellate issues. The judgment is affirmed. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259.)

Appellant T.A. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights as to the minor S.C. Under In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, Court dismiss the appeal.

Scott Loeliger (Father) and Sadiya Loeliger Alilire (Mother) dissolved their marriage in 1992.[1] The ensuing years witnessed on-going disputes over custody, visitation and therapy for the parties daughter, F. L., now 18 years old. (Loeliger I, pp. 2-6.) In what Court hope is the last chapter in this unhappy tale, Father appeals from the April 2007 judgment (order) awarding Mother $31,000 in attorney fees and $500 in costs. Court shall affirm the judgment (order).

Plaintiff Sacramento Housing & Redevelopment Agency (SHRA) entered into an agreement with the Meadowview Community Action (MCA) that provided $100,000 in federal Community Development Block Grant funds for the purchase of real property on which MCA promised to build a public service facility to serve low-income residents of the Meadowview neighborhood of Sacramento, including the provision of Headstart services. Court will reverse the judgment of dismissal as to five of the six causes of action and remand the matter to give SHRA the opportunity to amend its complaint.

Defendant Teng Yang appeals from his resentencing pursuant to People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 (Sandoval). He contends the trial court improperly used the same facts to impose the upper term on both an offense and an enhancement. Acknowledging that this contention was not raised in the trial court, he claims ineffective assistance of counsel. Court shall conclude the contention is forfeited and lacks merit in any event. Therefore, Court affirm.

In this marital dissolution action involving the marriage of Debra and Jeffrey Stauffer, Jeffrey[1]appeals from two 2007 child support orders modifying monthly child support from $3,000 to $41,282, retroactive to May 2002, the date of a previous stipulation as to the amount of child support pending a determination of Jeffrey's income. On appeal, Jeffrey asserts the court's award was erroneous because (1) it lacked jurisdiction to make a support award retroactive to any date earlier than September 2006 when Debra filed her order to show cause (OSC) to modify support; (2) it abused its discretion in refusing to entertain Jeffrey's laches defense; (3) it failed to deduct Jeffrey's Florida business expenses from his income; (4) it placed the burden on Jeffrey to demonstrate that the high income exception to guideline child support should apply in this case; and (5) the court awarded guideline support at a time when it did not know what that amount was, and without assessing the children's needs. Court affirm.

G.D. appeals a judgment establishing a conservatorship of the person for her under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 5000 et seq.) G.D. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding she was gravely disabled within the meaning of the LPS Act. Court affirm the judgment.

By a confusing, 19-page hand-written complaint, plaintiff Roberto Chaidez, proceeding in propria persona, sued defendants and respondents (1) California Western School of Law (CWSL); (2) the State of California, by and through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the California Board of Parole Hearings (sued as and formerly the California Board of Prison Terms), the California Parole Services Agency, Santos Sanchez (collectively the State defendants); (3) the Superior Court of San Diego County (Superior Court), Commissioner Sandra L. Berry, Judge George W. Clarke, retired Judge Richard J. Hanscom (collectively the Superior Court defendants); and (4) the Judicial Council of California (the Judicial Council). This lawsuit arises from Chaidez's claim that an allegedly "fictitious 'attorney'," whom he identifies as "A. Johnson", was appointed to represent him at a pretrial hearing in a 2002 criminal proceeding identified in the complaint as case No. SCD M866047. The complaint, which did not allege any specific counts, was titled "Civil Liability Complaint for All Damages Incurred."
CWSL, the State defendants, the Superior Court defendants, and the Judicial Council separately demurred to the complaint generally and specially on various grounds. The court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed the action.

Rodney Jeffcoat appeals from a judgment convicting him of involuntary manslaughter (count 1); assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and the lesser offenses of battery and simple assault (count 2); and conspiracy to obstruct justice (count 3). He asserts (1) the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a unanimity instruction concerning the involuntary manslaughter charge; (2) the trial erred by refusing to apply Penal Code[1] section 654 to stay the sentence on his conviction for assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury; and (3) his convictions for battery and simple assault must be dismissed because they are lesser included offenses of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The Attorney General concedes, and we agree, the simple assault conviction must be dismissed as a lesser included offense of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. Further, after receiving supplemental briefing from the parties, we conclude that although battery is not a lesser included offense of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, the battery conviction must also be dismissed because Jeffcoat cannot properly be convicted of two offenses for a single count. Court reject Jeffcoat's other contentions of error. Court modify the judgment to strike the battery and simple assault convictions. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.