CA Unpub Decisions

A subsequent petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleged that defendant came under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for committing murder (Pen. Code, 187) while with a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). The juvenile court found all of the allegations in the petition true beyond reasonable doubt. Defendant appeals and contends that substantial evidence did not support the finding that he committed felony murder based on his status as an aider and abettor of attempted robbery. Defendants argument is unpersuasive and Court affirm the lower courts judgment.

Eric Christopher Daviesson admitted violating his probation. He appeals following the trial courts imposition of a previously stayed three-year prison sentence for receiving stolen property. Daviesson contends the court lost jurisdiction under Penal Code[1]section 1203.2a to impose execution of his sentence because he was not committed to prison within 60 days after the court was notified that he was confined in a state prison following his conviction for an unrelated offense. Daviesson also argues he was entitled to an award of custody credits in excess of those ordered by the trial court for time he was in prison and awaiting imposition of his three-year sentence. We conclude Daviesson failed to show that the court was notified as required by section 1203.2a that he was in prison for an unrelated offense. We also conclude there was no error in calculating his custody credits. Court affirm the judgment.

Aerospace Dynamics International, Inc. (ADI) contracted with Frize Corporation (Frize) to paint a building. Frize subcontracted the work to J. C. French. Edwin Limber Mendoza, Jr., an employee of J. C. French, sustained injuries while on the painting job and sued ADI and Frize. ADI settled with Mendoza, Jr. in his personal injury action by waiving the issue of liability and referring the damages question to a retired judge. After a trial, the referee found that Mendoza, Jr. had sustained $2.7 million in damages. ADI assigned its indemnity claim against Frize to Mendoza, Jr. and made a refundable cash payment of $350,000 to him in exchange for a covenant not to execute on any sums above that amount.

Clarence Ray Beauford appeals from the judgment following his conviction of resisting a police officer (Pen. Code, 69);[1]possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)); vandalism ( 594, subd. (a)); and three counts of making criminal threats. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his criminal threat convictions and asks this court for an independent review of the trial court's in camera hearing on his motion for discovery. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.) Court affirm.

Thomas E. Patrick filed a malicious prosecution action against Michael P. Rubin. The trial court sustained Rubins demurrer on the basis that Patrick had not shown that the underlying action resulted in a favorable termination, and denied leave to amend. Patrick appeals. Court affirm the trial courts sustaining of Rubins demurrer but reverse its denial of leave to amend.

Willie Ware appeals from his convictions on one count of possessing cocaine and one count of selling cocaine. Ware contends that (1) the prosecution impermissibly used a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror on racial grounds, and (2) the admission of evidence relating to laboratory reports (including the reports themselves) that were prepared by a criminalist who did not testify violated Wares rights under the Confrontation Clause. Court disagree with both contentions and affirm.

Plaintiff Goldic Technology, Inc. sued its business competitor, defendant Maxmile Corporation and Maxmiles president Roger Hwang (together, Maxmile) for, among other causes of action, breach of a settlement agreement. Goldic contends Maxmile violated the agreements prohibition against communications that defame, libel, slander or degrade Goldics products in a flyer containing true but unflattering statements about Goldics product. In a bifurcated trial on liability, specifically, on the meaning of the word degrade as used in the settlement agreement, the trial court rejected Goldics argument that true statements could breach the agreement and ruled for Maxmile. Goldic appeals, contending that the trial courts interpretation was erroneous and that Goldic was denied its right to a jury trial on the factual issue of whether Maxmiles statements constituted a breach of the settlement agreement. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

The jury found defendant Michael Kejuan Smith guilty of two weapons-related offensescarrying a loaded firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12031, subdivision (a)(1),[1]specially finding he was not the weapons registered owner ( 12031, subd. (a)(2)(F)), and felon in possession of a firearm ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)). In a separate trial, the jury found defendant suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction under the three strikes law ( 667, subds.(b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) for federal armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(a)-(d)) with the further finding defendant used a firearm in committing the offense (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Defendant received the upper term sentence of three years in state prison for the section 12031 offense, which was doubled under the three strikes law. The court stayed imposition of an identical concurrent sentence under section 654.
In his timely appeal, defendant contends the evidence of his federal bank robbery conviction is legally insufficient to support a finding of a serious or violent felony under California law, and the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment jury trial right by imposing the upper term for his convictions without a jury finding on the aggravating factors pursuant to Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham) and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 301 (Blakely). Court disagree and affirm.

Fredrick Aaron Merritt, also known as Fredrick Merritt, appeals from a judgment entered upon his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1))[1]upon a negotiated plea of no contest, after his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 was denied. Defendant admitted having suffered a prior felony strike within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate state prison term of three years and eight months. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the warrantless search of his home and seizure of a rifle and ammunition from his bedroom violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Court affirm.

R.E. (Father), the father of minors M.E. and R.E., appeals from the juvenile court orders sustaining a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). Because his minor children M.E. and R.E. were subject to substantial risk from Fathers domestic abuse of Mother, and because Father was in state prison at the time of the hearing for domestic abuse of another woman, Court affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

Plaintiffs Artour Hagopian, Diran Maloumian, and A.D. Truck Parking & Fuel LLC appeal from that portion of a judgment in favor of defendants Raymond Barron, Arrow Fuel Service, Inc., and the Barron Family Limited Partnership. On appeal, plaintiffs contend: 1) the terms of the parties contract were sufficiently certain to order specific performance; 2) the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony to interpret the contract; 3) Barrons contracting method was an unfair business practice; and 4) Hagopian and Maloumian were prevailing parties, because restitution of $25,000 was a net monetary recovery. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying specific performance, the admission of expert testimony did not cause any prejudice to plaintiffs, substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that Barron did not commit an unfair business practice, and Hagopian and Maloumian were not the prevailing parties.
Defendants Raymond Barron, Arrow Fuel Service, Inc., and the Barron Family Limited Partnership appeal from the portion of the judgment ordering restitution of a $25,000 deposit to plaintiffs, with interest. Court conclude there is no evidence to support the trial courts finding that defendants tender of plaintiffs deposit prior to the instant action was conditional. Therefore, the judgment must be modified to provide for replacement of the check, without prejudgment interest. As modified, Court affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant subcontractor Burns Pacific Construction, Inc. appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration award. Defendant and respondent contractor Modern Alloys, Inc. withheld payment from Burns and pursued arbitration of a billing dispute. The arbitrator found Modern was not entitled to payment from Burns. On appeal, Burns contends statutory prompt payment penalties should have been assessed against Modern under Public Contract Code section 10262.5, because Moderns reasons for withholding payment did not constitute a good faith dispute over the amount due on a progress payment. Court hold there is substantial evidence to support the arbitrators finding that Moderns claims were a good faith dispute over the amount due on a progress payment, and therefore Court affirm.

Defendant, Steve Esteves, appeals his second degree robbery conviction. (Pen. Code, 211.) Defendant argues the trial court improperly instructed the jury on admissions and failed to instruct on theft as a lesser included offense. Court affirm.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300 et seq.), C. M., the maternal grandmother of the minor child M. V. (Maternal Grandmother and M., respectively), appeals from a disposition order. Maternal Grandmother asserts the minor should be placed in long term foster care rather than adopted. She also contends her visits with the minor should not have to be monitored.