CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Jarvonne Feredell Jones of three firearms offenses and the trial court found he had served a prison term. (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1), 12025, subd. (b)(6), 12031, subd. (a)(2)(F), 667.5, subd. (b).)[1] Defendant was sentenced to prison for four years, and he timely appealed. Defendant contends the trial court should have stayed the sentences for two counts and that the abstract reflects jail fees that were not orally pronounced at sentencing. The Attorney General partly concedes the former claim. Court shall modify the sentence and otherwise affirm.

On May 30, 2008, Stephen Mendonca and his friends Robert Beck and James Nicholas returned home to the apartment Mendonca shared with his mother. Defendant Brad Lee Long, who used to date Mendoncas mother, was out in the parking lot talking with a friend in a white sport utility vehicle. Ms. Mendonca told her son that defendant had refused her request to leave the apartment complex, and she asked him to tell defendant to leave. While Nicholas was in the bathroom, Mendonca and Beck went outside to talk to defendant. Defendant was standing in the open doorway of the drivers side of the vehicle. Mendonca asked defendant to leave, but defendant refused unless Ms. Mendonca came out and asked him. As Mendonca turned, defendant kicked him in the groin. Mendonca responded by punching defendant and they ended up in a fight on the ground. Nicholas arrived and saw defendant on top of Mendonca with Beck standing by. During the fight on the ground, Mendonca realized he had been stabbed and was bleeding. He called to Beck that defendant was stabbing him and asked Beck to get defendant off.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.[1] We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 123-124.) Between August 2002 and October 2002 defendant James W. Beasley III molested five-year-old J.G. In May 2003 he entered a guilty plea to committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) On August 19, 2003, the court sentenced defendant to a six-year prison term, imposed a consecutive one-year term following the termination of probation in an unrelated case, imposed various fines, and awarded 512 days credit (446 actual days in custody and 66 days for conduct). Among the fines imposed was a $1,400.00 restitution fine. ( 1202.4, subd. (b).)
On November 20, 2008, while incarcerated in state prison, defendant filed a pro se motion in the trial court seeking to modify the sentence pursuant to section 1260 based on his alleged inability to pay. Defendant requested the court to strike the $1,400.00 restitution fine. The court denied the motion, and defendant appeals from that denial. As Court shall explain, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of defendants postconviction motion. Accordingly, Court shall dismiss the appeal.

On August 7, 2007, a Marysville police officer stopped a car for lack of a registration sticker and a cracked windshield. The driver, Andre Price, was on searchable probation and the rear passenger, Adam Monroe, had an outstanding warrant from another county. Defendant, William Anthony Murphy, sat in the front passenger seat. After another police unit arrived, the officers requested that defendant get out of the car because it was going to be searched. As defendant did so, Marysville Police Officer Christian Sachs smelled fresh marijuana on defendants person. Officer Sachs patted defendant down for weapons and found none. When the officer asked defendant about the smell, defendant did not respond. When the officer expressed his belief that defendant had marijuana on his person, defendant admitted that he had a little bit. The officer asked if it was about an eighth of an ounce and defendant agreed. The officer asked for the marijuana and defendant reached into his pocket, retrieved a bag containing 5.75 grams of marijuana, and gave it to the officer. The officer handcuffed defendant and then searched him, finding a zippered wallet containing a plastic bag with 7.11 grams of methamphetamine and a digital scale with powdery residue. An information charged defendant with transportation of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of not more than one ounce of marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a), 11378, 11377, subd. (a), 11357, subd. (b), respectively.) The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Jarrett Wayne Reynolds violated a restraining order and threatened to kill his ex-wife. He then threatened to kill an investigating police officer. Appearing to be intoxicated, defendant also asked to speak with his daughter. He was charged with making criminal threats, threatening a police officer, and stalking. Defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to making criminal threats to his ex-wife (Pen. Code, 422). In accordance with the plea agreement, the imposition of judgment was suspended and he was placed on probation. Among the conditions of probation are defendant serve 365 days in jail, have no contact with his ex-wife and his daughter, and remain 100 yards from their person, residence, place of employment and school. If, however, defendant completes batterers treatment and anger management programs, he may seek visitation with his daughter only as outlined in a family law order rendered subsequent to the anger and batterers treatment completion dates.

In addition to the no contact condition of probation, the trial court issued a CRIMINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Pen. Code, 1203.097) that precludes defendant from having any personal, electronic, telephonic, or written contact with his ex-wife and daughter and from being within 100 yards of them, except for the safe exchange of children for visitation as stated in a Family, Juvenile, or Probate court order issued after the date [of the protective order].

The jury also found that defendant had a prior conviction for vehicle theft. (Pen. Code, 666.5, subd. (a).) The jury was unable to reach a verdict on another charge alleging vehicle theft (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), and a mistrial was declared as to that count. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) and sentenced him to state prison for a term of five years.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury after it reported it was deadlocked. Court agree with this contention and, accordingly, shall reverse.

On April 18, 2007, petitioner Stephen Chiara filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We summarily denied that writ. Our Supreme Court subsequently issued an order to show cause, returning Chiaras petition for a writ of habeas corpus to this court. Court now grant his petition.

Appellant Patricia Hewlett (Hewlett) appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend to her petition to set aside a final distribution of the estate of Vivian Barrett. The court found her petition time-barred, as do Court. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Appellant was convicted upon her plea of guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, 192, subd. (a)),[1] as charged in an amended information. She admitted an allegation that she personally used a firearm in the commission of that offense ( 12022.5, subd. (a)). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, appellant received a fixed prison sentence of 21 years in state prison (the aggravated term of 11 years for voluntary manslaughter, plus a consecutive 10-year term for personal use of the firearm). Appellant was 16 years old at the time of the charged offense, and 21 years old at the time of her plea.

Appellant Raymond Lee Hayden contends the trial court abused its discretion both in denying probation as recommended by the probation department, and by imposing the upper term. Court disagree, and affirm.

I. C., the father of J. T., petitions this court to set aside the juvenile courts order setting a permanent plan hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He contends that the court erred in terminating reunification services. Court deny the petition.

Petitioner De.W. (father) seeks a writ of mandate pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 directing the juvenile court to vacate its orders terminating his reunification services with his daughter, D.W. (minor), at the 12-month review hearing and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Court deny the petition.

This is the second time this case is before us. In a prior unpublished opinion, we reversed the order of the trial court denying attorney fees to M&C. We held that M&C was entitled to an award of fees as a matter of law because the trial court found that M&C was the prevailing party under both Civil Code section 1717 and Labor Code section 218.5. (M&C Products Analysis Technology, Inc. v. Bertik (Oct. 19, 2006, B179195).) On remand, the trial court awarded M&C $1,187,906.46 in attorney fees for trial and post-trial proceedings, approximately 90 percent of the amount requested. It awarded an additional $42,277.50, as attorney fees on appeal. On appeal, Bertik argues the fee award is excessive because the trial judge initially determined not to award any attorney fees and the judge who made the award on remand was not the trial judge.

The trial court ordered specific performance of a lessees option to purchase industrial property from the lessor after a jury, in a general verdict, (a) found that the lessee did not breach the contract, but (b) found that the lessee did breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (c) in that connection awarded the lessor damages of one dollar. On appeal, the lessor contends the courts award of equitable relief to the lessee in the form of specific performance was impermissible, because it was inconsistent with the jurys earlier verdict that the lessee had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The lessor also argues the judgment ordering specific performance must in any event be reversed because (a) the lessee failed to prove it was ready, willing and able to pay the $6.4 million purchase price, and (b) the lessee did not prove it complied with a provision of the option which required the parties to attempt to agree in good faith upon a single appraiser to determine the fair market value of the property. Court conclude the trial court did not err in ordering specific performance and accordingly affirm the judgment.