CA Unpub Decisions

Following stipulations by the parties to waive spousal support, Linda Condon appeals from a family court order denying her motion to set aside judgment terminating the courts jurisdiction to award spousal support. Finding the court acted within its discretion, Court shall affirm the order.

Sonny Gibson brought this action against respondent HSBC Bank USA (the bank), to recover monies withdrawn from an account on which he was one of two signatories.[1] He appeals from a summary judgment entered after the trial court found that the statute of limitations had run on his cause of action. Because the evidence showed that the account was held in the name of a trust of which Gibson was a beneficiary, and Gibson did not join the trust or allege that he was the trustee, we requested supplemental letter briefs addressing whether Gibson was the real party in interest with standing to appeal. As Gibson has not shown that he was the real party in interest, we find that he does not have standing, and we dismiss the appeal.

T.F. appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, R.J. After examining the record, appellants appointed counsel was unable to identify any arguable issues and so informed this court. We directed counsel to immediately send a copy of that letter and the record on appeal to appellant. We also wrote a letter to appellant advising her that she had the right to personally submit any contentions she felt we should consider and that the appeal would be dismissed in the absence of arguable issues. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952.)

The trial court denied Daniel Dunnings application for release from commitment based on restoration of his sanity. Court reverse and order the court to grant the application.

K.D. admitted an allegation in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition charging him with vandalism of religious property, a felony, but denied an allegation that he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The juvenile court found the gang enhancement allegation to be true, and K.D. appealed from that order. His court-appointed counsel filed a brief requesting this courts independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Our review of the record shows no arguable issues, and Court affirm the judgment.

Convinced he had a right to purchase certain real property owned by defendants Charles F. Bush, Sr. and Kathleen Bush for $1.2 million as part of a settlement agreement, plaintiff Ronald Miller filed a motion for entry of a judgment by stipulation pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (section 664.6). The trial court disagreed with Millers interpretation of the settlement agreement and eventually entered a judgment dismissing the action. Miller appeals claiming error in the trial courts interpretation of the parties settlement agreement. Rejecting the Bushes claim that Millers appeal is improper and moot; Court reach the merits and affirm the judgment.

The trial court denied appellant Alan Omar Abarcas motion to withdraw his negotiated guilty plea and then sentenced appellant to 25 years to life in state prison for first degree murder. With a certificate of probable cause, appellant claims on appeal that he had not made his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, and, as a result, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellants motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Court affirm.

Defendant Vera Inez Rehfeld appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of first degree murder, and finding true an allegation that she had used a dangerous and deadly weapon. (Pen. Code,[1] 187, 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced her to a prison term of 25 years to life for murder, with a consecutive one-year term for the weapon enhancement. Defendant contends that the trial court committed instructional error and that it erred in failing to hold a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). Court affirm.

Pursuant to a written agreement, respondent Robert Sprague provided legal services to appellant Curtis Kekoa, Jr. in a dissolution proceeding commenced against Kekoa by his wife. The jury awarded Sprague damages in the amount of $219,221.75 for breach of contract, plus interest thereon of $30,931.28.
The focus of Kekoas appeal is the pretrial grant of Spragues motion for judgment on the pleadings on Kekoas first amended cross-complaint alleging causes of action against Sprague for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of contract. Finding that Kekoas cross-complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state any cause of action, the court granted Sprague's motion. With respect to Kekoas causes of action for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, the court concluded that Sprague did not have the requisite duties because the relationship between the parties was not that of attorney-client, as Kekoa maintained, but that of employer-employee. Court shall affirm the judgment. Finding that Kekoas appeal and other pleadings in this court were designed to harass and delay and are therefore frivolous within the meaning of In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 649-650 (Flaherty), and also because Kekoa repeatedly violated the Rules of Court and sought to introduce numerous matters not material to this appeal, thereby significantly prolonging this appeal and rendering it far more difficult to process than it should have been, we shall impose sanctions on Kekoa and his appellate counsel, Armen L. George. We shall also declare Kekoa a vexatious litigant. (Code Civ. Proc., 391.)

Defendant Charles Joseph Carter (appellant) appeals his conviction by jury trial of rape by means of force or fear (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)) and attempted oral copulation (Pen. Code, 288a, subd. (c)(2), 664).[1] The court found true four prior felony conviction allegations (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (a), 667.6, subd. (a), 1170.12, subd. (c)) and one prior felony conviction allegation (Pen. Code, 667.61, subd. (d)(1), 1203, subd. (e)(4).) Appellant raises claims of evidentiary, instructional and sentencing error. He also contends the attempted oral copulation conviction is not supported by substantial evidence. Court reject appellants contentions and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Ronald Nathaniel Hurtado of three counts of attempted murder, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, and attempting to dissuade a witness, and found true various gang and gun use enhancements. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life for shooting at an occupied vehicle, consecutive terms of seven years to life for attempted dissuasion of witness and 37 years for one of the three attempted murder counts, and concurrent sentences of 37 years each for the remaining attempted murder counts. Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to (1) uphold his challenge for cause of one of the jurors, (2) stay imposition of sentence on all three of the attempted murder charges under section 654, and (3) grant him the full amount of presentence custody and conduct credits to which he was entitled. We agree in part with defendants contentions and will modify the judgment to stay imposition of a concurrent sentence on one of the attempted murder convictions, and correct defendants presentence credits. In all other respects, Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant M.P. Mountanos, Inc. (MPM), a company of which Mark P. Mountanos (Mountanos) is a principal, entered into purchase agreements with respondents Donovan C. Albright and DCA II, LLC (collectively, DCA) for two parcels of land. Donovan C. Albright (Albright) is a member of DCA II. MPM thereafter sued DCA for damages and injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging breach of contract and fraud. DCA filed a cross-complaint for specific performance and declaratory relief and moved for summary adjudication of the second, third and fourth causes of action of appellants complaint and for summary judgment on its cross-complaint. The trial court granted both motions, ruling that MPMs proffered parol evidence failed to create a triable issue of material fact. Court affirm.

Defendant Jerome Ontario Dosty was found guilty by a jury of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, 496d, subd. (a)),[1] felon in possession of a firearm ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)), carrying a concealed weapon and ammunition ( 12025, subd. (b)(6)), resisting arrest ( 148, subd. (a)(1)), receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)), and first degree burglary.[2]
( 459.) The jury was unable to reach verdicts on three other counts alleging first degree robbery ( 211), first degree burglary ( 459), and false imprisonment of an elder. ( 368, subd. (f).) A second jury found defendant guilty of these charges but found not true an enhancement for committing specified crimes against a person age 65 or older. ( 667.9, subd. (a).) Probation was denied and defendant was sentenced to a term of eigHt years eight months in state prison. Defendant appeals, raising numerous claims. Court affirm.

A modification decision.