CA Unpub Decisions

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Omar Avelar pleaded no contest to forgery (Pen. Code, 470, subd. (d)[1]), second degree commercial burglary ( 459), grand theft of personal property ( 487, subd. (a)), and five counts of theft ( 484e, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years in state prison for his forgery conviction and to a concurrent, middle term sentence of two years on each of the remaining convictions. The trial court imposed, inter alia, a victim restitution award of $4,905.84 and awarded defendant 564 days of presentence credit consisting of 376 days of custody credit and 188 days of conduct credit. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. Defendant requested a certificate of probable cause with respect to the trial courts ruling on his motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5. The trial court granted defendants request.
On appeal, defendants appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any arguable issues on appeal. On September 9, 2009, we gave notice to defendant that counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. Defendant filed a letter brief contending that the trial court erred in denying his section 1538.5 motion, the affidavit in support of a search warrant and the reporters transcripts for his section 995 and 1538.5 motions have been altered, and he received a longer sentence because his greedy lawyers dragged his case. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant Sarah Rebecca Morales appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found her guilty of count 1, unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, a maroon pickup truck (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)); count 2, assault on a peace officer (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (c));[1] count 3, assault on a peace officer ( 245, subd. (c)); count 4, assault on a peace officer ( 245, subd. (c)); count 6, willfully evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a)); count 7, resisting an executive officer ( 69); and count 8, unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, a white Honda (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years and four months in state prison consisting of the following: count 2, the upper term of five years; count 1, eight months (one-third the midterm of two years); count 3, four months (one-third the midterm of one year); and count 4, four months (one-third the midterm of one year). Appellant was also sentenced to the midterm of two years each for count 6, count 7, and count 8, to run concurrently.
Appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that it could convict her of a crime committed by co-perpetrator Glenn Patrick Rose if the crime was the natural and probable consequence of a different crime that appellant committed; and (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that appellant could be guilty of Roses assaults with the maroon truck if appellant aided and abetted Roses efforts to evade police in a different vehicle earlier that evening.

We affirm.

A modification decision.

Lamont J. Thompson appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of residential robbery and related felony offenses. On appeal, Thompson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the robbery conviction. Court affirm.

The People of the State of California challenge the trial courts order setting aside the information against Steven Ezequiel Montanez alleging possession of methamphetamine and possession of an opium pipe or device. Court affirm the order.

Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing the case for failure to timely serve the summons and complaint and from an order denying an ex parte application to set aside the dismissal. Court reverse the order of dismissal because the trial court had no authority to dismiss the case that had been filed from months earlier without an order to show cause.

Appellant and mother, S.R. (mother), appeals from the juvenile courts February 2, 2009, dispositional orders denying, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), mothers family reunification services with her children, F.A. (born in 1993) and M.S. (born in 2004). The juvenile court also denied mother reunification services with F.A. because she had already received more than the statutorily mandated period of services with her oldest son. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to grant her reunification services with M.S., and in failing to recognize that exceptional circumstances existed justifying further reunification services with F.A. Court affirm the juvenile court orders.

Narin Nao appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death (Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (a)). After revoking Naos probation for failure to comply with its terms, the trial court sentenced Nao to three years in state prison. Court affirm.

R.M., the presumed father of minor R.M. and the alleged or step-father of O.B. and Z.B., appeals the juvenile dependency courts order denying his Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 388 petition seeking return of his son R.M. to his custody, or the reinstatement of reunification services with R.M. and an order for the reinstatement of visitation with O.B. and Z.B. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude the juvenile dependency court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the petition. Because appellant is only the alleged father of O.B. and Z.B. he has no right to visitation with the girls and thus he lacks standing to complain that the juvenile court denied his request to reinstate visitation with them. Furthermore, with respect to his claim concerning R.M., appellant failed to show a change of circumstances or the proposed changes would benefit R.M. Accordingly Court affirm.

D.C. (the minor) appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the court and ordering him home on probation after finding he had made a criminal threat. The minor contends the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702,[1]to determine whether the adjudicated allegation was a felony or misdemeanor, requiring remand for the juvenile court to make that determination. The minor further contends that because the offense was not declared a felony, he should not have been ordered to provide a DNA sample.

C.B. (father) appeals the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his son, J.B. He contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that the minor is adoptable and that the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights does not apply. He additionally argues that the reunification efforts of the Department of Children and Family Service (DCFS) were inadequate. Finding no error, Court affirm.

In this dependency proceeding, R.L. appeals from a family law "exit order" (Welf. & Inst. Code, 362.4[1]) concerning his sons R. and S. DCFS has not taken a position. Court affirm.

Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, a two-count petition was filed alleging that appellant, L.L., committed a residential burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459, and received stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496. Our review of the appellate record reveals the following facts: On September 25, 2008, Richard Dapsi returned to his home at approximately 11:30 a.m. and found several police officers on his property. The officers had responded to a possible burglary at Mr. Dapsi's home. Later that evening, Mr. Dapsi's son found a backpack in an area adjacent to his backyard, which contained several items which belonged to Mr. Dapsi, including a laptop computer, camcorder, software, and jars containing rolls of coins.

M.S. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to M. He contends that the order must be reversed because the court failed to find that he was a presumed father and order reunification services for him, and terminated his rights without making a finding of detriment. Court affirm.