CA Unpub Decisions

Satya Reddi properly appeals in pro per from two orders embodied in an order filed October 16, 2008.[1] We disregard the material in much of his opening brief, because it is really directed at the merits of an initial spousal support order made in favor of Satyas ex-wife Lakshmi[2] back in April 2001. That order has long since become final and is beyond the jurisdiction of this court to review. The first order properly challenged on appeal was an order denying a set aside motion. The set aside motion itself attacked an attorney fee order of some $32,000 made in response to several previous OSCs brought by Satya challenging the 2001 spousal support award. The second order was an attorney fee order for fees incurred by Lakshmi, not only to defend against Satyas set aside motion, but for everything else in the continuing family law litigation between them during the previous year.

This appeal follows the trial courts denial of Fernanda Krofts request for temporary spousal support. Fernanda argues the court abused its discretion because it relied on inappropriate factors. Court disagree and affirm the order.

Defendant Robert Storey White appeals from the denial of his motion to reinstate his drivers license. He argues that the judgment ordering him to reimburse plaintiff County of Orange for public support payments made for the care of his children expired. Because of statutory changes discussed below, the judgment did not expire and, because defendant failed to satisfy the judgment, he is not entitled to a return of his drivers license.

Defendant Donald R. Murphy pleaded no contest to attempted pimping of an adult prostitute (Pen. Code, 266h, subd. (a), 664), possession of a forged drivers license (Pen. Code, 470b), and using personal information without authorization (Pen. Code, 530.5, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation with various conditions. On appeal, defendant challenges the imposition of probation conditions requiring him to submit to chemical testing, complete a substance abuse program, and refrain from possessing or consuming alcohol or illegal drugs. Court modify the probation conditions with respect to alcohol and affirm the order as modified.

Appellant Wesley David Brown appeals from an order denying his motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, 1538.5.)[1] Following entry of that order, appellant pled no contest to felony possession of cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a), and was sentenced to probation. Appellants counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, requesting that we conduct an independent review of the entire record on appeal. Having done so, Court affirm the trial courts order.

Dean William Hart appeals from a judgment imposed after revocation of his probation. His counsel raises no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was apprised of his right to file a supplemental brief but did not do so. On March 12, 2007, defendant waived his right to a jury trial and pled guilty to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459, 460, subd. (b)) and driving while under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (b)). The charges stemmed from defendants theft of beer from a convenience store and his subsequent get-away. On June 25, 2007, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for a period of three years.

In this appeal, Court are presented once more with the issue of whether plaintiff Martina A. Silas (Silas) has stated a prima facie case of malicious prosecution arising out of an underlying legal malpractice action that was adjudicated in her favor. This appeal involves another one of the lawyers in the legal malpractice case, James Ellis Arden (Arden). Silas sued a number of lawyer defendants in addition to Arden, including Ardens now-dissolved legal partnership (Scott, Arden & Salter LLP), for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, arising from a legal malpractice action that Ross Gunnell (Gunnell), a former client of Silas, brought against her. Silas prevailed on summary judgment in the legal malpractice action. Arden was one of Gunnells attorneys in the legal malpractice case. Arden filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court granted the motion as to the abuse of process cause of action, but denied the motion as to the malicious prosecution cause of action. On appeal, Arden contends Silas failed to produce admissible evidence showing a viable prima facie case of malicious prosecution. Court disagree and affirm the order.

The trial court found true an allegation of one felony count of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. The court declared Michael M. to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and a ward of the court, ordered Michael M. be placed home on probation, and gave him 22 days of predisposition custody credit. Michael M. filed a timely notice of appeal. Court appointed counsel to represent Michael M. on appeal. After examining the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court to independently review the record. On November 4, 2009, Court advised Michael M. he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. To date, Court have received no response.

The trial court abused its discretion by granting Raymond Koskeys Pitchess motion to review of complaints regarding Officer Evleth as to dishonesty, perjury and false reporting relating to workers compensation claims, disability, and false time sheets. Accordingly, the petition is granted.

A jury convicted defendant Victory Ilsung of attempted murder with premeditation (Pen. Code, 664/187; subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code), mayhem ( 203), corporal injury to a former cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition ( 273.5, subd. (a)), battery on a person he had been dating ( 243, subd. (e)(1)), and assault ( 240), while sustaining allegations of great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (e)), personal use of a weapon ( 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and a prior strike ( 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i)). The court sentenced defendant to 24 years to life in prison. On appeal, we reversed the conviction, finding the trial court violated defendants due process right to represent himself at trial (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta)).
On retrial, the jury convicted defendant of attempted murder with premeditation, mayhem, corporal injury to a former cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition, and battery on a person he had been dating, and sustained the great bodily injury and personal use of a weapon allegations. Defendant admitted the strike allegation, and the court sentenced him to 25 years to life.

Nevada County law enforcement officers followed a minivan believing the driver was the registered owner of the vehicle, who was on searchable probation. Instead, the driver was defendant Chris Votino, Jr. Defendant gave one of the officers permission to get his drivers license out of his truck (parked in front of the minivan) to confirm his identity. Upon learning defendant was driving the minivan with a suspended license, the officers asked him for permission to search him and the minivan. Defendant consented to both requests and officers found methamphetamine and cocaine on him.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming the evidence seized was the fruit of an illegal detention, arrest, and search. The trial court denied his motion, and he pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine and received Proposition 36 probation.

Defendant Stephen Thomas Concepcion took his brothers truck without permission. Driving 60 miles per hour in a 40 mile-per-hour zone, defendant struck a vehicle driven by Daniel Palmer, who sustained lacerations on his forehead and body, contusions, and a broken collarbone. Defendant had a blood-alcohol level of 0.36 percent, three prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol, and was on probation for driving under the influence.

Plaintiffs Isabel Valdivia on behalf of herself and a proposed class, HUD Investments, LLC, and Karen Schneiter appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants CertainTeed Corporation (CertainTeed), Anlin Industries (Anlin), and Mikron Industries, Inc. (Mikron) (collectively defendants), who are manufacturers of replacement vinyl windows installed in plaintiffs' properties. Plaintiffs' operative pleading sought to recover damages in the form of costs of removing and replacing the allegedly defective vinyl windows under theories of negligence and strict liability. The trial court sustained Mikron's demurrer to plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint without leave to amend and granted the other defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings in part on grounds the economic loss rule barred recovery of purely economic loss under strict liability and negligence causes of action. On appeal from the ensuing judgment, plaintiffs contend (1) the economic loss rule does not preclude them from proceeding in strict liability or negligence because they pleaded and can prove at trial that property damage resulted from the defendants' product; (2) the economic loss rule does not dictate the types of compensatory damages or remedies once the elements of a tort cause of action are established; and (3) they sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). Court conclude the economic loss rule does not bar plaintiffs' tort causes of action. Further, Court decline to find a waiver of plaintiffs' appellate arguments as to their CLRA cause of action. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment.

This is an appeal by Faye P. Johns (hereafter Faye)[1]from the judgment on the petition filed by William D. Johns (hereafter William) declaring their marriage of 28 years a nullity under Family Code section 2201.[2] The issues decided against her and which she challenges on appeal are that the marriage is void because Faye was not legally divorced from her fourth husband at the time she married William, her fifth husband, and that Faye is not a putative spouse because she did not have a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage. More particularly, Faye contends that (1) the trial court incorrectly applied an objective standard to determine whether Faye had a good faith belief in the validity of her marriage to William; (2) even under an objective standard of good faith the evidence is insufficient to support the trial courts finding that Faye is not a putative spouse; (3) the evidence does not support the trial courts finding on the date of separation; (4) the trial court incorrectly found that estoppel does not apply to preclude William from challenging the validity of the marriage; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Fayes request to submit her closing argument in writing; and (6) the trial court erred when it took judicial notice of various court records from Fayes prior divorce proceedings because the documents were not certified.
Court conclude for reasons Court explain below that Fayes claims are all meritless. Therefore court will affirm the judgment.