City of LA Police Dept. v. Super. Ct.

Filed 12/31/09 City of LA Police Dept. v. Super. Ct. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of mandate. Monica Bachner, Judge. Petition granted.

Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Carlos De La Guerra, Managing Assistant City Attorney, Kjehl T. Johansen and Stephen C. Cohen, Deputy City Attorneys for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Walter Kuiland and Mark Harvis, Deputy Public Defenders for Real Party in Interest.

___________________________

The trial court abused its discretion by granting Raymond Koskeys Pitchess[1]motion to review of complaints regarding Officer Evleth as to dishonesty, perjury and false reporting relating to workers compensation claims, disability, and false time sheets. Accordingly, the petition is granted.[2]

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 24, 2009, Los Angeles Police Officers Davis and Garcia investigated a complaint concerning an assault with a deadly weapon. The victim was not present but the person reporting the incident identified Koskey, who had been detained. Koskey admitted to gang membership. Officer Davis recognized Koskey as a gang member from over six other contacts with Koskey.

Later, Officer Evleth, the author of the arrest report, and his partner, Officer King, received a call about a vandalism suspect. Koskey, who appeared to fit the description of the suspect, and who was later identified by other officers, did not comply with commands to turn around and place his hands over his head. Koskey admitted gang membership. Koskey resisted handcuffing and being put into the police car. Koskey was tasered. Once in the police car, Koskey kicked out the car window causing injury to Officer King. A hobble device was placed on Koskey. Between four to six officers assisted in restraining Koskey.

Koskey was charged with violations of Penal Code sections 245(c), assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer, 186.22 (b)(1)(C), violent felony for the benefit of a street gang, and 594, felony vandalism to a police patrol car.

Koskey denied resisting arrest or making gang related statements.

Koskey filed a Pitchess motion. He requested, inter alia: All complaints from any and all sources relating to acts of violation of constitutional rights, fabrication of charges, fabrication of evidence, fabrication of reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause, illegal search/seizure; false arrest, perjury, dishonesty, writing of false police reports, writing of false police reports to cover up the use of excessive force, false or misleading internal reports including but not limited to false overtime or medical records, and any other evidence of misconduct amounting to moral turpitude within the meaning of People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284 against Officer King (#38451) and Officer Evleth (#38086). The City of Los Angeles Police Department opposed the motion.

At a hearing on September 29, 2009, the trial court granted the motion and set the parameters of review to include complaints as to Officer Evleth relating to workers compensation claims, disability, and false time sheets.

DISCUSSION

In performing writ review of discovery orders, we apply the abuse of discretion standard of review, keeping in mind that [t]rial courts are granted wide discretion when ruling on motions to discover police officer personnel records. [Citation.] (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1019.)

The Pitchess motion was granted with an expansive scope of review. The extent of the discovery included review of records for any complaints related to dishonesty, perjury or false reporting concerning workers compensation, disability and time sheets.

In Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1024, our Supreme Court stated: To show good cause [for review] as required by [Evidence Code] section 1043, defense counsels declaration in support of a Pitchess motion must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges. The declaration must articulate how the discovery sought may lead to relevant evidence or may itself be admissible direct or impeachment evidence [citations] that would support those proposed defenses. These requirements ensure that only information potentially relevant to the defense need be brought by the custodian of the officers records to the court for its examination in chambers. [Citations.]

In California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court, supra, the Sixth District Court of Appeal opined that problems relating to claims of false reporting by highway patrol officers should not lead to review of reports about an issue concerning a problem relating to irregularities on a prior time card since there was insufficient similarity between the allegation of filing a false police report and misconduct consisting of time card irregularities. (Id. at p. 1023.) The court did not believe that review of the time card complaints was relevant.

The court stated: Further, our Supreme Court has indicated that a showing of good cause must be based on a discovery request which is tailored to the specific officer misconduct that is alleged. Thus, when a defendant asserts that his confession was coerced, a discovery request that seeks all excessive force complaints against the arresting officer is overly broad . . . [instead] only complaints by persons who alleged coercive techniques in questioning [are] relevant. [Citations.] The trial court will properly deny such an overbroad discovery request. [Citation.]

In other words, only documentation of past officer misconduct which is similar to the misconduct alleged by defendant in the pending litigation is relevant and therefore subject to discovery. (Id. at p. 1021.)

Petitioner, City of Los Angeles Police Department, challenges the granting of the Pitchess motion insofar as it includes workers compensation claims, disability, and false time sheets. We agree with petitioner because such items are not relevant to Koskeys claim that he did not resist arrest or make any gang related statements and that he was a victim of an illegal detention and excessive force. (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court, supra.)

DISPOSITION

THEREFORE, let a peremptory writ issue, commanding respondent superior court to vacate its order of September 29, 2009, granting defendant Raymond Koskeys Pitchess motion to include review of complaints as to Officer Evleth relating to workers compensation claims, disability, and false time sheets, and to issue a new and different order excluding a Pitchess review of complaints as to Officer Evleth relating to workers compensation claims, disability, and false time sheets, in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BA359459, entitled People v. Raymond Koskey.

The temporary stay order is hereby terminated.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

THE COURT:

_____________________ ____________________ ____________________

MALLANO, P. J. ROTHSCHILD, J. JOHNSON, J.

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[1]Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

[2] As there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law, and in view of the fact that the issuance of an alternative writ would add nothing to the presentation already made, we deem this to be a proper case for the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance. (Code Civ. Proc., 1088; Lewisv. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241; Alexanderv. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223; Ngv. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35.) Opposition was requested and the parties were notified of the courts intention to issue a peremptory writ. (Palmav. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.)