CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Jamar Golson, a minor at the time of the offense, was charged with one count of murder in the first degree (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)),[1]one count of robbery ( 211), and one count of attempted murder ( 187, subd. (a) & 664), with the special circumstance allegation that he committed the murder while engaged in a robbery ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), three gun use allegations ( 12022.53), and a criminal street gang allegation (186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)). A jury convicted Appellant of first degree murder, finding true the allegation that the murder was committed during the commission of robbery, and convicted him of second degree robbery, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the attempted murder count. The jury found true the criminal street gang allegation and the allegation that a handgun was used, but it did not find true the allegation that the gun was intentionally discharged. Because of Appellants age, the court sentenced him on the murder count to a term of 25 years to life, plus a consecutive term of 10 years for the use of a firearm allegation. (See Pen. Code, 190.5, subd. (b) [the court has discretion to sentence a defendant between 16 and 18 years of age convicted of certain first degree murders to 25 years to life].) As to the robbery count, the court imposed sentence but stayed the sentence pursuant to section 654.

A modification decision.

Prentina Walker and her husband, Marvin Jones, appeal from an adverse judgment in their action for medical malpractice. They argue the trial court erred in excluding the declarations of their medical experts, that defendant Pacific Hospital of Long Beach (Hospital) did not provide evidence of compliance with the standard of care warranting summary judgment, and that they raised triable issues of material fact. We conclude the Hospitals initial showing in support of summary judgment was sufficient, and that the declaration of Dr. Plourd, plaintiffs expert, should not have been excluded under Health and Safety Code section 1799.110, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 1799.110(c)) because that statute is inapplicable. We find no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the untimely declaration of plaintiffs other medical expert witness. We affirm the judgment because the declaration of Dr. Plourd does not cite nor discuss what is the applicable community standard of care in support of his opinions. Court reject plaintiffs other arguments regarding the standard of care.

On December 11, 2007, Officer Jesse Reyes and his partner, Officer Scott Coffey, were in full uniform, patrolling a high crime, high narcotics area of Los Angeles in their unmarked patrol car. Officer Reyes observed appellant standing on the sidewalk in front of a Doughnut King. Appellant made eye contact with the officers vehicle and then with the officers, bent down, placed something on the sidewalk and walked away to a parked car where another person was standing. Appellant appeared startled and nervous. At the location where appellant had bent down, Officer Reyes found a bic lighter and an off-white substance which he believed, and which was later determined, to be a usable amount of cocaine base sufficient for a single use. The officers detained appellant. Appellant denied that he ever possessed any cocaine or placed anything on the sidewalk and claimed that he was at the location because he had run out of gas.

Stanley A. Wright appeals from his conviction on one count of indecent exposure with a prior. He contends that the trial court erroneously refused his request for a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. Court agree and reverse.

A jury convicted Jessie Castro (appellant) of attempted murder (Pen. Code, 187, 664)[1] (count 1). The jury found that a principal discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury ( 12022.53, subds. (d)(e)) and that the crimes were committed to benefit a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)( C)). The trial court sentenced appellant to the midterm of seven years for the attempted murder and 25 years to life for the firearm use enhancement, for a total sentence of 32 years to life.

Deshawn Young appeals from judgment in favor of Clifford Bourland in this action for negligent and intentional misrepresentation arising from an appraisal of real property. Young contends the trial court erred in sustaining objections to his declarations submitted in opposition to summary judgment, and that triable issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.
Court conclude that while most of the evidentiary objections were well founded, sufficient admissible evidence remained to raise triable issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Court shall reverse the judgment in favor of Bourland.

Thomas C. Gustafson appeals orders of the family law court denying his motion to modify child custody and visitation and awarding attorney's fees. Court affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Daniel Miranda (defendant) guilty of two counts of attempted, premeditated murder and two counts of assault with a firearm. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the gang expert to testify as to the state of mind of various persons, including defendant, and by allowing the expert to testify that the minor with whom defendant was arrested was a self-admitted member of defendants gang. Defendant also contends that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct when during argument, she speculated on a shooters reflexes. And, defendant argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury with four CALCRIM instructions that, when read together, misstated the principle of reasonable doubt and the manner in which the jury should view the evidence.

After Miguel Angel Buenrostro choked Mary Crail to death on April 2, 2008 and took her car, he was charged by information with murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) and grand theft automobile (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (d)(1)). It was further alleged that in committing the murder, Buenrostro had inflicted great bodily injury on Crail.
At trial, Buenrostro testified that on the night of the murder, he and Crail had consumed alcoholic drinks and then had sex. Afterwards, Crail repeatedly insulted defendant, and he lost control. Defendant did not realize what he had done until later, and he believed his drinks had been doctored with something because he had never before behaved that way. Buenrostro fled to Mexico in Crails car and was later arrested and returned to the United States.

William J. Long appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, 192, subd. (a)) and his admission, pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a) and the Three Strikes law, that he previously was convicted of assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)). The trial court sentenced Long to 27 years in prison. Court affirm the judgment.

The Appellate Division abused its discretion when it denied defendant Emanuel Charles petition for writ of mandate to review the denial by the trial court of his supplemental Pitchess motion. Accordingly, the petition is granted in part and denied in part.

This is a dispute between the owners of adjacent waterfront parcels on an inlet of Lake Tulloch in Calaveras County. The parcels in question extend out into the inlet, such that a portion of each parcel is under water. For years, a dock owned and used by plaintiff Randal W. Yick was positioned over a portion of the parcel owned by defendant Susan Larson. Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to that portion of defendants parcel, claiming adverse possession as well as a prescriptive and an implied easement. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment rejecting plaintiffs adverse possession and prescriptive easement claims but granting an implied easement. However, the court restricted the implied easement to an area less expansive than that sought by plaintiff. The court also rejected plaintiffs request for an injunction to restrict defendants use of her own dock, which plaintiff claimed interfered with the use of his dock. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment, contending the trial court erred in restricting the implied easement, denying a prescriptive easement, and denying an injunction. Court conclude the judgment is supported by substantial evidence and affirm.

F.M., the minor, was adjudged a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 based on the juvenile courts finding that he committed robbery (Pen. Code, 211)[1] and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1)), both with gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)) and great bodily injury ( 12022.7) enhancements, and participation in a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (a)). The court set a maximum confinement period of 18 years and ordered general out-of-home placement. On appeal, the minor challenges the gang offense and enhancements. He contends there is insufficient evidence of participation in a criminal street gang because the gang experts testimony and the minute orders of other cases used to prove the pattern of criminal activity are hearsay. He contends there was insufficient evidence of the primary activities of the gang or of his specific intent to benefit the gang to sustain the gang enhancements. Finally, he contends the matter must be remanded for a reunification plan under Welfare and Institutions Code section 727.2.