CA Unpub Decisions

Jesus Ramos appeals from a judgment convicting him of various sex offenses arising from his molestation of his two stepdaughters. He asserts the judgment must be reversed and the case dismissed because his constitutional rights to a speedy trial and due process were violated due to a lengthy delay in bringing his case to trial. Given that Ramos was the cause of the delay, there were no bad faith delay tactics by the prosecution, and there was no significant prejudice to the defense, Court reject this contention. As to sentencing, Ramos contends his rights under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 were violated because the trial court selected upper term sentences based on facts that were not found by the jury. We also reject this assertion, and affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves claims for police brutality and related causes of actions based on two sets of incidents. On February 7, 2004, plaintiff Devell Lavon Lincoln was arrested by the California Highway Patrol (CHP) during a traffic stop. He maintains he was beaten by the CHP officers, Jason Lyman and M.V. Sais, during the arrest. Afterwards, Lincoln was detained for 21 days at the County of San Bernardinos West Valley Detention Center until his release from custody on February 28, 2004. Lincoln maintains that the County defendants,[1]including two deputy sheriffs, subjected him to many forms of abuse between February 7, 2004, and February 26, 2004.

Lincoln appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of the County defendants. His claims against the CHP are not the subject of this appeal, which involves only the County defendants.

Initially, the only legal issue raised by Lincoln on appeal involved the operation of Government Code section 945.3 (section 945.3) and its provisions for the tolling of the statute of limitations for an action against a peace officer. In the respondents brief, the County defendants raise a number of other legal issues to which Lincoln responds in his reply brief. But we conclude the application of the appropriate statutes of limitationsCode of Civil Procedures section 335.1 and Government Code section 945.6is dispositive. Based on our independent review, we affirm the judgment. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843-857.)

Following entry of this courts decision in this case, defendant filed a petition for rehearing of this appeal, arguing this court should reconsider whether Penal Code section 290.011, subdivision (g) and jury instruction CALCRIM No. 1170 are unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. This court granted the petition and reheard the matter on February 2, 2010. Upon considering defendants petition for rehearing and the Peoples response, as well as additional oral and written argument, this court adheres to its original decision, which remains unchanged as follows.

Defendant Jack Nelson Nottingham moved to dismiss a two-count felony information pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (the IAD). (Pen. Code, 1389-1389.8.)[1] The trial court granted the motion on the grounds defendant was not brought to trial within 120 days of the date he arrived in California from Nevada to face the charges and there was no good cause shown for a continuance beyond the 120-day period. ( 1389, arts. IV, subd. (c), V, subd. (c).) The People appeal, arguing the motion was erroneously granted. We conclude the motion was properly granted and affirm the judgment dismissing the information with prejudice.

Defendant and appellant Juan Moya Gonzalez, Jr., waived his right to a jury and was convicted in a bench trial of having sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10 years (Pen. Code, 288.7, subd. (a))[1](count 1) and committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 by duress ( 288, subd. (b)(1)) (count 3). He now challenges his conviction for a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 ( 288, subd. (b)(1)) on the ground there is insufficient evidence to establish the act was committed by means of duress.

Defendant and respondent Gene Delon Yeats pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery, one count of evading a police officer, and admitted a prior serious felony conviction and a prior strike conviction. He agreed to plead guilty on the trial courts indication that it would sentence him to 11 years in state prison. The People appeal, contending the guilty plea and sentence were the product of unlawful plea bargaining by the trial court. Court agree with the People and reverse.

In this matter, we have reviewed the petition, the opposition filed by real party in interest Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company (Atlantic), and petitioner Wausau Underwriters Insurance Companys (Wausau) reply. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law and that issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate is appropriate to secure limited relief to petitioners. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)

Defendant Bernardo Colon was charged with count 1, possession of a controlled substance, phencyclidine (PCP) (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)); count 2, misdemeanor driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code,[1] 14601.1, subd. (b)(1)), with the special allegation that he had three prior convictions for the same offense within the previous five years ( 14601.1, subd. (b)(2)); and count 3, misdemeanor attempting to elude a peace officer ( 2800.1). As to count 1, it was further alleged defendant had two prior serious and/or violent felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (c)-(j) & 1170.12).

Appellant was convicted of murder and other crimes stemming from his participation in an attack against a group of people he had recently encountered at a bar. He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the jurys finding the attack was premeditated, and the trial court committed a host of instructional errors. In addition, he argues the court unduly restricted his right of cross-examination and erroneously denied his motion for a new trial. The Attorney General also raises an issue pertaining to the legality of appellants prison sentence. Court find the parties claims unmeritorious and affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury convicted the defendant, Raymundo Rivera, of murder and robbery. He claims that an instruction on robbery was defective and requires reversing the judgment as to both murder and robbery. He also claims that the total prison sentence and the amount of a restitution fine were miscalculated. Finally, he asks us to review another perpetrators prison records for certain information that may be useful to his case. Finding that recent California Supreme Court authority compels rejection of defendants instructional claim, that review of the records in question yields no relevant information, and that the restitution fine is correct, but that defendants consecutive sentence lacks a sufficient legal basis, we will reverse the judgment in part and remand for resentencing, while affirming the judgment in all other respects.[1]

After the trial court found that defendant Jess Hernandez had violated his probation, the court revoked defendants probation and sentenced him to three years in prison with 415 days custody credits. Defendant appeals, contending that the court failed to give him written notice of the alleged probation violations, and failed to provide a written order as to the evidence it relied upon and the specific reasons for revoking his probation; that the evidence does not support a finding that he volitionally failed to comply with the terms of his probation; and that the court erred by admitting documents containing multiple layers of hearsay, which rendered the documents unreliable. Court disagree with all these contentions and, therefore, will affirm the judgment.

The juvenile court found C.C. (minor) to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] (wardship for violation of law) in that he had possessed weapons on school grounds (weapons 602) and committed first degree burglary (burglary 602). It placed minor on probation. Minor left home in violation of probation. The juvenile court then sustained a section 777 petition (violation of probation not amounting to crime) and continued minor on probation. It then placed minor in the Juvenile Drug Treatment Court (JTC) program after signing an agreement with minor that outlined the conditions of minors participation in the program. After minor successfully completed the program, it terminated minors probation stemming from the weapons 602. But it refused to terminate minors probation stemming from the burglary 602 because minor had not fulfilled a condition of probation to make restitution to the burglary victim. On appeal, minor contends that he is entitled to have his probation in the burglary 602 dismissed pursuant to the JTC agreement. court agree. Court therefore reverse the judgment and direct dismissal of minors probation in the burglary 602.

Defendant Ontwone Michael Spencer appeals from a stipulated order finding that his competence had not been restored and transferring him back to Atascadero State Hospital. The order came after a contrary recommendation from the State Hospital for a finding that his competence had been restored following a previous order that had judged him incompetent under Penal Code section 1367 et seq. Court affirm.

In this appeal, defendant Bruce Oliver Braun appeals two judgments, one entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of three counts of lewd acts with a child, Jane Doe 1 (Pen. Code, 228, subd. (a)) (case No. SCR 490129), and one entered upon his plea of no contest to one count of committing a lewd act with a child, Jane Doe 2 (id., 288, subd. (a)) (case No. SCR 517653). Court affirm.