CA Unpub Decisions

Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro appeals an order awarding it attorneys fees in connection with its representation of David R. Haberbush, the court-appointed receiver for Southland Land Corporation. The trial court reduced Jeffers requested fees primarily because the Receiver had failed to comply with a court order requiring it to make monthly accountings in the receivership. Jeffers contends the trial court abused its discretion because its fee reduction improperly penalized Jeffers for conduct of the Receiver. Court affirm.

Donald Monroe Offerman appeals from the order, entered after a jury trial, extending for one year his involuntary commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code section 2972. He contends the judgment must be reversed because there is no substantial evidence that he poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others. Court affirm.

Based on evidence that defendant Tchalla Jamal Corum assaulted his former girlfriend (S.) and his four-year-old son (D.) on September 3, 2006, the jury convicted him of six criminal counts. (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2) [count 1, forcible rape], 236 [count 2, false imprisonment], 273.5, subd. (a) [count 3, domestic violence], 273a, subd. (b) [count 4, child cruelty], 273.6, subd. (a) [count 5, violating a court order], 422 [count 6, criminal threats].) Based on evidence that in 2002 he gave a drunk girl (K.B.) Ecstasy and then sexually assaulted her, the jury convicted him of sodomy of an intoxicated person. (Id., 286, subd. (i) [count 7].) The trial court found allegations that defendant had a prior domestic abuse conviction and had served a prior prison term to be true. (Id., 273.5, subd. (e), 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court granted a new trial as to the sodomy charge because of a purported instructional error, and the People timely appealed. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 11 years for the other counts, and defendant timely appealed.

Defendant Maxine Toney appeals her conviction for first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187) contending the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Court shall affirm the judgment.

R.M. (appellant), the mother of the minor C.C. (born September 2003), appeals from the juvenile courts order denying her petition for modification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 388, 395.) She contends the juvenile court erred in denying the petition for modification without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Court shall affirm.

Aug. P. (appellant), the presumed father of four minors, C.P. (17 years old), A.P. (11 years old), Au.P. (13 years old), and L.P. (16 years old), appeals from the order of the juvenile court terminating his reunification services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.21, subds. (f) & (g).) Appellant appeals the termination of his services at the 12-month review hearing. Appellant raises several issues in support of his claim. Concluding his claim has no merit, Court affirm.

N.F., a minor, admitted charges of receiving stolen property (his mothers car), unlawful taking of a vehicle (his mothers car), hit and run, and driving without a license. The admissions were conditioned upon the understanding that if he was found unsuitable for deferred entry of judgment, one of the car theft offenses would be reduced to a misdemeanor with the remaining counts being dismissed. The minor was found unsuitable for deferred entry of judgment, the court reduced the receiving stolen property offense to a misdemeanor, and the minor was placed on probation. On appeal, the minor contends that [b]ecause there is no factual basis to support [his] admission, the admission and true finding on [the receiving stolen property charge] should be reversed. Court disagree.

Sentenced to nine years in state prison, defendant appeals, contending the trial court lacked jurisdiction to permit amendment of the information to add a prior conviction allegation after the jury had been discharged. Court reject the contention and shall affirm the judgment.

As his sole contention on appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in finding his prior juvenile adjudication constituted a strike, and that the court was prohibited from using the juvenile adjudication to enhance his sentence under the federal due process clause and the right to a jury trial granted by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Court will affirm the judgment.

Mother, A.H., appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to the minors K.U. and R.B., now four years old and 23 months old respectively. Mother contends there is not substantial evidence supporting the juvenile courts refusal to apply the beneficial relationship exception to adoption. Court affirm the judgment.

On March 30, 2009, defendant was found in violation of his probation in both cases, based on his plea in a third case. On June 8, 2009, the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of five years in prison in case No. CRF07449, then suspended execution of sentence through April 21, 2011, and placed defendant on probation. Simultaneously, in case No. CRF0623, the court sentenced defendant to one year in prison, consecutive to the term in case No. CRF07449, then also suspended execution of this sentence through April 21, 2011, and placed defendant on probation.

The mother filed a timely appeal, and appears in propria persona after her appointed appellate counsel advised her that counsel could not find any arguable issues pursuant to In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952. ( 395.) (Although preceding In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, this procedure does not conflict with that opinion.) As Court interpret her filing, she reargues the evidence, attacks the credibility of the minor, and makes conclusory assertions that she was denied due process of law. Court affirm the orders.

Plaintiffs appeal from the postjudgment order striking their punitive damages award, contending they presented adequate evidence of Gardner's wrongfully gained profits on which to support such an award. They seek reinstatement of the award or an order that the trial court grant them a new trial on punitive damages. As Court explain below, Court affirm the judgment and postjudgment order.

On appeal, Carr contends there is insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted the sale of cocaine because he was a mere purchaser, not a seller of the drugs. He further contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to reasonably respond to a juror's question about the law of aiding and abetting or poll the jury in the face of asserted evidence that it rushed its deliberations. Mack contends the trial court prejudicially erred by (1) failing to conduct an investigation into asserted juror misconduct pertaining to a juror's question about consequence of the jury not reaching a verdict by the end of the day; (2) answering the juror's notes without his attorney present or a waiver permitting co-defendant Carr's attorney to appear on his behalf; and (3) instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 220 on reasonable doubt. Carr joins Mack's first and third appellate arguments. Court affirm the judgments.