CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant was identified as one of three or four young men who were seen coming out of a house that had just been burglarized. Appellants defense at trial was mistaken identification. On appeal, he contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument in two respects, contending that: (1) the prosecutors stated reason for not calling additional police officers to testify constituted improper vouching, and (2) the prosecutor improperly accused appellants trial counsel of wasting taxpayer money by hiring an expert to present testimony on eyewitness identification.

R.A. appeals from a juvenile court order sustaining allegations of vandalism, possession of a sawed-off shotgun and possession of a firearm capable of being concealed. He claims his Miranda rights were violated in connection with police questioning about the vandalism and no substantial evidence supports his convictions of possessing a sawed-off shotgun and possessing a concealable firearm. Court find no merit in his first two assertions of error, but we do in the third. Court therefore reverse the conviction for violating Penal Code section 12101, subdivision (a)(1).

Lester W. appeals from an order denying his motion to be accorded presumed father status as to the minor H.W. He contends that he met the foundational requirements of a presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). Alternatively, Lester asserts that because H.W.s mother, Annette W. (mother), prevented him from achieving presumed father status, the court should have found he was a father under Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey S.). Court affirm.

Father appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders entered in dependency proceedings involving his now 13-year-old son A.P. and 14-year-old son Z.P. He contends that (1) substantial evidence does not support the courts jurisdictional findings; (2) the children were improperly removed from his physical custody and placed in the physical custody of their mother; and (3) he was improperly denied reunification services. He also contends that the San Francisco Human Services Agency (the agency) was biased and its alleged misconduct resulted in a denial of his right to due process. Finally, he asserts that the orders must be reversed because the court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq. (ICWA). Court shall affirm.

Bonny Schellinger (Bonny) appeals from an order distributing the settlement proceeds of a wrongful death and survival action equally between Bonny and her sister, Denice Schellinger (Denice). Bonny contends the court erred because she had a much closer and more dependent relationship with the deceased. Court will reverse the order.

Defendant Gene James Hankes appeals the trial courts order that he pay a presentence report fee of $560. He claims the fee is improper because the court did not make a finding of his ability to pay, as required by Penal Code section 1203.1b. Court agree and reverse.

Plaintiff Stacey Palmer appeals from the judgment entered in her favor in her action against Carmen Thompson for breach of a contract to pay Palmer her share of the increased value of a home bought for Thompson in Palmers name. Palmer contends the trial court erred by: sustaining demurrers to other causes of action; denying her motion to amend the complaint; refusing to award her attorneys fees; and conditionally granting a new trial, thereby forcing her to accept a reduction of her damage award. Thompson has cross appealed, contending, among other things, the trial court should have granted her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the contract by its terms did not obligate her to pay Palmer.Court agree with Thompson and therefore reverse the judgment.

Mihran Novshatian appeals from a judgment awarding him damages for a work-related injury. Court affirm.

This is an appeal by attorneys who represented a now deceased trustee of a trust, and by beneficiaries of that trust whom the attorneys also represented, from an order requiring production of the attorneys trust file to the trustees successor, and to an individual who claims to represent the late trustee personally.[1] Appellants also appeal from an order refusing to vacate the order.

Court agree with appellants that the order is overbroad, only to the extent that it provides for turnover of documents generated subsequent to the former trustees death. Additionally, we hold that the claimed representative was not entitled to production. Hence, Court modify the order, and affirm it as modified. Court also affirm the order refusing to vacate the principal order.

Appellant Donald Sanders shot two men, Joel M. and Joels father, Rodney M., during a fight at a party of the Rare Breed Motorcycle Club (Rare Breed). Court will refer to the victims as Joel and Rodney, to avoid confusion. They survived and testified against appellant, as did a third eyewitness, Lanny T. (Lanny). Appellant was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and two counts of assault with a firearm, plus firearms discharge and great bodily injury enhancements. He was sentenced to 64 years to life in prison.
Rodney and Lanny knew appellant, and they identified him as one of two shooters. Joel did not see who shot him, but he saw appellant running toward him before he was shot. As to the other shooter (S-1), Joel and Lanny erroneously selected another man, Johnny C., when they were shown a six-pack photographic lineup (six-pack). They corrected that mistake when they saw Johnny in a live lineup. Johnny was dismissed from the case prior to appellants trial, and no one was tried as S-1. On the other hand, all three eyewitnesses were positive that appellant was one of the two shooters.

Michelle Crocker sued Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC for violation of the refund-or-replace provision of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Song-Beverly Act) (Civ. Code, 1790, 1793.2, subd. (d)(2)), arising out of Ms. Crockers purchase of a new Jaguar convertible as a gift for her husband. Ms. Crocker obtained a judgment of $135,979.18, a sum which included a civil penalty of $45,000 against Jaguar for willfully failing to repurchase or replace the car. Jaguar appeals, claiming lack of substantial evidence to support a violation of the Song-Beverly Act, lack of substantial evidence of willfulness to support the civil penalty, and abuse of discretion by the trial court in rulings on closing arguments made by Ms. Crockers counsel (which Jaguar claims were improper and in violation of an in limine order). Court find no merit in Jaguars contentions and affirm the judgment.

The juvenile court found that Wilmer M. had committed the crimes of second degree robbery, and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and that Wilmer had committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The court ordered Wilmer placed in a camp program, with an order that his maximum term of confinement was not to exceed 15 years, 4 months. The court also ordered that a series of probation conditions imposed in a prior juvenile proceeding were to remain in full force and effect, and added two additional conditions. Court affirm the juvenile courts findings that Wilmer committed a robbery and an assault, but find the evidence is insufficient to sustain the courts gang benefit finding, and, for that reason, remand for a new disposition hearing. In addition, Court find a probation condition which commands Wilmer not to participate in gang activity should be modified to include a knowingly element, a matter which may be addressed in new disposition orders.

The community property interest in the retirement benefits of a divorced spouse who is eligible to retire but has not yet done so is to be valued as of the date the nonemployee spouse files a motion seeking immediate payment of his or her one-half share of the community property interest in the benefits.

From 1997 to December 2005 or January 2006, plaintiff was employed at the Medical Center at University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). During her employment, plaintiff had two back surgeries, one in March 2003 and the other in January 2005. Plaintiff quit her employment in either December 2005 or January 2006 while still on medical leave for the second surgery. Plaintiff contends that she was subjected to a continuous course of discrimination and harassment that began after her first surgery in March 2003. However, she seeks damages only for the acts that allegedly occurred between 2004 and January 2006.
During all relevant periods, plaintiff was employed as a staffing coordinator and was supervised by defendant Panylyk. The staffing coordinator position was staffed on a 24-hour, 7 days per week basis consisting of two 12-hour shifts, 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.