CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and petitioner Dino M. Zaffina seeks a writ of mandate to overturn an order prohibiting him from communicating directly with defendant. Court grant the petition.

Petitioner Natalie D. (mother) seeks extraordinary review of an order terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing to develop a permanent plan for her son, Eduardo L. (Eduardo) pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Court deny the petition, finding no merit in mothers contentions that the juvenile court erred by not returning Eduardo to her care and incorrectly calculating the section 366.21, subdivision (g) 18-month date.

The trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant Alex Sanitation its request for a continuance of the good faith hearing so that it could have an opportunity to conduct discovery regarding defendants Smith & Thompson Pumping, Dorothy Anne Smith, Glynn E. Smith and Sherwin Pascal Smiths (collectively referred to as Smith) financial ability to pay the judgment and their insurance policies. Accordingly, the petition is granted.

When the employee of a subcontractor is injured, the general contractor may owe a duty of care to the employee of the subcontractor if the general contractor retained control over the details of the work and affirmatively contributed to the employees injury. (Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 210 (Hooker), discussing Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette) and its progeny.)
In this case, plaintiff Lanier Lewis, an employee of a subcontractor, was injured when he fell more than 15 feet off an elevated beam while working at the IKEA construction site in West Sacramento. He and his wife seek to recover in tort from Pepper Construction Company Pacific (Pepper), the general contractor, alleging that Pepper owed Lewis a duty of care. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Pepper, finding that Pepper did not owe Lewis a duty of care.

Mobile home park resident Robert C. Carroll obtained a civil harassment restraining order against Mark Weiner, the sole representative of the corporation that owns the park. In this pro se appeal, Weiner claims the order is not supported by substantial evidence of an actual threat of future harm. Court reject his contention and affirm the order.

Convicted of murder and attempted murder with various sentence enhancements arising from a shooting perpetrated by another man, defendant Tousaun Stewart appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the theory he aided and abetted commission of the crimes. He also contends the trial court erred by giving CALCRIM No. 600 and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that instruction on federal constitutional grounds. Finding no merit in his arguments, Court will affirm the judgment.

Appellant Marie P., paternal grandmother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile courts order denying her petition for modification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 388.) In her petition, appellant argued, as she does here, that she was entitled to relative placement preference under section 361.3, yet never received consideration for placement of the minor. On appeal, she contends the juvenile court erred in denying her an evidentiary hearing on her petition.
The Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) contends that appellant does not have standing to appeal the trial courts decision, that she waived or forfeited her right to request a relative placement hearing by failing to request it at the appropriate time, and that her petition for modification was facially deficient. Court affirm the juvenile courts denial of appellants petition for modification for the reasons discussed below.

P.O.P. Enterprises, Inc. (P.O.P.) leased commercial space from Riley J. Lively (Lively) to operate a billiards parlor. In a written lease (Lease), the parties agreed to arbitrate "any dispute between Lessor and Lessee with respect to the provisions hereof . . . ." P.O.P. subsequently filed this action against Lively claiming slander of title, and intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, based on allegations that Lively had interfered with P.O.P.'s attempt to sell its business and assets, including the Lease, to a prospective purchaser. In a first amended answer, Lively raised various affirmative defenses, including that all of P.O.P.'s causes of action were barred on the ground that the Lease required that the claims be arbitrated. The trial court sustained P.O.P.'s demurrer to this affirmative defense, and the action proceeded to trial.

A jury convicted Ricardo Miguel Ruiz of second degree murder and vehicle theft. The court sentenced him to 15 years to life plus two years. On appeal, Ruiz argues there is insufficient evidence to support the second degree murder conviction, and the court erred in instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury awarded K. Hovnanian Forecast Homes, Inc. (Forecast), $250,430.31 on claims arising from Forecast's purchase of finished lots in Coachella, California, for the purpose of constructing new homes for sale. The court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in favor of IRC Coachella Ventures, LLC (IRC), and Innovative Communities, Inc. (Innovative), ruling that an indemnity provision barred Forecast's claims.
orecast appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in considering the indemnity defense in the motion for JNOV and (2) the plain language of the indemnity provision shows it was inapplicable to Forecast's trial claims. Court agree with Forecast's second argument and reverse the judgment.

A jury convicted Sengngeun Koulavongsa of unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, 496d) and two counts of petty theft with a prior ( 484). In a subsequent proceeding, the trial court sustained allegations that Koulavongsa had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) and had two prior serious/violent felony convictions or strikes within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i).
Subsequently, the trial court dismissed one of the strike conviction allegations and sentenced Koulavongsa to six years in prison: double the middle term of three years for the unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle count; a stayed sentence under section 654 for the receiving a stolen vehicle count; and concurrent sentences of two years on the petty theft counts.

A jury convicted Sengngeun Koulavongsa of unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, 496d) and two counts of petty theft with a prior ( 484). In a subsequent proceeding, the trial court sustained allegations that Koulavongsa had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) and had two prior serious/violent felony convictions or strikes within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i).
Subsequently, the trial court dismissed one of the strike conviction allegations and sentenced Koulavongsa to six years in prison: double the middle term of three years for the unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle count; a stayed sentence under section 654 for the receiving a stolen vehicle count; and concurrent sentences of two years on the petty theft counts.

Court affirm. First, Court conclude the trial court effectively issued a statement of decision as part of its minute order denying the motion. Further, it was unnecessary for the court to rule on any of respondents evidentiary objections, because even if Petersen had met his burden of showing that any of respondents were alter egos of CCC or CC LaQuinta, Petersen did not present any evidence that any of respondents controlled the litigation or, more specifically, that any of them had an adequate incentive to defend the litigation as though their own liabilities were at stake. Thus, Petersen did not show that granting the motion as to any of respondents would not have violated their due process rights. For this reason alone, the motion was properly denied.

Appellant Grant C. Wilson filed a civil action against respondent County of Merced in which he sought mandamus relief to lift the establishment of a moratorium of medical marijuana dispensaries in Merced County in addition to seeking compensatory and punitive damages and a declaration that Merced County Ordinance Code section 1830 was unlawful and unconstitutional. Respondent demurred to the pleading. No written opposition was filed. A visiting judge heard argument and sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. The court dismissed the case. Appellant appealed.