CA Unpub Decisions

Vanessa S. appeals the findings and orders entered at the permanency planning selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error. In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting [her] custody of a child or [her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny her request to review the record for error and to address her Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.) Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, Vanessa's counsel also requests leave for her to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.

A jury convicted defendant, Edwin Anthony Arnold, of inflicting corporal injury on his cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)),[1]making terrorist threats ( 422) and dissuading a witness ( 136.1, subd. (c)(1)). In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found defendant had suffered a prior conviction for which he served a prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)) and a serious and strike prior ( 667, subds. (a), (c) & (e)). He was sentenced to prison for 14 years, 4 months. Defendant appealed and we affirmed his convictions, the true findings and the sentence imposed for inflicting corporal injury, but reversed his sentences for making terrorist threats and dissuading a witness and remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to stay punishment for the former under section 654 and to decide whether to impose a concurrent or a consecutive term for the latter. The court below stayed punishment for the terrorist threats conviction and elected to run the term for the dissuasion conviction consecutive to the term for inflicting corporal injury, and, under the terms of section 1170.15, was mandated to impose a full term as to it. Defendant appeals, contending that the court improperly appointed counsel to represent him during resentencing on remand and section 1170.15 violates due process and equal protection. Court reject his contentions and affirm.

Willard and Flora Turner lived at Claremont Manor, a retirement community operated by Pacific Homes, a nonprofit public benefit corporation.[1] Claremont Manor had a health care center that needed to be replaced with a modern facility. Pacific Homes Foundation (the Foundation), the fundraising arm of Pacific Homes, created a fundraising campaign for that purpose. In February 1999, the Turners executed a revocable trust that provided for the distribution of 40 percent of the trust estate to the CLAREMONT MANOR HEALTH CARE CENTER REPLACEMENT FUND. However, [i]f . . . the CLAREMONT MANOR HEALTH CARE CENTER REPLACEMENT FUND is no longer in existence or is otherwise unable to accept this forty percent (40%) of the residue of the [trust] estate, then this forty percent (40%) shall be distributed ratably among certain other specified beneficiaries.
Willard Turner died in 1999. Construction began on the new health care center in 2000 and was completed in 2001. Flora Turner died on December 8, 2005. At the time of her death, a portion of the debt attributable to the construction of the health care center remained unpaid and an account used for receiving contributions and bequests for construction of the health care center was still open and being used to repay the debt. Marsha Meek Banks was the Turners accountant and is the trustee of the Turners trust. She is married to James Banks, the attorney whose firm prepared the Turners trust documents. She is also one of the contingent beneficiaries who would benefit if the bequest to the Claremont Manor Health Care Center Replacement Fund fails. We will hereafter refer to Ms. Banks as petitioner.[2]

Plaintiff Matthew Price was injured after diving off the deck of a pontoon boat into Lake Elsinore and striking his head on the lake bottom. The superior court granted the motion for summary judgment brought by the City of Lake Elsinore (City) based on governmental immunity for injuries caused by hazardous activity and for natural conditions. (Gov. Code, 831.2 and 831.7.)
Price appeals, contending there are material disputed facts. Based on our de novo review, we affirm the judgment as a matter of law.

The appellant in this case is Lowell Steiger, a lawyer who represented the plaintiff, Leigh Umberger, in a personal injury action against Mount Baldy Ski Resort. The court first granted Mount Baldys motion for summary judgment and then granted Mount Baldys motion for sanctions in the amount of $20,468.06. Steiger appeals the sanctions order issued against him. (Code Civ. Proc., 904.1, subd. (a)(12).)
On appeal, Steiger argues the motion for sanctions was procedurally defective and the court abused its discretion in granting the motion. Court disagree on both points and affirm the judgment.

On May 7, 2009, a second amended felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Louis Nunez with failing to register as a sex offender under Penal Code[1]section 290, subdivision (g)(2) (count 1); and failing to update his registration within five working days of his birthday under section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(D) (counts 2 & 3). The complaint also alleged that defendant had suffered four prison priors under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and two strike priors under sections 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(2)(A), and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(A).
On August 13, 2009, defendant pled guilty to all counts and admitted all allegations after the court gave an indicated sentence of eight years.

This is an appeal from judgment entered after a jury convicted defendant and appellant Frank Espinoza Ramirez of 10 counts of violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), committing a lewd act on a child. On appeal, defendant contends the pattern jury instruction on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) prejudicially instructed the jury it could use an expert's testimony as evidence that the crimes actually occurred. This contention is without merit. Court affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial. On appeal, defendant and appellant Juan Carlos Hernandez contends we should reverse his conviction on one of the two felony counts on which he was convicted. Court find appellants arguments meritless and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Kao Kuang Saechao appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of coram nobis. Court affirm the order denying the writ.

On June 4, 2008, Kern County Sheriff's Deputy Robert Contreras was on patrol in McFarland when he saw appellant, Miguel Garza Gonzalez, and another man walking in a market parking lot toward an alley that ran by the market. After Contreras pulled into the alley, the men immediately turned around and began walking in opposite directions. Contreras contacted Gonzalez, conducted a probation search, and found a knife with a wooden handle and a three-and-a-half inch fixed blade concealed in Gonzalezs rear pants pocket.

Petitioner appeals from the dismissal of its petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The petition was dismissed on the ground it was not timely filed. Court affirm.

Antonio Patino (defendant) was convicted of two counts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than defendant. The day before she testified at trial, the victim, a four year old at the time of the charged offense and seven years old at the time of trial, watched a video of her Child Abuse Service Team (CAST) interview recorded three days after the last incident. The prosecution did not disclose that fact to the defense, but it became known the next day during the victims testimony. Defendant contends the prosecutor violated her discovery obligation and committed misconduct. He also contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it denied his mistrial motion, motion to strike the victims testimony, and motion to continue the trial. Lastly, he contends the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant to consecutive 15 years to life terms. Court disagree.

Defendant Jesus Gomez Martinez challenges the trial courts denial of his Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence. He contends the motion to suppress should have been granted because he was subject to an unduly prolonged detention after a routine traffic stop, and he did not consent to a search of his person and his vehicle. Or, if he did, the consent was vitiated because it was given during a period of prolonged detention. Court find no merit in his contentions and affirm the judgment.

Michael George Berger petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus. Bergers petition claims the California Board of Parole Hearings (Board) improperly found him, on multiple occasions, to be unsuitable for parole in contravention of Supreme Court case law. (See In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Lawrence); In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241 (Shaputis).) These cases make clear that, to support a finding of unsuitability, there must be some evidence a prisoner remains a current threat to public safety and not merely some evidence supporting the . . . characterization of the commitment offense as particularly egregious. (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1191.) Because we find the Board did not identify any evidence of current dangerousness, Court grant Bergers petition.