CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Daniel Robles Gonzalez of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)).[1] He waived his right to a jury trial on two prior strike conviction allegations (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12), which were found true in a bifurcated court trial. After a Romero[2] hearing, the court struck one of the strike findings and imposed an eight-year prison sentence.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court (1) prejudicially abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his other acts of domestic violence and (2) erred in concluding that his Texas burglary conviction qualified as a strike. We affirm.

Carl “Vini” Bergeman appeals from an order denying his motion to terminate a restraining order issued against him. He contends the trial court at the original hearing improperly denied him the right to defend himself with the assistance of counsel on respondent Robert David Green’s application for the restraining order, and it was consequently “duty bound” to terminate the restraining order upon his subsequent request.
We disagree. A motion to terminate a restraining order can be based on a showing of either new facts, a change in the law, or that the ends of justice would be served by termination. In effect, Bergeman relied on the last of these justifications in arguing the trial court should have terminated the order because the court issued it without giving him a brief continuance so his counsel could be present to defend him. Bergeman fails to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to postpone the hearing. Moreover, the court allowed him to present additional evidence attacking the restraining order, with the aid of his counsel, at the termination hearing. The court then found Bergeman’s evidence insufficient to terminate the restraining order. We cannot say the court erred in reaching that conclusion, and thus we affirm its order.

In an information filed August 5, 2010, it was alleged that appellant, Carlos Charles Salas, committed three counts of indecent exposure in violation of Penal Code section 314, subdivision (1) (section 314(1))[1] (indecent exposure; counts 1, 2, 3), and that he had suffered a prior conviction of that offense, served two separate prison terms for prior felony convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and previously suffered a “strike.”[2] On December 3, 2010, appellant pled not guilty by reason of insanity.
On March 28, 2011 (March 28), the date set for trial on the guilt phase, appellant pled no contest to each of the charges and admitted the special allegations, and it was agreed appellant would proceed to trial at a later date on the issue of whether he was sane at the time of the charged offenses.
On April 27, 2011, a jury found appellant sane at the time of the instant offenses.
On June 14, 2011, appellant requested, pursuant to section 1385, that the court strike his strike conviction. The court denied that request and imposed a prison term of six years, consisting of the two-year midterm on count 1, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), for a total of four years, plus one year on each of the two prior prison term enhancements. On each of counts 2 and 3 the court imposed concurrent four-year terms.
On appeal, appellant contends the court erred in sentencing him under the three strikes law because, he asserts, the prosecution did not plead and prove that he had suffered a strike conviction.

On August 27, 2008, appellant, Brandie Anne Boyenga, was placed on Drug Court Probation for five years after pleading no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). As a condition of probation, appellant was ordered to successfully complete a drug treatment program.
On February 28, 2011, appellant failed to appear at a Drug Court Review Hearing. Her probation was revoked and a warrant issued for her arrest. On June 13, 2011, appellant appeared and admitted violating the terms of her probation. She was ordered to serve 60 days in jail for failing to appear. On June 20, 2011, appellant requested to be removed from drug court.
On August 5, 2011, the trial court sentenced appellant to jail for 180 days with credit for 49 days served. Because appellant was sentenced in August 2008, the court denied appellant’s request for half-time credits. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

This is an appeal from summary judgment entered against plaintiff Maria Garcia and her children (collectively, plaintiffs), survivors of Luis Garcia, Sr. (Garcia). Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred when it concluded there was no triable issue of fact by which plaintiffs could establish defendants’ acts or omissions were a substantial cause of Garcia’s death. We affirm the judgment.

After using a firearm in the commission of two carjackings, Surgio Valencia Baltazar falsely identified himself to the arresting officer and admitted possession of the firearm.[1] A jury found him guilty of two counts of carjacking, two counts of felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of false identification to a peace officer. The jury found the firearm allegation in each carjacking count true. On appeal, he challenges the proof of his felony prior at trial and the calculation of his fees at sentencing. We order the correction of two fees but otherwise we affirm the judgment.

The Jurupa Unified School District (the District) hired Juan Tecun as a classified employee. Just 126 working days later, it fired him.
Under the District’s express written policy, a new classified employee remains on probation for “130 regularly assigned consecutive working days, including paid holidays,” but excluding any “leave of absence or vacation.”
When Tecun filed this mandate proceeding, he was apparently under three misconceptions. First, he believed the District was subject to Education Code section 45301, which has been construed to require that vacation days must be counted as part of a classified employee’s probationary period. The District, however, is not subject to Education Code section 45301. In this appeal, Tecun does not argue otherwise.
Second, Tecun believed he could add all of his accrued vacation time (6.5 days) to the total duration of his employment (126 days), which would put him over the 130-day minimum. He overlooked the fact, however, that he used 3 vacation days during the 126 days. Thus, he was double-counting. Even if he were entitled to the 3.5 days of unused vacation time, as well as to all of the 126 days, that would put him at only 129.5 days. Again, Tecun does not argue otherwise.

Plaintiff and appellant Kelly Tata (Tata) sued defendant and respondent La Toscana Resort & Spa (the Resort) for (1) negligence; (2) premises liability; (3) assault and battery; (4) negligent supervision and retention; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51); (7) false imprisonment; (8) sexual battery; and (9) invasion of privacy. Tata was initially represented by an attorney, C. Donald Amamgbo (Amamgbo). A substitution of attorney was filed during the case, placing Tata in the status of a self-represented litigant. Tata asserts she was unaware the substitution of attorney placed her in the status of a self-represented litigant. Approximately seven months after the substitution of attorney, the trial court granted summary judgment against Tata, in favor of the Resort. No appearance was made on behalf of Tata at the summary judgment hearing.
After discovering summary judgment had been granted, Tata hired a different attorney, David Wheeler (Wheeler), and moved to vacate the summary judgment ruling on the basis of a mistaken default, i.e., Tata did not know she was self-represented at the time of the summary judgment motion. The trial court denied Tata’s motion to vacate. Tata contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to vacate. We affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant James Daniel Baker asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Hector Ortega Roldan has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal.[1] (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we modify the judgment to award additional custody credits and otherwise affirm.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On August 25, 2011, after accusing his wife of infidelity, defendant kicked her in the shin and punched her in the face. Later that night, he sexually assaulted her.

A jury found defendant Leroy Dale Holsey guilty as charged of failing to update his annual sex offender registration. It further found that he had two strikes and had served three prior prison terms, and that he had previously violated the sex offender registration laws. (Pen. Code, §§ 290.012, subd. (a); 290.018, subd. (b); 667, subds. (b)-(i); 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 28 years to life. Defendant timely appealed.
Defendant’s claims may be grouped as follows: (1) the jury should not have been instructed that “I forgot” was no defense; (2) the trial court mishandled defendant’s claim of incompetent counsel; and (3) the trial court should have stricken the strikes, because otherwise the lengthy sentence violates state and federal constitutional norms.
As we will explain, defendant’s contentions fail to persuade. Accordingly, we shall affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Rebecca Rickley and Natasha Roit (collectively referred to as appellants) appeal from an order denying attorneys fees. We recently addressed the same issue in a related appeal, Rickley v. Goodfriend (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1528 (Rickley I.). We reverse and remand.

Regina H., the mother of 18-year-old C.H.,[1] 15-year-old Christina H., 14-year-old Cynthia H., 12-year-old Cassandra H., and nine-year-old Joseph H., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order removing the children from her custody and placing them with their maternal aunt under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department). Regina contends the jurisdiction findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

B.W. appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered after the court sustained petitions alleging his commission of trespass by “entering and occupying” property (Pen. Code,
§ 602, subd. (m)),[1] battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), and false imprisonment (§ 236). After being sentenced to 165 days in juvenile hall with credit for 165 days served, he was placed on supervised probation.
B.W. contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the trespass offense.[2] We affirm.