P. v. Livingston>

















Filed 4/25/13 P. v. Livingston CA4/3















NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS





California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.











IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT



DIVISION THREE




>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MEGHAN VICTORIA LIVINGSTON, Defendant and Appellant.

G046281 (Super. Ct. No. 06CF0208) O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, Daniel J. Didier, Judge. (Retired Judge of Orange
Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal.
Const.) Dismissed.

Laurel M. Nelson, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L.
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Ronald A. Jakob,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.



*
* *



Defendant
Meghan Victoria Livingston pleaded guilty to href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">arson of an inhabited dwelling (Pen.
Code, § 451, subd. (b)) and sentenced to three years in state prison. After she violated parole, she was committed
to the State Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disturbed
offender. (Pen. Code, § 2960 et
seq.) In December 2011, the court
granted the district attorney’s petition to extend defendant’s commitment for
another year based on the opinion of an appointed psychologist. Defendant appeals, contending the case should
not have proceeded to trial after the prosecutor was advised her current
treating psychiatrist had opined her mental disorder was in remission and she
no longer posed a substantial risk to others.
She also argues no substantial evidence supports the extended commitment
order.

While this appeal was
pending, defendant was discharged from the state hospital and we requested
informal letter briefs “explaining why the appeal should not be dismissed as
moot.” The Attorney General argues the
case is moot because defendant “has already received the relief which she
sought through reversal of the 2011 judgment . . . .” We agree.
“‘“[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical
effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.”’” (People
v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 321.) Because defendant “has already received the
relief [s]he seeks from us” (ibid.),
the appeal is moot.

Defendant urges us to
resolve her appeal because otherwise the issues “are likely to
evade . . . consideration in the future” due to the time
constraints involved in the appeal process.
We are not persuaded. Although we
have discretion to consider “‘an issue of broad public interest that is likely
to recur’” (Blakely v. Superior Court
(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1455, fn. 3), defendant has not shown the issues
she raised are likely to reoccur or that they involve the public interest. To the contrary, whether defendant’s extended
commitment proceedings should have
been terminated based on an alleged opinion from her current treating
physician, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support such an order, both
depended upon the particular facts of her case.


The appeal is dismissed.









RYLAARSDAM,
J.



WE CONCUR:







O’LEARY, P.
J.







FYBEL, J.