CA Unpub Decisions

Jose Chavarria appeals from a victim no-contact order issued after he pled no contest to first degree residential burglary and was sentenced to state prison. The trial court ordered appellant to stay away from the victim.[1] We affirm and hold that the trial court had the inherent authority to issue a non-statutory protective order. (Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1095.)
On May 14, 2012 appellant burglarized Claudia's apartment, stealing her X-box game and checkbook. Appellant was on parole and lived in the main house with his mother. Claudia lived in the garage which had been converted to an apartment. She paid rent to appellant's father.
Pursuant to a negotiated plea, appellant was sentenced to four years state prison. Over defense objection, the trial court ordered appellant not to contact Claudia.

Defendant Xavier Fonseca appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction for lewd acts upon a child (Pen. Code,[1] § 288, subd. (c)(1)), unlawful sexual intercourse (§ 261.5, subds. (c), (d)), and oral copulation of a person under age 18 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)). He contends that the court erred in imposing a $40 criminal assessment for each conviction instead of a $30 fee for each. Further, he contends that the trial court miscalculated both his presentence custody and conduct credits. Finally, he asserts that the matter should be remanded to the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment itemizing the statutory bases for the penalty assessments imposed. The Attorney General concedes each of these points, and we agree. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Sun-Woo (Sunny) Shin appeals from a judgment after an order granting summary judgment was entered in favor of defendants Farmers Group, Inc., Farmers Insurance Exchange, Truck Insurance Exchange, Fire Insurance Exchange, Mid-Century Insurance Company, and Farmers New World Life Insurance Company (collectively, Farmers). Shin brought various claims, all of which were dependent on the existence of an employer-employee relationship with Farmers. The trial court found that Shin was an independent contractor and on that basis granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Veronica Estela Talavera (defendant) appeals from a judgment of conviction of five felony counts. She challenges two counts, attempted murder and aggravated mayhem, claiming those convictions were not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant also requests a review of the sealed transcripts of the trial court’s hearing on her Pitchess motion.[1] Respondent asks that we correct the judgment to reflect the true amount of mandatory fees to be paid by defendant. After reviewing the entire record including the sealed transcripts we conclude that substantial evidence supports the verdicts and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ruling on defendant’s Pitchess motion. Finding respondent’s contentions regarding fees to be well taken, we modify the judgment accordingly, and otherwise affirm.

Coleman Kenyatta Smith appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of first degree murder in which he personally discharged a firearm causing death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court found Smith had a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) and sentenced him to a term of 55 years to life in state prison.
Smith contends the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct during argument and defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object. We reject these contentions but modify the judgment to reflect imposition of a
five-year enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a), rather than section 667.5, subdivision (a). As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Kenneth Lynn Huysman appeals from a judgment of conviction after the trial court found him in violation of his probation. He contends the trial court violated his due process and confrontation rights at his probation violation hearing by allowing a probation officer to testify regarding a probation officer’s report prepared by a different probation officer. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs and appellants Elvira Ortiz, Jorge Aguirre, and Jaime Aguirre appeal from the trial court’s order granting defendants and respondents Israr Siddiqui’s and Sadeeda Akhtar Siddiqui’s motion for summary judgment in this action for negligence, wrongful death, gross negligence, emotional distress, and premises liability. Plaintiffs contend defendants owed Jorge and Francisco Aguirre (now deceased) a duty, as patrons, to protect them from injury by third parties. They further contend there is a triable issue of fact with respect to whether defendants’ inaction caused the injuries suffered. Finally, plaintiffs assert the judgment must be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in overruling their evidentiary objections.
We affirm the judgment.

John Sylvester Diaz appeals from the judgment entered after his no contest plea to driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or more. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b).) Appellant admitted three prior convictions of driving under the influence. The three priors made the present crime a felony offense. ( Id., § 23550.) Appellant was granted probation on condition that he serve 300 days in county jail.
Appellant pleaded no contest after the trial court had denied his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.[1] Appellant contends that the trial court erred because the police made a warrantless entry into his residence without probable cause or exigent circumstances. He also contends that the warrantless, nonconsensual drawing of blood from his person violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm.

Lino F. Hernandez, Alvino Joe Hernandez, and Alejandro Salas appeal from the judgments following their convictions by jury of one murder and three attempted murders. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189; 664/187, subd. (a).)[1] The jury convicted Salas of second degree murder, and convicted Lino and Alvino of first degree murder, with a true finding as to a gang special circumstance allegation.[2] (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189; 190.2, subd. (a)(22).) The jury also found true allegations that appellants' crimes were committed for the benefit of, in association with, or at the direction of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); a principal personally used a firearm in the crimes (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)); and Lino personally inflicted great bodily injury in their commission (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
Appellants raise multiple challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings and verdicts: Alvino and Salas challenge the gang enhancement findings; Alvino and Lino challenge the gang special circumstance findings; and Salas challenges his second degree murder and attempted murder convictions. Appellants also contend that the trial court committed multiple prejudicial instructional and evidentiary errors that violated their constitutional rights. Alvino claims that the trial court cited improper factors as justification for imposing consecutive sentences for the three attempted murders.[3] We affirm.

B.J. and K.U. (parents) petition this court for an extraordinary writ pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, seeking review of the juvenile court’s order terminating their reunification services and setting the matter for hearing to implement a permanent plan for their son, B.T. (minor).[1] Parents seek this relief on the ground that the evidence in the record fails to support the juvenile court’s findings that they failed to make substantial progress on their case plan and that returning minor to their care would present a substantial risk of harm to his physical or emotional well-being. We deny the writ petition, and deny as moot parents’ related request for a stay of these proceedings.

Shawn S. (Father) is the father of Ethan S. (now age 11). Ethan was the subject of a September 2004 dependency petition, based on an allegation of caretaker absence or incapacity. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (g).)[2] At the time, Father was unable to provide for his son because he was participating in a residential drug treatment program. Ethan was found to be a dependent of the court in November 2004. Father was offered reunification services with a case plan that required him to complete his inpatient substance abuse program and follow all recommendations for aftercare. Father successfully completed his treatment program and the dependency was terminated in February 2006.
On June 3, 2011, a second dependency petition was filed alleging that Father was frequently consuming alcohol in the home to the point of passing out. He had also physically abused Ethan when he was drunk.
At the jurisdiction hearing held on July 28, 2011, the juvenile court sustained the petition as amended. The jurisdiction report filed by the Humboldt County Department of Health & Human Services (Department) concluded that Father “has unaddressed alcohol issues that render him unable or unwilling to provide adequate care for his son.” A supplemental report stated that Father had been arrested on July 12, 2011, and charged with stealing a bottle of tequila from a supermarket. At the time of his arrest, he had another individual’s prescription medication in his pocket.

After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations of a juvenile wardship petition alleging that appellant had possessed a controlled substance, i.e., cocaine base, for sale to be true. Later, another such court determined appellant to be a ward of the court and ordered the probation office to find a suitable facility for him. Appellant appeals, claiming that the first juvenile court erred in not admitting into evidence the testimony of two witnesses who would have proffered testimony questioning the veracity of two of the officers involved in his arrest. We find no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court and hence affirm its orders.

Plaintiff James Karim Muhammad, acting in pro. per., sued the manager of his apartment complex, defendant Eden Housing Management, Inc. (Eden), and two of its employees in connection with an alleged assault by one of the employees. When Eden and Muhammad appeared for an anticipated jury trial, the trial court refused to honor Muhammad’s demand for a jury trial because he had not timely posted jury fees. Muhammad contends he was wrongly denied a jury trial because there was no demonstration of prejudice resulting from his failure to post fees. We agree and reverse.

Defendant Joaquin Gustavo Denys appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate judgment. In 1999, defendant pleaded nolo contendere to two counts of possession for sale of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359) and one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine (id. § 11378). Defendant argues that he was not sufficiently advised of the immigration consequences of his plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5.[1] For the reasons set forth below, we find that the trial court that took defendant’s plea adequately and substantially complied with the requirements of section 1016.5, and we affirm the judgment.