CA Unpub Decisions

Hugo H. seeks extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)),[1] terminating his reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to his two-year-old daughter Leanna. We deny the petition.

After a Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5[1] disposition hearing, the juvenile court found the minor, R.R., to be a dependent of the juvenile court and removed custody from Christy H. (mother)[2] and denied her reunification services. The court also found Samuel C. (father) to be the biological father and granted him reunification services. Father appeals from the court’s order denying his request for determination as a presumed father and for placement, which he now contends was error. We disagree and affirm.

On April 7, 2011, respondent Cody Escovedo obtained a restraining order against appellant Laura Robitschek. By its terms, the order was to remain in effect until midnight on October 7, 2011. On October 17, 2012, respondent filed another request for a restraining order. In the request, respondent averred under oath that Appellant “has use[d] weapon and gun threats in the past.” Respondent attached letters dated October 21, 2011, and May 23, 2012, to his request for a restraining order. The letters contain appellant’s typewritten name at the bottom, but no signature.[1] Respondent also attached a letter he wrote to appellant. In the letter, respondent alleges that appellant made charges to credit cards in respondent’s name without permission.
Appellant filed a response, contending that respondent’s claims lacked specificity. Appellant also claimed that respondent’s allegations of prior abuse “do not meet the requirements of assault.”
The court held a hearing on the restraining order request. Both appellant and respondent were sworn and offered testimony. At one point, the court asked respondent what type of mail he received from appellant. One of the pieces of mail respondent identified were holiday cards addressed to respondent’s son.

In February 2012, a juvenile delinquency petition was filed alleging that appellant I.F. committed assault likely to produce great bodily injury based on an incident in juvenile hall. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).) After a contested jurisdictional hearing in May 2012, the allegation was found true. In July 2012, the juvenile court declared the offense to be a felony, adjudged I.F. to be a ward of the court, and ordered him committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), for a term of 16 months. Combined with the terms for his previously sustained petitions, I.F.’s maximum period of confinement was eight years eight months.
On appeal, I.F. contends that (1) juvenile hall staff violated his right to equal protection by withholding medication prescribed for the treatment of his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD); (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to investigate or present any evidence regarding his ADHD and the withholding of medication in his defense at the jurisdictional hearing; (3) the juvenile court failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 5.651 (hereafter rule 5.651); and (4) the cumulative impact of these errors deprived him of his right to due process and a fair trial. We find I.F.’s contentions unpersuasive and will affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication and orders.

Appellant, surety United States Fire Insurance Company (appellant), through its bail agent Garcia Family Bail Bonds, Inc. (the bail agent), posted bail bond number U100-20304496 in the amount of $100,000 to release defendant Miguel Marquez Rodriguez[1] from custody (the bond). Defendant failed to appear in court on January 28, 2011, and a bench warrant was issued.
The clerk’s transcript contains a one-page “Notice of Forfeiture and Certificate of Mailing” dated January 31, 2011 (the notice). The notice advises that defendant failed to appear on January 28, 2011, and the superior court had ordered bail forfeited. The notice was addressed to appellant and the bail agent. At the bottom of the notice, there is the heading “CERTIFICATE OF MAILING” under which the following text appears:

Appellant/defendant Mark E. Garner met with a psychologist on April 24, 2009, and disclosed that he had been having sex with his 27-year-old daughter, Jane, for at least 10 years.[1] Defendant said Jane lived in his house, she was developmentally disabled, and he might have fathered a child with her in 2004. Defendant also said he had sex with her the previous night, and he was concerned it would happen again. The psychologist immediately reported defendant’s confession to the Madera County Sheriff’s Department. In the meantime, defendant repeated various aspects of his confession to his sister, his adult son, and one of his adult stepsons. His son (Jane’s brother) immediately removed her from defendant’s house, and Jane tearfully told him that defendant had been “messing” with her. It was later determined that defendant was not the father of Jane’s child.

A modification decision.

On July 5, 2012, the San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging that defendant and appellant D.K. (minor) committed vandalism under $400. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A), count 1.)[1] At a jurisdictional hearing, a juvenile court found the allegation true and continued the case for a dispositional hearing. On November 8, 2012, a first amended juvenile petition was filed on an unrelated case. That petition alleged that minor had committed misdemeanor battery on school, park, or hospital property (§ 243.2, subd. (a)(1), count 1), misdemeanor battery (§ 242, count 2), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 3). The court dismissed counts 1 and 3, and minor admitted the allegation in count 2. On December 27, 2012, the court held a dispositional hearing on both cases. The court declared minor a ward and placed her on probation under the terms recommended by the probation department.
On appeal, minor contends that two of her probation conditions should be modified since they are unconstitutionally overbroad. We agree. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Derrick Deshone Graham was a member of a gang called the Edgemont Criminals. During a routine traffic stop of a car he was driving, the police found an “eight ball” of methamphetamine inside a laptop case on the passenger seat.
A jury found defendant guilty as follows:
Count 1: Possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), with a prior drug-related conviction enhancement (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)) and a gang enhancement (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)).
Count 2: Transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379), with a prior drug-related conviction enhancement (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)) and a gang enhancement (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)).
Count 3: Active participation in a gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)).
Defendant admitted one “strike” prior (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and one prior serious felony conviction enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)). At sentencing, however, the trial court struck the strike prior. It also struck the punishment on the gang enhancements. (See Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (g).)
As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total of 11 years in prison, along with the usual fines, fees, and conditions.
Defendant now contends:

This is an appeal by defendant and appellant, Darwin Castro Matute (defendant), from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty, among other things, of false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236), as a lesser included offense to the charged crime of kidnapping to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)), forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)), attempted forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286, subd. (c)(2)), assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and an attempt to make criminal threats (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 422). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a term of 15 years to life in state prison on the rape conviction, preceded by determinate terms of three years on his conviction for attempted forcible sodomy, and eight months on his conviction for false imprisonment.
Defendant raises five claims of error in this appeal, the first of which challenges the correctness of CALCRIM No. 852, which instructs the jury on how to consider evidence of uncharged acts of domestic violence. Next, defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling that defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence were admissible under Evidence Code section 1109. Defendant also challenges the constitutionality of Evidence Code section 1109 and Penal Code section 422, the criminal threats statute. Defendant’s final claim is that CALCRIM No. 1300, which instructs the jury on the crime of making criminal threats, is incorrect. We conclude defendant’s claims are meritless. Therefore, we will affirm.

Defendant and appellant Erek Kernell Smith pled no contest to one count of street terrorism. (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a).)[1] The parties stipulated that defendant was a member of a criminal street gang, and that he actively committed a felony offense. The court placed him on probation for a period of three years under certain probation conditions.
On appeal, defendant contends that certain probation conditions should be modified. The People concede, and we agree, that the probation conditions at issue should be modified. As modified, we affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Eric S. seeks writ review of juvenile court orders granting a writ petition filed by his daughter, Chloe S., under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388, subdivision (c)(1)B), terminating his reunification services and referring the matter to a section 366.26 hearing. We deny the petition and deny the request for a stay of the proceedings.

In this case, David B. (the Minor) was on probation in the juvenile court for robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). His probation terms included placement in the San Diego County Probation Youthful Offender program (Y.O.U.) for a period not to exceed 480 days.
In February 2013, the Minor was detained for alleged probation violations. Later the Minor admitted three of the probation violations, following a full advisement of his rights to a probation violation hearing. The court again placed the Minor on probation subject to 90 to 120 days in the Y.O.U. program.
The Minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) raising possible, but not arguable issues. We offered the Minor the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal. The Minor has not responded.