CA Unpub Decisions

John K. and Monique C., in propria persona, seek extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e))[1] terminating their reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing to implement a permanent plan of adoption as to their 10-month-old son, J.K.
John and Monique contend they initiated their reunification services late but are making an effort to comply with the juvenile court’s orders. They seek an order from the juvenile court continuing their reunification services and returning J.K. to their custody.
We will dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, David Anthony Corral, pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from owning a firearm (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)), and admitted an allegation that he had suffered a “strike.”[1] Consistent with the plea agreement, the court imposed a prison term of four years, consisting of the two-year middle term on count 1, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The court imposed a concurrent four-year term on count 2.
The instant appeal followed. The court granted appellant’s request for a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5).
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.

Appellant, Jose Casillas Malanche, was convicted after a jury trial of rape (Pen. Code,[1] § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1), sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2); count 2), and sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The jury also found that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the commission of each offense. (§ 12022.8, former § 667.61, subd. (b).)[2] This court filed an opinion in appellant’s first appeal, case No. F060845, on March 2, 2012. We affirmed appellant’s convictions, found sentencing error, and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion to sentence appellant to concurrent or consecutive sentences on each count.
The trial court conducted a new sentencing hearing on August 20, 2012. The court found appellant’s conduct in committing the offenses to be egregious and imposed a sentence of 15 years to life on count 1 and consecutive sentences in counts 2 and 3 of 15 years to life, for a total sentence of 45 years to life. The court stayed the great bodily injury enhancements found true as to each count.[3] The court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine. Appellate counsel has filed a brief seeking independent review of the case by this court pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

On May 12, 2011, appellant, Lorenzo Gilbert Trevino, Jr. pled guilty in Fresno Superior Court case No. F10904144, to one count of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459 & 460, subd. (b))[1] and admitted a prior serious felony conviction under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12). Appellant appealed this conviction and on July 31, 2013, we issued our opinion in case No. F063621, rejecting appellant’s challenge to the number of his custody credits and affirming his conviction.[2]

A jury found defendant Michael Edward Chandler guilty of sodomy by force or fear (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)) and simple assault (Pen. Code, § 240). It rejected charges of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422). It also rejected allegations that he used a deadly weapon in the commission of the sodomy. (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4), 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total of six years in prison, plus the usual fines, fees, and conditions.
Defendant now contends:
1. In light of the fact that the jury rejected the charges of assault with a deadly weapon, making a criminal threat, and robbery, and also rejected the deadly weapon use enhancement, there was insufficient evidence of force or fear to support the sodomy and simple assault convictions.
2. The trial court erred by prohibiting defendant’s expert witness from testifying that the victim had a chronic anal fissure.
We find no error. Hence, we will affirm.

Sixteen year-old Kaieesha Franklin (defendant) argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term following her conviction for attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)).[1] We will affirm.

Defendant Keith Allen Shovey claims that because he did not receive notice or a hearing prior to the trial court’s imposition of a $500 appointed attorney compensation fee, it must be stricken. In the alternative, relying upon People v. Pacheco (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1392 (Pacheco), he asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the order and that the matter must be remanded for a hearing on whether he has the ability to pay the fee. The People answer that defendant forfeited his right to notice and a hearing by failing to object below, but concede that the matter must be remanded for an ability to pay hearing on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. In a one-page letter reply brief filed March 21, 2013, appellate counsel asks us to “accept respondent’s concession.”
Because the trial court failed to provide defendant the notice and hearing required by Penal Code section 987.8, and because we find defendant’s due process claim was not forfeited, we will remand the matter for the trial court to determine his ability to pay the disputed fee.

This is an appeal by Jose Aurelio Aguilar, defendant and appellant (defendant), from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1)[1] (count 1), and possession of ammunition in violation of section 12316, subdivision (b)(1) (count 2), and the trial court sentenced him to serve the middle term of two years in state prison on each count, to be served concurrently.[2]
Defendant raises two claims of error in this appeal—first, he contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding him guilty on count 1 of being a felon in possession of a firearm and, second, that the trial court committed prejudicial error in responding to questions the jury asked during their deliberations.
We conclude both claims are meritless, as we explain below. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury found Edgar Nunez Beltran, defendant and appellant (defendant), guilty of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)),[1] as a lesser included offense of the charged crime of murder, and further found true the special allegation defendant used a firearm in committing the crime (12022.5, subd. (a)). In this appeal from the judgment entered after the trial court sentenced him to serve a total of 14 years in state prison, defendant contends, first, the evidence does not support the jury’s guilty verdict; next, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity; and, finally, that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the legal principles pertinent to the defense based on defending others from imminent injury. We conclude, as we explain below, defendant’s claims are meritless. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment.

Arguing that the many instances of sexual molestation of his stepdaughter over a period of years constitute, and should have been charged as, a single violation of Penal Code section 288.5,[1] defendant Luis Fernando O’Donovan seeks reversal of four of his eight felony sex offense convictions. The People maintain that the offenses were properly charged and the separate convictions should stand. We agree with the People and will affirm.

In this juvenile wardship proceeding, Larry W. (Minor) appeals from a judgment finding that he committed offenses on three different occasions, including falsely identifying himself to an officer and two distinct instances of theft from a person. He argues (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he aided and abetted the theft from one of the victims (Suzanne Cook); (2) a condition prohibiting his unsupervised presence in downtown San Diego is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specify the geographic boundaries of the prohibited area; and (3) the juvenile court was required to calculate his precommitment custody credits and specify his maximum permissible period of confinement given that he was committed to the Breaking Cycles program.

This case arises from a gang fight in which then 17-year-old Jimmy Espinosa participated as a member of the Oceanside Posole street gang. During the fight one of the victims suffered a stab wound.
Espinosa was charged as an adult with a number of felony offenses. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Espinosa pled guilty to attempted murder (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 664 & 187) and admitted he committed the crime for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The parties agreed to a 15-year limitation on any prison sentence and the remaining counts and allegations were dismissed.
Following an extensive hearing, the court denied Espinosa's request for probation and sentenced him to the upper term of nine years for attempted murder. The court struck the 10-year gang enhancement in the furtherance of justice under section 1385.
Espinosa appeals contending the court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation and in imposing the upper term for the offense. We will find no abuse of discretion for either decision and will affirm.

Appellant Thomas Sears challenges an order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus, in which he sought to overturn the denial of unemployment insurance benefits under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256 (hereafter, "section 1256"). Representing himself on appeal, he contends that he should have received such benefits because there was no evidence of misconduct during his employment with the Monterey County Housing Authority Development Corporation. We will affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.