CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Patsy Gilbert-Davis appeals from an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer by defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (the MTA) to her second amended complaint. She argues that she stated a claim for violation of the federal Americans with Disability Act (ADA) (Pub.L. No. 101-336; 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) and California’s Disabled Persons Act (DPA) (Civ. Code, § 54 et seq.), or alternatively that the trial court should have granted her leave to amend.[1] We conclude that the trial court properly sustained the MTA’s demurrer but should have granted Gilbert-Davis leave to amend. Therefore, we reverse in part with directions.

Defendant Justin Thomas Miller appeals from an order of the trial court denying his motion to award additional presentence credit. Defendant contends that although his probation was revoked on a different case and he was sentenced on that case while he was awaiting his trial in the present case, he should have been given credit in the present case for his entire period of custody, from arrest until sentencing on the present case. We conclude the order was not appealable, but treat the appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and deny the petition for failure to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to additional credit.

Appellant Bigfoot Ventures, Ltd. appeals from the judgment entered in favor of respondent NextEngine, Inc. following a jury trial on Bigfoot’s claims for breach of contract and NextEngine’s cross-claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the California Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). On appeal, Bigfoot argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s special verdict findings in favor of NextEngine and that NextEngine’s defenses and cross-claims fail as a matter of law. Bigfoot also asserts that the judgment must be reversed because the jury’s special verdict findings were inconsistent and contradictory. For the reasons set forth below, we reject Bigfoot’s arguments and affirm the judgment in NextEngine’s favor.

Kenneth R. appeals from the order of the juvenile court taking jurisdiction over his son, three-year-old Blake. He contends the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the finding that his conduct justifies declaring Blake a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a).[1] We conclude the evidence supports the finding under section 300, subdivision (a). Accordingly, we affirm the order.

The grant of a defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy principles terminates the People's case. Where, as here, the trial court grants a new trial based on its independent assessment of the evidence pursuant to People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, and Penal Code section 1181, subdivision (6),[1] there is simply no authority upon which such motion can be made or granted. Any trial court contemplating terminating the People's case on double jeopardy principles should welcome the opportunity to pause and reflect before making a ruling. Here, the trial court did so without the benefit of a written motion or written opposition.

The roof of a commercial building collapsed after a heavy rain causing over a million dollars in damages to a tenant of the building. The tenant’s insurer, Affiliated FM Insurance Company, brought this action in subrogation against defendant Southland HVAC & Construction, Inc., alleging that Southland’s negligence in altering the drains on the roof caused it to collapse. The trial court granted Southland’s summary judgment motion and entered judgment for Southland. We affirm.

Defendant, Darnell James Thomas, was charged with second degree robbery. (Pen. Code,[1] § 211.) During trial, however, the prosecutor orally amended the information to charge attempted robbery. The jury convicted defendant of attempted robbery. (§§ 664, 211.) The jury further found the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Defendant admitted the truth of the allegations concerning: 2 prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); 2 prior separate prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); and 13 prior serious or violent felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court struck the additional punishment under section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was sentenced to 35 years to life in state prison with a 15-year minimum parole eligibility. We modify the judgment to award defendant 110 days of conduct credit and to strike the $20 penalty imposed under Government Code section 76104.7, subdivision (a). We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Defendant Royce Sung Kwark appeals from the judgment entered upon his jury conviction of criminal threats, false imprisonment by violence, assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury, and assault with a firearm. Defendant argues the court committed reversible error in limiting his cross-examination of the prosecution’s main witness. We disagree and affirm.

Daniel V. DuRoss is special trustee for the John H. Stewart Trust (Trust), which Stewart created to care for his son, Ronald Stewart (Ron), a developmentally disabled adult. Ron lives with and is cared for by his conservator Michelle Malveaux and her husband Paul Malveaux.[1] DuRoss filed a petition under Probate Code section 17200,[2] seeking authorization to pay $270,000 for improvements to the Malveauxs’ home to improve care for Ron. That petition was granted. However, when additional costs arose, he filed a second petition seeking authorization to pay $321,425, an increase of $51,425. The trial court granted the petition in part and denied it in part, authorizing the disbursement of only an additional $17,500 and ordering that the sum be paid by deducting $1,000 a month from the monthly conservator fee paid to Michelle Malveaux. DuRoss appeals, contending that the trial court erred in restricting his discretion to make the disbursement. We affirm.

Pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.),[1] the trial court granted plaintiff and respondent Marion Helen DeMello Lionel’s (Marion) application for a domestic violence restraining order against defendant and appellant Evan Lionel. Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the issuance of the order. We affirm.

Ivan Rene Moore appeals in pro. per. from the superior court’s judgment following trial on the unlawful detainer complaint of Kimberly Martin-Bragg seeking forfeiture of a lease and possession of a property. The judgment, entered January 23, 2012, awarded Martin-Bragg possession of the disputed property, along with rent of $50,068.34 and rental damages of $57,220.96 for the period from May 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011, plus daily damages of $238.42 per day from January 1, 2012 until the date of judgment.
Moore appeals from the judgment on a number of grounds, most notably the trial court’s refusal to consolidate the unlawful detainer case against him with another action then pending in the superior court, brought by Moore, seeking quiet title to the property based on allegations that Martin-Bragg’s title to the property was actually held in trust for Moore’s benefit. Upon a fragmentary and disorganized record we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing Moore’s request to consolidate the unlawful detainer and quiet title actions for trial, and that Moore was prejudiced by being forced to litigate the complex issue of title to the property under the summary procedures that govern actions for unlawful detainer.

Appellant Ahmed L. Dosso is the owner of a unit, apparently a condominium, in a building on Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles. Respondent Park Wilshire Homeowners Association (HOA) is a homeowners association established by covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R’s) governing the property. The HOA is authorized to, and has, imposed assessments on Dosso as a unit owner. Pursuant to the CC&R’s, failure to pay assessments when due may lead to enforcement proceedings, as it did in this case. Dosso was substantially late in paying assessments. The HOA sued him to enforce the secured lien it held under the CC&R’s with respect to these late payments. Dosso answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint in which he sought damages for breach of contract, various torts, and other relief.
After settlement efforts failed, the case was tried to the court. The court found in favor of the HOA and against Dosso.[1] Dosso filed a timely appeal.

Willie Mays appeals from the judgment after a jury found him guilty of one count of attempted second degree commercial burglary and the court found the prior prison term allegations true. Mays argues that the court erred in revoking his pro per status at the commencement of the trial and in excluding him from the courtroom during a portion of the trial. Those arguments have no merit. We agree, however, that Mays’s custody credits should be recalculated.

Ruth Moynes died in 2006 at the great age of 100. Plaintiff Lynn Lintz, the decedent’s executor and the sole beneficiary of her pour-over trust, brought suit to recover various sums alleged to have been improperly obtained by Moynes’ long-time caregiver, Ruby Waltrip, and Waltrip’s daughter, appellant Marilu Ramirez. At the conclusion of a two-stage bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Lintz and against Ramirez for approximately $1.250 million. Ramirez attacks the judgment on a number of grounds, but she directs her primary fire at the trial court’s finding that the decedent had been the victim of undue influence. We find no error, and we affirm.