CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants Andrea M. and James H. appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition order entered on August 24, 2012, adjudging their daughter, N.H., a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b),[1] and ordering her removal from Andrea’s custody. James joins in Andrea’s appeal and separately challenges the juvenile court’s disposition order requiring him to participate in parenting education classes and individual counseling pursuant to section 362. This case arises out of the tragic injuries suffered by N.H’s one-year-old cousin, Kiara, while N.H. and Kiara were in Andrea’s care. Although N.H. did not suffer the injuries giving rise to the present action, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS” or “respondent”) filed a section 300 petition on her behalf due to Andrea’s treatment of Kiara.
On appeal, appellants argue the juvenile court erred in adjudging N.H. a dependent of the court because she was neither injured, nor the sibling of the injured child. Further, James separately argues the juvenile court erred in ordering him to attend parenting education classes and individual counseling because he played no role in causing Kiara’s injuries. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Winbush was convicted of second degree commercial burglary upon his no contest plea. (Pen. Code, § 459.) The trial court sentenced him to the upper term of three years, but suspended execution of the sentence and granted probation. Winbush violated the terms and conditions of his probation. He tested positive for hydrocodone for which he did not provide a prescription, and he tested positive for marijuana. He did not complete court-ordered community service and did not enroll in required drug and domestic violence programs. The court revoked his probation.
We appointed counsel to represent Winbush in this appeal. After counsel's examination of the record, he filed an opening brief raising no issues.
On December 17, 2012, we advised Winbush that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished to raise on appeal. We have not received a response.
We have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that Winbush’s attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The order is affirmed.

Defendants Elizabeth Galarza and Janet Loaiza appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motions to withdraw their 1996 guilty pleas pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5[1] and their petitions for a writ of error coram nobis. We affirm.

In this family law case, Debbie Minkler sought modification of a child support order after her former husband, Scott Minkler, received a large lump sum in settlement of a lawsuit. The trial court ruled the settlement funds were not income for purposes of child support. The court imputed a reasonable rate of return on the portion of the settlement funds remaining for investment ($1,141,000) after Mr. Minkler bought and improved a residence, repaid accumulated debt, and purchased “items for living” (automobile, furniture, family vacations and so on). The court declined to deviate upward from guideline child support.
Ms. Minkler appeals. She contends the settlement funds constituted income under Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 61), and therefore those monies must be included in the calculation of guideline child support. Alternatively, she challenges the court’s refusal to impute income on the $600,000 the husband spent to purchase and improve a family home, and argues that in any event the court should have deviated upward from guideline child support.
We affirm the trial court’s order.

Appellant Jad Attili borrowed $1 million to purchase a home, secured by a deed of trust on the property. When Attili stopped making his monthly payments, the loan servicer, respondent OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest), appointed a successor trustee to institute nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Attili failed to cure the default, and the trustee sold the property at a foreclosure sale. Attili's fourth amended complaint seeks damages against OneWest and respondent E*Trade Bank (E*Trade) for, inter alia, wrongful foreclosure, intentional infliction of emotional distress and promissory estoppel.
The trial court dismissed Attili's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and granted respondents' motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims. Attili contends triable issues of fact exist that preclude the grant of summary judgment. We disagree and affirm.

Donna Y. Keulen, appellant, brought an action against Well Fargo Bank, N.A., respondent, challenging the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of her residence in Paso Robles (the residence). Notice of the sale was published in the Paso Robles Press. Appellant appeals from the judgment entered in respondent's favor after the trial court granted its motion for summary judgment. Appellant contends that there are triable issues of fact (1) whether the Paso Robles Press is a newspaper of general circulation within the City of Paso Robles, and (2) whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies. We affirm.

Defendant Cory Brim pleaded no contest to two counts of dissuading a witness. He appeals from his sentence of five years, the maximum sentence authorized by law. He contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying probation and imposing the maximum term. We affirm.

David McKinney (appellant) appeals from an order granting NuScience Corporation’s (respondent) special motion to strike a malicious prosecution complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).[1] Appellant also challenges an order awarding respondent attorney fees in the amount of $129,938.75. We affirm both orders.

This involves a second appeal in a dispute over class action attorney fees. Two law firms, Morris Polich & Purdy LLP and Shenoi Koes LLP, were named as defendants in an arbitration proceeding. Brandon McCall, Barry Selbst, Kelly-Slate Diaz and Dani Reagan are the named plaintiffs of the salaried managers’ subclass in the class action. They are likewise the plaintiffs in the arbitration proceeding. The parties refer to the salaried managers’ subclass as the McCall subclass. Defendants had represented the entire class during part of the wage and hour class action. Opposing defendants in the attorney fee dispute is the Quisenberry Law Firm, which appeared through its principal, John N. Quisenberry (the objector). The objector represented the McCall subclass during a portion of the class action. The objector negotiated a settlement on the McCall subclass’s behalf. For clarity’s purpose, we will refer to Morris Polich & Purdy LLP and Shenoi Koes LLP as defendants.
The objector appeals from a March 22, 2012 order directing Labor Ready Inc., the McCall class’s employer, to disburse $247,000 to defendants. The trial court issued the disbursement order after an arbitrator awarded defendants, the prior class counsel, 65 percent of the $380,000 attorney fees award. The objector argues: it was error to order Labor Ready Inc. to release two-third of the class counsel fees to defendants; it was not bound by the arbitration award because the arbitration was between defendants and the McCall class; the trial court could not release two-thirds of the class counsel fees on the basis of the arbitration award; the class counsel fees cannot be used to satisfy the prior class counsel’s quantum meruit claim against the McCall class; the disbursement order circumvents the requirements governing the execution of money judgments because Labor Ready, Inc. is not a judgment debtor. The objector’s arguments are meritless as they are barred by the law of the case doctrine. Thus, we affirm the order.

Plaintiff and appellant Rita Sabina Mandosa brought an action for professional negligence against defendant and respondent the Regents of the University of California (Regents), alleging that several doctors were negligent in the diagnosis and treatment of a condition known as Charcot foot. By special verdict, a jury concluded that two doctors were negligent, six were not, and any negligence was not the cause of appellant’s injuries. The trial court thereafter denied appellant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, granted in part appellant’s motion to tax costs and denied her motion for reconsideration and renewed motion to tax costs.
We affirm. Though we conclude that appellant has waived her substantial evidence argument by presenting only the evidence favorable to her position, we would find the verdict amply supported by substantial evidence in the form of testimony from treating physicians and experts. Moreover, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying appellant’s posttrial motions seeking to overturn the verdict. Finally, the trial court properly exercised its discretion limiting the hearing on the initial motion to tax costs and in denying appellant’s unmeritorious and untimely efforts to modify the partial denial of that motion.

Donald Joseph MacKenzie III appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1), count 1),[1] two counts of making criminal threats (§ 422, counts 2 and 4), and failure to care for an animal (§ 597f, count 3). The trial court sentenced appellant to a prison term of three years and eight months. The court selected the middle term of three years on count 1, and a consecutive eight months (one-third the middle term) on count 2. On count 4, the trial court imposed a consecutive eight-month term and stayed the sentence under section 654. Appellant was ordered to serve six months in Los Angeles County Jail for the misdemeanor conviction on count 3.
Appellant contends (1) the prosecution committed misconduct and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during jury voir dire, (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence and denied the defense request to present surrebuttal evidence, (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte with the unanimity instruction on counts 2 and 4, (4) the trial court erred by placing time limits on the parties’ closing arguments, (5) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on counts 1, 3, and 4, and (6) his convictions for counts 2 and 4 were unlawful.
We affirm.

After being made a ward of the court and placed on probation in her mother’s custody in 2011, appellant, now age 17, left her mother’s home without permission or supervision several times, and then admitted the violations of probation to the juvenile court. After two hearings in June 2013, and over the objection of defense counsel, the juvenile court ordered appellant placed at the New Foundations facility. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, she appeals and asks this court to examine the record and determine if there are any significant issues deserving of further briefing. We have done so, find none, and hence affirm the juvenile court’s dispositional order.

Following the denial of a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5)[1], appellant Judah Malachi Sherwin pled no contest to one count of possession of marijuana for sale, and the prosecution moved to dismiss the remaining charge for transportation of marijuana. On appeal, appellant challenges the constitutionality of the use of a police canine to establish probable cause, and the trial court’s finding of probable cause based on the results of the canine’s “alert” on appellant’s storage unit. We reject appellant’s challenges, and affirm.

Between 2007 and 2008, Bijan Madjlessi entered into or guaranteed repayment of three loans from Sonoma Valley Bank (SVB). Following SVB’s closure and takeover by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the loans were acquired by Westamerica Bank (Westamerica) in August 2010. Madjlessi failed to repay those loans or make good on his guaranties, and Westamerica filed suit for breach of contract. The trial court granted Westamerica’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal from the judgment against him, Madjlessi challenges the evidence submitted by Westamerica in support of its motion and the trial court’s rulings admitting that evidence. We affirm.