CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and appellant Payman Emamian appeals a judgment following a grant of a motion for summary judgment brought by defendants and respondents Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) and The Bank of New York Mellon fka The Bank of New York as Trustee for the Holders of the Bella Vista Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2004-1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-1 (BONY) (collectively, defendants).
Because Emamian failed to meet his burden as the appellant to present an adequate record for review, the judgment must be affirmed.

Defendant and appellant Angelo Wingo raises a contention of trial error relating to jury selection, following his conviction of multiple robbery, attempted robbery and illegal use of tear gas charges, with principal armed and personal use of a firearm findings.

Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of multiple felonies committed on separate occasions. Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury when it denied his motion to discharge a juror who attended the same church as a law enforcement witness for the prosecution, the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm because it was not shown his gun was operable on the day the assaults were committed, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We disagree and affirm the judgment.

The County moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, finding multiple defendants jointly and severally liable for nuisance per se. One of the defendants, Dominguez and Sons Trucking, Inc. (Dominguez), has appealed from the judgment. It contends the trial court erred in concluding that the County had met its burden of establishing that Dominguez had violated a County ordinance upon which liability for creating a public nuisance could be based. Dominguez argues further that the court erroneously found Dominguez jointly and severally liable with the remaining defendants for creating the public nuisance. And it asserts that the court erred by denying its motion to continue the summary judgment hearing to obtain necessary discovery.
We conclude that the court properly granted summary judgment and did not err in denying Dominguez’s continuance request. We will therefore affirm the judgment entered on the summary judgment order.

On April 24, 2013, appellant/defendant Thomas Hernandez fired a shotgun blast at Bernardo Valdez as they were standing in front of the house located at 4469 East Nevada in Fresno. The first shot missed Valdez and instead shattered the house’s front window. In reaction to the shot, Valdez turned away from defendant and fell to the ground. Defendant reloaded his shotgun and walked toward Valdez, who was lying face down on the ground, and fired a second shot directly into Valdez’s back. Valdez died from this wound.

Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Defendants.
Claimants and appellants Me.O. and Mi.O. (Claimants) appeal the denial of their petition to be named de facto parents (Petition) of D.R. (Minor) entered prior to the disposition hearing. We conclude this predisposition order is not appealable and dismiss the instant appeal.

The juvenile court terminated defendants and appellants, J.K.’s (Mother) and J.S.’s (Father; collectively Parents), parental rights as to J.S. (Minor) (born in June 2014). On appeal, Mother contends the appeal must be construed to include the order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, the court erred by denying her an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition, the court violated her due process rights by preventing her from testifying regarding Minor’s relationship with his sibling, and the court erred by finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights inapplicable. Father joins Mother’s arguments insofar as a resolution in her favor would benefit him. We reverse and remand the matter for a limited hearing on the issue of the sibling relationship exception.

The juvenile court declared one-year-old H.C. a dependent after police found him and his presumed mother, Catrina C., in a stolen car in a convenience store parking lot; Catrina had drugs in her pockets. The court terminated Catrina's reunification services at the 18-month status review hearing, kept H.C. in a placement with Catrina's sister (Aunt), and set a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. A few months later, Catrina filed a petition under section 388 requesting that the court modify this order by placing H.C. with Catrina at her residential treatment facility or, in the alternative, by reinstating her reunification services. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied Catrina's petition and placed H.C. in a guardianship with Aunt. Catrina contends the juvenile court erred in denying her petition. We affirm.

K.B. appeals a judgment terminating her parental rights to her two children, Jc.L. and Ja.L. K.B. contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because the court failed to comply with "the inquiry/notice requirements" of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et. seq.; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq. [incorporating ICWA's requirements into California statutory law]). We affirm the judgment.

In this family law case, the trial court granted in part appellant's request to reduce his spousal support obligation and reduce the amount of life insurance he was required to maintain as security for that support. The trial court denied appellant's request for an offset for amounts he paid on a student loan for which both parties were obligated and for which they had previously agreed they would share equal responsibility. The trial court stated that it had unresolved questions about the request and that its denial of appellant's request was without prejudice to appellant's ability to make a further request for an offset.

This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We briefly recount the facts and procedural history in accordance with People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110.
On November 24, 2015, defendant Travis Keith Nelson sprayed his live-in girlfriend V.V. with a hose while she was sleeping in their bed. V.V. awoke, soaked from head to toe, and ran into the bathroom.
Inside the bathroom, V.V. attempted to block defendant’s access but he forced his way in and tried to wrestle a cell phone out of V.V.’s hand while threatening to kill her. Defendant threw V.V. around the bathroom. He kicked her legs, hip, and shoulder and slammed her head into the tile floor. Defendant then took the cell phone away from V.V. and left the bathroom. V.V. stayed in the bathroom and used a different cell phone to call the police. V.V. then went to the kitchen and waited for the police to arrive.

In denying defendant Pavel Tovpeko’s motion to suppress evidence that his blood alcohol level was 0.30 percent, the trial court found that he freely and voluntarily consented to a blood draw despite the arresting police officer’s failure to inform him of the consequences of refusing to consent. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings and agree with its legal conclusion defendant was not subjected to an unreasonable search because he consented to the blood test. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Bobby Gerome Roston appeals from an order revoking and reinstating his parole (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a)). He contends there is insufficient evidence his parole violations were “willful.” We disagree and affirm.

On November 4, 2014, the voters approved Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Proposition 47 reduced certain nonserious, nonviolent felonies to misdemeanors. Proposition 47 allows a person convicted of a felony prior to its passage, who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, to petition the court to reduce his or her felony to a misdemeanor and be resentenced.
In 2005, prior to the passage of Proposition 47, defendant and appellant Daniel Scott Trenholm entered a guilty plea to a felony violation of receiving stolen property, specifically a motor vehicle, within the meaning of Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a). Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence (Petition) stating that his felony conviction should be reduced to a misdemeanor. The trial court denied the petition on the ground defendant’s conviction was not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47.