CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Joshua Dubose appeals from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s request for an order finding that defendant satisfied certain conditions of probation and should be released from custody. We reverse and remand.

Brandon Steven Lovato appeals from his judgment of conviction of two counts of attempted willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) with true findings on related firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)) and gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). On appeal, Lovato argues that (1) the trial court may have abused its discretion in determining whether all discoverable material in the investigating officer’s personnel file was disclosed, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that Lovato was the perpetrator of the charged crimes.

Appellant C.M., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order following appellant’s admission to the claim, asserted in a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, that appellant committed a battery against a person with whom he had a dating relationship (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)). Appellant contends one of the conditions of his probation, limiting his ability to associate with known gang members, was improperly imposed and overbroad. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

A jury found Steven M. Behnke guilty of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) (count 1), unlawful possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2), and possession of cocaine (§ 11350, subd. (a)) (count 3). After the jury returned its verdicts, Behnke admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction for a violation of section 11378, and a prior conviction for a violation of section 11351. Based on these admissions, the trial court found that Behnke had suffered two prior drug-related convictions within the meaning of section 11370.2, subdivision (c). The trial court sentenced Behnke to prison for a total term of three years and eight months, consisting of the upper term of three years on count 1, plus a consecutive eight-month sentence on count 2. In imposing the upper term on count 1, the court relied in part on Behnke's prior convictions. The trial court sentenced Behnke to time served on count 3, and stayed the impositi

On April 3, 2015, Nick Julian Herran waived his constitutional rights to a jury trial, pleaded no contest to one count of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and admitted the special allegation he had personally used a deadly weapon in committing the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)) as charged in the amended information.
At the time he entered his plea, Herran was advised of his constitutional rights and the nature and consequences of the plea, which he stated he understood. Herran’s counsel joined in the waivers of his constitutional rights. The trial court expressly found Herran’s waivers and plea were voluntary, knowing and intelligent.

J.Y. appeals from the juvenile court’s order of wardship based on a sustained Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that alleged one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). On appeal, J.Y. contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding.

Defendant Quincy Lewis appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of misdemeanor battery and felony criminal threats. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to the criminal threats conviction to a misdemeanor. We shall affirm the judgment.

In June 2016 we considered the issue of whether the family law court abused its discretion by denying R.C.’s (Father) petition for legal and physical custody of his son Michael C. (Michael). (R.C. v. P.C. (June 28, 2016, G051519) [nonpub. opn.] (R.C.).) In that appeal, Father complained the family law court ignored the fact his due process rights were violated when the court in 2013 gave Michael’s maternal grandmother, P.C. (Grandmother), sole legal and physical custody of the child as part of a domestic violence restraining order to keep Michael’s drug addicted mother, H.C. (Mother), safely away from them. (Ibid.) Father maintained it was unfair to be excluded from the proceedings that effectively terminated his parental rights. We concluded he was right because the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate custody in favor of a non-parent in the context of a domestic violence restraining order. (Ibid.) We also expressed dismay the Orange County Department of Social Service

Cesar S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s September 15, 2016 order terminating parental rights to his minor son, E.S., and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. The court concluded father had not established the applicability of the sibling exception or the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. Father contends the juvenile court erred in finding that neither exception applied.

Defendant Nathaniel Smith was convicted in 1995 of possession of a firearm by a felon. Based on his prior convictions, he was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison as a third strike offender. He now appeals from the postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126, enacted by Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36). The trial court found defendant was “armed” during the commission of his underlying crime and therefore was ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36. We reject his challenge to that ruling and affirm the order.

Plaintiff Paul T. Wilkes appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition to compel defendants Metal Flowers Media, LLC, Tim Warren, Alevil Rincones, and Allen Vainshtein to arbitrate plaintiff’s claims arising from his participation in a television show, “Bar Rescue.” The petition alleges that Metal Flowers is the casting company that “pitches potential bars for filming” to Bar Rescue’s producer, Bongo, LLC. Defendants Warren and Rincones are executive and story producers for the show, and defendant Vainshtein is Bongo’s attorney. To participate in the show, plaintiff signed an Appearance Release with Bongo, which contained an arbitration clause. Following plaintiff’s demand to arbitrate his claims arising from the show, JAMS ordered Bongo to participate in arbitration. However, because defendants are not signatories to the agreement, JAMS would not order them to participate absent their consent or a court order.

Defendant Peter Todd Johnson appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of attempted first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246). Defendant contends the trial court coerced the jury into rendering a verdict by ordering continued deliberation after a deadlock was announced. He also argues that the court erred in denying his motion to substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We disagree and affirm.

Defendants and appellants Oscar Tomas Rayos Parra and Hipolito Rayos Parra were convicted of the murder of Irela Quinones in a joint trial before separate juries. Oscar and Hipolito are half brothers. Ms. Quinones was the former girlfriend of Oscar. Both Oscar and Hipolito gave statements to law enforcement admitting involvement in the death of Ms. Quinones.

Henry McCullough (Henry) appeals from an order following trial awarding him spousal support in the amount of $500 per month for 60 months and retaining jurisdiction to make further orders, including after the expiration of the 60 months. Although the trial court considered the factors identified in Family Code section 4320 as required in setting support, there is no reasonable basis in the evidence for the amount and duration of support that the court ordered in light of the disparity in the parties’ post-separation income and lifestyles. The parties were married for over 16 years. At the time of trial, Henry had been ruled permanently disabled and had a disability income of $950 per month. Carolyn was a nurse with a monthly income of $7,833, over eight times that amount. Their children were adults. In light of Henry’s obvious need, Carolyn’s ability to pay, and the marital lifestyle, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order only $500 pe