CA Unpub Decisions

Borrower on a loan secured by a deed of trust was in default. He applied to the loan servicer for a modification of his loan. The servicer contracted with borrower to modify the loan if borrower fulfilled certain conditions. Borrower alleges he fulfilled the contract conditions, but servicer refused to modify the loan. Borrower brought this action against the present and former loan servicers, alleging causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Clarence R. and Erica C. (collectively, the de facto parents) are former foster parents and de facto parents of two-year-old Jasmin M. Clarence R. appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying his petition for modification (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388), in which he had requested return of Jasmin to his care. Although his briefing on appeal is somewhat unclear, it appears he essentially contends that his and Erica C.’s constitutional rights were violated when the juvenile court removed Jasmin from their care without a hearing and, in addition, that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied his section 388 petition without a hearing. We conclude (1) the de facto parents have waived the right to challenge Jasmin’s removal by failing to appeal the March 2016 removal order, and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Clarence R.’s section 388 petition without a hearing. We shall therefore affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Defendants E.N. and C.B. (Mother and Father, respectively) appeal from an order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating their parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for their two-year old son, M.B. Both parents contend the trial court erred by (1) determining the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights did not apply, and (2) failing to give notice of the proceeding to relevant Native American tribes as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). For the reasons explained, we find no error and will affirm the order.

Defendant Victor Noel Vaca appeals from an order denying his Penal Code section 1170.18 petition to designate as a misdemeanor a felony conviction that was previously dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. The Attorney General concedes it was error to deny the petition. For the reasons explained, we find the concession appropriate and agree the court erred. We will therefore reverse the order.

Defendant Jose Antonio Silva appeals his conviction of five counts of lewd or lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on principles of unanimity. As set forth below, we affirm.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant Todd Martin Wilkinson’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47. (See Pen. Code, § 1170.18.)
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

In this dependency action, the mother (appellant R.M.), half-brother (mother’s son, appellant Paul M.), and presumed father (appellant Jeff P.) of dependent minors L.P. and E.P. appealed from orders terminating parental rights, freeing L.P. and E.P. for adoption, and denying petitions for modification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 366.26, 388.)

In case number SCUKCRCR 1684543 (hereinafter case number 1684543), the Mendocino County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant Armando Quiroga with the felony offenses of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359), with a related allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)).

Defendant Christopher James Bynum appeals from a judgment of conviction after pleading no contest to a felony charge of possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years subject to various terms and conditions. The probationary terms and conditions were accepted by defendant without objection and, as to a gambling prohibition condition, specifically requested by defendant.

Defendants, the owners and managers of a 38-unit apartment building at 1918 Lakeshore Avenue in Oakland (collectively, owners), appeal from the denial of their anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1)) seeking to strike the complaint brought by the “tenants union” and a large number of tenants of the apartment building (collectively, tenants) alleging multiple acts of harassment and misconduct designed to evict tenants and to cause tenants to terminate their tenancies. The tenants’ complaint contains 10 causes of action preceded by a four-page unnumbered “introduction,” which tenants concede on appeal should be stricken, and 23 numbered paragraphs over 16 pages of further introductory allegations incorporated into each of the causes of action. Spread throughout the complaint are allegations of both protected and unprotected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.

In this dependency appeal, Shayla G. (mother) challenges the jurisdictional finding and dispositional order which led to the removal of her young daughter, Kaitlyn A. (born May 2015), from her custody. Specifically, mother argues that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under subdivision (b) of section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence. Mother also claims that the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing Kaitlyn from parental custody was not sufficiently supported by evidence of risk to the minor and that reasonable means existed to keep the minor safe in mother’s care. Finally, mother challenges the sufficiency of the required noticing under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., contending it was deficient. Seeing no error requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s challenged findings and orders, we affirm.

This is the second action brought by Glenda Lovell concerning alleged construction defects in a home built by respondent Ben Li Qiu and purchased by appellant from respondents Stanley and Sofia Fong. Appellant appeals from a judgment sustaining respondents’ demurrers to her complaint, dismissing her action and awarding attorney fees. She contends the trial court erred in finding her action barred by her previous action against the same defendants and in awarding attorney fees despite respondents’ refusal to participate in mediation. We affirm.

On November 3, 2011, the Alameda County District Attorney filed an indictment charging David Demarcus Haqq (Haqq or appellant) with three counts of forcible rape while acting in concert (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264.1), and one count of kidnapping to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)). In connection with the forcible rape counts, it was further alleged that Haqq kidnapped the victim, that the movement substantially increased her risk of harm, and that the victim was 14 years of age or older. (§§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2), 667.8) On April 11, 2013, Haqq filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the lengthy precharging delay in the case resulted in a denial of his federal and state constitutional rights to due process. Haqq’s jury trial began on April 15, 2013. On April 18, 2013, the trial court denied Haqq’s motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on May 23, 2013, the jury found Haqq guilty as charged and found true the charged allegations. As a result, on June 21, 201

Danny Cavic identifies in his notice of appeal five underlying trial court orders he claims are erroneous. The notice also lists the eventual entry of judgment dismissing Cavic’s malpractice action against Gary E. Schreiber, Jerome D. Stark, Jerome D. Stark, P.C., other attorneys who formerly represented Cavic, and numerous other defendants. The trial court dismissed the case after Cavic failed to post security required of him as a vexatious litigant.