CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Robert James Markrell was convicted by plea of two counts of second degree robbery and two counts of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). He admitted having four prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b) – (i), 1170.12) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), and that he had served one prior prison term for a violent felony conviction (§ 667.5, subd. (a)) and three other prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

The collapse of much of our country’s home lending market over the last decade produced rubble of varying compositions. The debris in this case included an old fashioned Ponzi scheme. When one perpetrator’s bankruptcy and a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation effectively eliminated suit against the schemers, the borrowers here sued their lender on various common law theories, asserting generally the lender had made a loan the lender knew the borrowers could not repay. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding no triable issue of fact existed that the lender was in cahoots with the Ponzi operators, nor was the lender liable under any other theory. We agree with the trial court and affirm the grant of summary judgment.

The superior court denied a criminal defendant’s request for an in camera review of a correctional officer’s personnel files on the ground that the factual scenario suggested by the defendant was not “plausible.” We conclude the superior court employed too restrictive a definition of the word “plausible” and, in effect, required the defendant to speculate about the officer’s motives. We therefore reverse its decision and direct it to conduct the requested in camera review.

Appellant was convicted of numerous sex crimes on September 29, 2000. As described in this court’s opinion from the judgment, People v. Hughes (July 11, 2003, H022186) [nonpub opn.] , “A jury convicted defendant of 12 counts of committing lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)),[ ] 4 counts of rape with a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)), 19 counts of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), and 1 count of misdemeanor possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a)). The jury found true enhancement allegations on various counts for multiple victims (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)), kidnapping (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(1)), aggravated kidnapping (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)), impersonation of a police officer (§ 667.17), and kidnapping of a person under the age of 14 for the purposes of committing a sexual offense (§ 667.8, subd. (b)). The jury also found true numerous probation ineligibility allegations (§§1203.066, subds. (a)(3), (6) & (7)). [¶] Defendant

Defendant Todd Peter Howard pleaded no contest to four counts of forcible lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b).) The trial court imposed a total term of 30 years. The court also ordered general restitution in the amount of $20,000, in addition to a $200 restitution fine and a $200 sex offender fine under section 290.3.
On appeal, Howard contends the $200 restitution fine and the $200 sex offender fine were unauthorized under the versions of the statutes in effect at the earliest time the offenses could have been committed.

When a party obtains a judgment dismissing all claims against it, may the trial court deny that party’s motion for contractual attorney fees without prejudice to the party again raising the issue after the court decides the claims among the remaining parties? In this case, we answer that question in the negative.

A jury convicted defendant Ron Roberson of committing an aggravated assault with great bodily injury. In this appeal, Roberson claims the trial court improperly denied three motions: his motion to continue (made as voir dire was about to begin); his motion for mistrial (made by his own counsel based on ineffective assistance); and his motion for new trial (also based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
We will find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the continuance and mistrial motions. The continuance motion was untimely and not supported by good cause; the motion for mistrial did not establish a legal necessity.

Defendant and appellant J.B. (Mother) has a history of abusing drugs and domestic violence that led to the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (CFS) removing her two-year-old son E.B. (the child) from her home. Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to the child. Mother argues that the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applies and that the juvenile court should have ordered legal guardianship instead of adoption. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we reject Mother’s claim and affirm the judgment.

Following his conviction for carrying a loaded firearm in violation of Penal Code section 25850(a), defendant Calvin Alexis Garcia was placed on felony probation. He contends the trial court erred by imposing probation conditions that are unconstitutionally vague because they lack an express knowledge requirement. While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 (Hall) and we gave the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs discussing its application to this case. Although defendant now concedes that under the doctrine of stare decisis we are bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455), he urges us to distinguish that decision. He notes that the weapons condition in Hall applied only to concealable weapons while here, he is barred from possessing any weapons. We disagree that this admittedly “narrow” distinction requires a different result and accor

A jury convicted defendants Jennifer Lynn Toro and Stevie Theodore Torres of what is commonly known as an “Estes robbery,” in which a defendant uses force or fear after the initial taking of the property. (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 (Estes).) Torres, joined by Toro, contends Estes was “wrongly decided” because it improperly expanded Penal Code section 211 “beyond its common law meaning.” Toro also argues insufficient evidence supports her conviction under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and thus the trial court erred in instructing the jury on that theory. We disagree with defendants’ contentions and affirm the judgments.

D.W. (Mother) and J.H. (Father) have a history of abusing drugs that led to the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (CFS) removing their children from their home. The parents’ reunification services were terminated as to their two older children, and the children currently reside with their legal guardian. Both parents were denied reunification services as to their then six-month-old daughter J.H. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(12), and (b)(13). About four months later they each filed section 388 petitions, which were summarily denied. The parents appeal from the juvenile court’s orders denying their section 388 petitions.
On appeal, both parents argue the juvenile court erred in summarily denying their section 388 petitions without a hearing. We conclude the juvenile court did not err and affirm the orders denying the parents’ section 388 petitions.

Appointed counsel for defendant Timothy James Crownover asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On May 15, 2016, Brandon Dozier contacted law enforcement about a friend’s stolen vehicle, as he drove around looking for it. He spotted the vehicle and was following it when he saw it was pulling over. Dozier attempted to block the driver in, while simultaneously getting out of his own car. Defendant was driving the stolen vehicle and, in an effort to get away, drove at Dozier who had to leap out of the way to avoid being hit.

In 1998, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant with (1) evading a pursuing police officer causing death or serious bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 2800.3), (2) possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5), and (3) vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)(1)). The charges were predicated on evidence defendant fled in a car he was driving from two police officers who were attempting to conduct a traffic stop. During the ensuing police chase, defendant drove though numerous stop signs and eventually collided with another car at an intersection. The two occupants of that car suffered serious injuries as a result of the collision: the driver was knocked unconscious and died a month later, and the passenger suffered lacerations to her face which caused heavy bleeding.

Elza Orin Pittman (Pittman) appeals from a judgment finding him to a be sexually violent predator (SVP) (as defined as in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq.) and committing him to the custody of the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term of appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility.
In 1958, Pittman pleaded guilty to fondling a nine-year-old boy (Pen. Code, § 288); at the time, Pittman was 19 years old. In 1959, just one year later, Pittman pleaded guilty to fondling two 13-year-old boys (Pen. Code, § 288).