Filed 4/20/17 P. v. Garcia CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE


THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CALVIN ALEXIS GARCIA,
Defendant and Appellant.

A148014

(Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR669556)


Following his conviction for carrying a loaded firearm in violation of Penal Code section 25850(a), defendant Calvin Alexis Garcia was placed on felony probation. He contends the trial court erred by imposing probation conditions that are unconstitutionally vague because they lack an express knowledge requirement. While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 (Hall) and we gave the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs discussing its application to this case. Although defendant now concedes that under the doctrine of stare decisis we are bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455), he urges us to distinguish that decision. He notes that the weapons condition in Hall applied only to concealable weapons while here, he is barred from possessing any weapons. We disagree that this admittedly “narrow” distinction requires a different result and accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant pleaded no contest to, among other charges, a felony violation of section 25850, subdivision (a)–carrying a loaded firearm. He was found guilty based on that plea. Pursuant to section 25850, subdivision (c)(3), he admitted that he was an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in section 186.22, making the offense a felony.
At sentencing, the trial court ordered that defendant not “possess or use any controlled substances or associated paraphernalia without a valid prescription.” Defendant was also ordered not to “possess any weapons,” and not to “own, possess, [or] have under [his] custody or control any firearms or ammunition per federal and state law.” Defendant stated that he understood and accepted the terms and conditions of his probation. Defendant timely appealed.
Defendant initially argued that the probation conditions prohibiting his possession or use of weapons and controlled substances without a valid prescription violate due process because they fail to provide him fair warning of what is proscribed. Defendant concedes that Hall holds that “probation conditions already include an implicit requirement of knowing possession” and need not carry an express knowledge requirement. He now argues that Hall should be distinguished because his weapons condition bans all weapons while the ban in Hall was of concealable weapons.
DISCUSSION
The trial court “has broad discretion to determine whether an eligible defendant is suitable for probation and . . . under what conditions” in order to promote rehabilitation and minimize the risk to public safety. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin); see also § 1203.1 et seq.) A “ ‘facial challenge’ ” such as vagueness may be raised for the first time on appeal if it presents a pure question of law that “does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885, 889 (Sheena K.).) We review vagueness constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo. (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
“ ‘It is an essential component of due process that individuals be given fair notice of those acts which may lead to a loss of liberty.’ ” (In re Angel J. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1101.) To overcome a vagueness challenge, a probation condition “must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) The vagueness doctrine “bars the government from enforcing a provision that ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ ” (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 500.) “A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that should appear to a reasonable, objective reader’ ” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 382) and “should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague ‘ “ ‘if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language’ ” ’ ” or if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to “ ‘ “other definable sources.” ’ ” (Hall, at p. 501.)
In Hall, our Supreme Court held that “[t]he unwitting possession of contraband does not sufficiently establish backsliding by the probationer, nor does it sufficiently threaten public safety, to merit revocation without regard to the probationer's state of mind.” (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 499.) In other words, for a probation violation for possession of a weapon or a controlled substance, the People must show that the possession of the contraband was knowing, regardless of whether that requirement is expressly set out in the language of the probation condition. Defendant concedes that Hall holds that modifying those conditions simply to make explicit what the law already makes implicit is unnecessary. (Id. at p. 503.)
As for defendant’s proposed distinction, the vagueness claim in Hall did not turn on whether a weapon was concealable. On the contrary, the issue there, as here, was whether adding the word knowingly to the probation condition was necessary to overcome a vagueness challenge. Moreover, he offers no authority or reasoned argument to support that distinction. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 206. [“Points ‘perfunctorily asserted without argument in support’ are not properly raised.”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
 




SIMONS, J.



We concur.




JONES, P.J.




NEEDHAM, J.





(A148014)