CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Edward Scott Malloy entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)) and possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). He also admitted he had three prior Health and Safety Code section 11378 convictions. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c).) In accordance with the plea agreement, the court sentenced him to a total term of 12 years eight months in state prison, but suspended imposition of the sentence and placed him on probation for three years, under specified conditions. A trial court subsequently found defendant in violation of four of his probation conditions. The court terminated his probation and sentenced him to the previously suspended term of 12 years eight months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the court abused its discretion in failing to reinstate him on probation; and (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

A jury convicted Anthony Hernandez of possessing methamphetamine for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and transporting methamphetamine (§ 11379, subd. (a)).1
The trial court found Hernandez’s prior conviction allegations true (§ 11370.2, subd. (c),
Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and sentenced Hernandez to 10 years in county jail.

Defendant Alberto Arturo Ruiz was involved in a brawl, in which he knocked down one victim, and then assaulted him and two other victims with his car, before fleeing the scene. Defendant testified he thought he and his passenger were being threatened by gang members.
A jury convicted defendant of four counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon four different victims. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 667 and 1192.7, subd. (c)(31).) Count 1 specially alleged that defendant inflicted great bodily injury, causing one victim to become comatose due to brain injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (b).) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 11 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing gang evidence and by not giving an instruction on self-defense on counts 1, 2, and 3. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendants and appellants S.O. (mother) and A.G. (father) appeal from the
juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights with respect to M.G. (child), who
is the subject of this dependency proceeding. Their only contention on appeal is that
plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS)
failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We affirm the judgment.

In April 2016 the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral alleging Erasto and Aaron’s mother, Arilene R., had abused Aaron and Moises, Erasto’s 10-year-old son from an earlier marriage. The caller also alleged Erasto had abused Arilene. Interviewed at the family’s home, Arilene denied the allegations and blamed Erasto’s ex-wife (Moise’s mother, Lizette R.) for spreading rumors and instigating poor behavior by Moises when he spent time with Erasto and Arilene. Arilene denied that either she or Erasto had ever abused Aaron, who appeared healthy and bore no marks or other evidence of abuse, and insisted they had disciplined Moises appropriately when necessary. Arilene also denied Erasto was currently abusing her, although she acknowledged an isolated incident a year earlier in which he had been intoxicated and hit her on the head during an argument. She had called the police on that occasion, and Erasto had been arreste

Liliana P. (mother) appeals from a May 2, 2016, custody order regarding her child, Aimee R. Mother argues the juvenile court erred in granting Jose C. (father) sole physical custody of the child. Mother points to the fact that the juvenile court awarded her physical custody of her other two children (fathered by different men), and contends she should have similarly been granted joint physical custody of Aimee.
We affirm the judgment. It was reasonable for the juvenile court to determine the best interest of the child required sole physical custody of Aimee be awarded to father because the record establishes (a) prior to the issuance of the custody order, Aimee thrived under father’s temporary care, and (b) father offered a more stable environment than mother.

In 2012, defendant and appellant Desiree Dawn Villareal pleaded guilty to two
counts of second degree commercial burglary in violation of Penal Code1
section 459.
Subsequently, defendant petitioned for relief pursuant to the Safe Neighborhoods and
Schools Act, enacted by the voters as Proposition 47 in the November 2014 election.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by considering the aggregate
amount of loss, rather than the value of the property at issue in each separate count. The
People concede the aggregation issue, but contend that the denial of defendant’s petition
was nevertheless proper, because the cashing of a forged check at a check cashing
business does not fall within the meaning of “shoplifting” in section 459.5. We reverse
the trial court’s order

Defendant and appellant Chad J. Green pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving
stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a). Subsequently,
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defendant petitioned for relief pursuant to the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act,
enacted by the voters as Proposition 47 in the November 2014 election.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his
Proposition 47 petition. We affirm.

Crystal S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights over three of her children, 13-year-old Maya G. (Maya), 12-year-old Louis G. (Louis), and nine-year-old Cassandra C. (Cassandra). Lawrence C. (father) is the father of Cassandra, and he appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over her. Mother and father contend the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights existed and that the juvenile court denied them due process when it refused to allow the children to testify at the permanency planning hearing. We disagree and affirm.

As it is undisputed that the value of the property involved in count 2
(burglary) was not more than $950, the order appealed from is modified so
as to grant the petition with respect to count 2. The order appealed from is
further modified so as to give defendant leave to file an amended petition
with respect to count 10 (burglary) and counts 27, 31, and 33 (acquisition
of access card information). On remand, the trial court shall set a
reasonable deadline for the filing of any such amended petition, and it shall
have discretion to continue that deadline for good cause shown.

Tamara F. (mother) appeals from the jurisdictional finding and dispositional order declaring her daughter, Kiana F. (Kiana), a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s jurisdictional finding that, based on mother’s problems with alcohol, Kiana is at risk of suffering serious harm. She also argues the dependency court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.)
On February 24, 2017 (while the current appeal was pending), the dependency court entered a family law order defining the terms of Kiana’s custody, and an order terminating jurisdiction. We provided the parties an opportunity to address whether we should take judicial notice of the dependency court’s February 24, 2017 orders, and declare moot the issues currently on appeal.

A jury found Jason Andrew Broxton guilty of obstructing a utility line in violation
of Penal Code1 section 591 and tampering with a fire alarm. The trial court held a joint
sentencing hearing on the instant case and a probation violation in a prior case. Broxton
admitted that he violated probation in the prior case as a result of his convictions in the
instant case. At the hearing, the trial court denied Broxton's motion under section 1385 to
strike his prior strike conviction for residential burglary. The trial court sentenced
Broxton to 32 months in prison, and imposed a consecutive 16-month term for his
probation violation.

In September 2015, Joshua Padilla worked for Kmart in its shoe department. Defendant also worked at Kmart, stocking merchandise in the grocery and chemical department. The departments in which the men worked were “quite a distance” from each other, and the only reason someone from defendant’s department would pass Padilla’s department would be to go to the restroom or break room.
Padilla had been at Kmart for five years and defendant only one. Before working together, the men had never met. At first, they had a “normal co-worker relationship.” A few months before September 2015, that changed. Padilla was in the warehouse and a box hit his head. Defendant was “standing there,” and although he denied throwing the box at Padilla, a witness saw him do it. After that, the men had almost daily “yelling confrontations.” Defendant told Padilla to “ ‘watch your back. I’m going to get you. I have your number,’ ” and that Padilla’s time was “up.”

In 2012, Ed and Carole McVaney used a limited liability limited partnership they
owned (defendant TPL, LLLP) to purchase a residence in Coronado, California. After
they constructed a new home on the property, the McVaneys landscaped over a frontage
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road that crossed their lot and for decades had provided access to the main street for
neighboring residences. As a result, neighbor and plaintiff Harold DeNardi brought an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief to force the McVaneys to restore the frontage
road and access point. The trial court granted DeNardi's motion for summary
adjudication, concluding he had a prescriptive easement for use of the road. The court
then granted DeNardi's motion for a permanent injunction, ordering the McVaneys to
restore the road and access point. The McVaneys challenge those orders, asserting (1)
DeNardi did not establish a prescriptive easement because he and others in the
neighborhood generally believed the access road was a