CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and respondent Universal-Products International, LLC, (Universal) hired defendant Omega Products International, Inc. (Omega) to fabricate and test a pool resurfacing product. When the product began to reemulsify, or soften, Universal sued Omega for breach of contract and related claims. A jury found in favor of Universal and the court awarded a judgment for damages of $470,833. Omega appeals from the judgment.
Omega identifies five issues on appeal. The first two issues involve parol evidence and the agreement to test for reemulsification. Omega contends the trial court wrongly ruled that the testing agreement was not integrated and that Universal could present parol evidence about the meaning of the agreement. In the alternative, Omega contends that no substantial evidence proved the existence of a testing agreement.

Defendant Anthony Jerome Armstrong appeals from two separate cases sentenced
in the same proceeding, one resolved by trial and the other by plea. He raises a single
claim of error in the former, and claims no error in the latter. In the former, hereafter
“the domestic violence case,” (case No. 13F08165) a jury found him guilty of inflicting
corporal injury on a former cohabitant and assault with a deadly weapon, and found true
an enhancement for a prior domestic violence conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd.
(a), 245, subd. (a)(1), 273.5.) His stipulation that he had sustained a prior conviction for
domestic violence, entered during trial, is the subject of his sole claim on appeal.

A jury convicted defendant Bryan Scott Owen of continuous sexual abuse of a child. (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a).) The trial court sustained multiple enhancement allegations based on four prior convictions for lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14, and sentenced defendant to 48 years to life plus 21 years. On appeal, we modified the conviction to lewd act on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)) and remanded for resentencing.

Appellant D.N., Sr. (father) appeals from the juvenile
court’s October 3, 2016 jurisdiction and disposition orders
adjudging his young sons (D.N., Jr., and J.N.) dependents of the
court. Father challenges only the jurisdictional finding pursuant
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)1 as
it relates to him, but not as to A.S. (mother). Father contends the
jurisdictional findings as to him are not supported by substantial
evidence and asks us to reverse the judgment. Father’s briefs are
silent regarding the court’s disposition orders.

Defendant Vicente Carlos Vargas appeals from the denial of his suppression motion. While he was on parole, an officer searched his cell phone. Defendant contends the parole search was unlawful under Riley v. California (2014) 134 S.Ct. 2473 (Riley), which held a cell phone searched incident to arrest unlawful. We conclude the parole search was lawful and affirm.

Appellant Daniel Rios appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (hereinafter the Act or Proposition 36). The trial court concluded Rios was ineligible for resentencing because he was armed with a firearm during commission of his current offenses, possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of marijuana for sale. We affirm the trial court’s order.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Onofre Alvarado
Roblero of crimes arising from his sexual abuse of his daughters.
His primary contention on appeal is the trial court erred by
admitting evidence that one daughter, Je., attempted suicide.
We reject the contention, but, because there is an error in the
sentence imposed, we modify the sentence and affirm the
judgment as modified.

Defendant James Edward Peters appeals from a judgment issued after a negotiated disposition of his case. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief that does not raise any legal issues. Counsel requests this court independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and has not done so. Upon our independent review of the record pursuant to Wende, we conclude there are no arguable appellate issues for our consideration and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

“At all relevant times, Elizabeth Karnazes and John Hartford were attorneys, and
for a considerable number of years appear to have practiced together. Their parting of the
ways was in no sense amicable. The courts became their battleground, and the judges of
San Mateo County the most unwilling observers of their repeated campaigns of scorched
earth litigation tactics[1]
. . . . [¶] After it granted Hartford’s special motion to strike
Karnazes’s cross-complaint, the trial court granted his motion for the award of costs and
attorney fees guaranteed him by the SLAPP statute. ([Code Civ. Proc.,
[2]
] § 425.16,subd. (c).) The amount of the award was $21,143.37, and the order was filed on
September 28, 2009.”

R.P. appeals from orders of the juvenile court finding that he committed a robbery, with personal use of a firearm, and committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He contends the enhancement must be vacated because the evidence does not support the finding that the gun displayed during the robbery was a firearm within the statutory definition, as opposed to a replica, air gun, spring gun, or pellet gun. He further argues the dispositional order must be vacated because the social study was deficient, the judge relied upon information outside the record and improperly considered the availability of community college correspondence courses at DJJ, and his attorney failed to provide effective assistance with respect to disposition. We affirm.

R.P. appeals from orders of the juvenile court finding that he committed a robbery, with personal use of a firearm, and committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He contends the enhancement must be vacated because the evidence does not support the finding that the gun displayed during the robbery was a firearm within the statutory definition, as opposed to a replica, air gun, spring gun, or pellet gun. He further argues the dispositional order must be vacated because the social study was deficient, the judge relied upon information outside the record and improperly considered the availability of community college correspondence courses at DJJ, and his attorney failed to provide effective assistance with respect to disposition. We affirm.

On June 10, 2014, appellant Troy Devlin Thornton pled no contest to one count of
violation of Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a),1
identify theft, and admitted three
prior prison term enhancements. (Case No. F14902504.) On July 11, 2014, the trial
court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of six years, consisting of the upper term
of three years plus one year for each of the three admitted prison prior enhancements.
On November 26, 2014, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18) seeking to reduce his felony conviction in case
No. F14902504 (the pending case) and case No. F12902103 to misdemeanors. On
March 23, 2015, the court granted the request as to case No. F12902103 and denied the
request as to case No. F14902504.

This appeal follows the entry of a guilty plea. A request for a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5) was denied by the superior court but the certificate is unnecessary because the grounds for the appeal arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the validity of the plea. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8. 304(b)(4)(B).)
Appellant Chadwick Poole was on May 1, 2015, charged by the Del Norte County District Attorney with four counts of lewd acts upon a child with a 10-year age difference. (§ 288, subd. (c)(1).) The information contained allegations of one prior strike (§§ 1170.12; 667, subd. (b)), one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and with respect to one of the counts, the infliction of great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7.)

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendants and appellants
J.R. (Mother) and D.F. (Father; collectively Parents) to L.F. (Minor). (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 366.26.)1
Father contends the juvenile court erred by terminating his parental
rights because the court should have applied the parent-child bond exception.