CA Unpub Decisions

Anthony Peate (defendant) appeals his conviction for second degree robbery and the resulting 15-year prison sentence. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contests three of the jury instructions, and alleges that the trial court mishandled issues arising during the jury’s deliberations. Because these arguments lack merit, we affirm.

Erik V. Werner and Monica Thibodeaux (collectively, plaintiffs) and Irma Brown own adjoining property in Lake County. Brown used a driveway on plaintiffs’ land to access her property. At some point, the parties disagreed about who owned the driveway, and plaintiffs filed a complaint against Brown for declaratory and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for plaintiffs.
Brown appeals in propria persona. We conclude Brown has failed to provide an adequate record to demonstrate error, and we affirm.

Mark Anthony Jones was convicted of first degree residential burglary. He argues the trial court erred in denying his Marsden motions for substitution of counsel, his Faretta motion to represent himself at the sentencing hearing, and his request for a pinpoint jury instruction on the definition of first degree burglary. Jones does not show that he had a conflict with counsel that prevented effective representation, that he could represent himself at the sentencing hearing without disrupting the proceedings, or that his proposed instruction gave a fair overview of the relevant law. We affirm his conviction.

R.M., mother of the minor, V.P., appeals the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition for modification and terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 366.26, 395.) She contends the juvenile court (1) abused its discretion in denying her petition for modification, (2) erred in determining that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption does not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), and (3) failed to make appropriate findings regarding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
Agreeing with the claim of ICWA error only, we shall reverse and remand for proper notice.

In 1997, defendants and cross-complainants Robert D.
Weinbach and Cyclone Productions Inc. (Cyclone) entered into
a settlement agreement (1997 settlement agreement) with
plaintiffs and cross-defendants M.U.S.E. Picture Productions
Holding Corporation II, Muse Productions, Inc., and Chris
Hanley, the President of Muse Productions, Inc., (collectively,
Muse) to develop a film based on the novel “The Killer Inside Me”
(novel) and a screenplay written by Weinbach. In early 2009,
after failing to produce a film with Weinbach and Cyclone, Muse
sold its rights to the novel to cross-defendant Windwings
Productions, LLC (Windwings), who in turn sold its rights to the
novel to cross-defendant Kim Productions LLC (Kim); Kim
released a film based on the novel in 2010 that did not use any
portion of Weinbach’s screenplay.1

While defendant Beaumont Adam Burgess was serving the in-custody portion of a split sentence, he sent the trial court a motion for a sentence modification. The trial court ordered the motion filed and summarily denied it. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying his motion. We, however, will dismiss the appeal because defendant has not appealed from an appealable order.

Defendant was charged with rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1), attempted murder with premeditation (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a), 189; count 2), willfully causing permanent disability or disfigurement (§ 205; count 3), torture (§ 206; count 4), and corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 5). As to count 1, the information also alleged the crime fell within the one strike law (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(3), (4), (6) & (e)(2), (3)), that defendant inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.8), and that defendant used a deadly weapon during the commission of a sexual offense (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)). As to counts 2, 3, 4, and 5, it was further alleged defendant used a deadly weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) As to counts 2 and 5, it was also alleged defendant inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) Three prior prison terms were further alleged. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) It was also alleged the crimes required a state prison sentence. (§ 1170, subd.

A jury found defendant Craig John Crow guilty of felony vandalism. On appeal he contends the trial court improperly admitted evidence of uncharged acts of vandalism. Defendant further contends the jury instruction regarding the uncharged offenses was improper. We affirm.
At 10:00 p.m. on December 17, 2015, Tim Grooms was driving his car under a railroad overpass when, out of the corner of his eye, he saw something hit his car. Someone near the entrance to the raised pedestrian tunnel above had thrown a chair at the passenger side of his car. Grooms’s girlfriend, Nomin “Julia” Boldbaatar, was also in the car and saw someone swing something toward the car and then heard a loud thud. Grooms pulled over at the next stoplight and noticed the car’s side mirror had been knocked off and the passenger side was dented and scratched. The car received $2,206 in damages.

Defendant Jolene Marie Powell challenges the trial court’s denial of her request to recall her sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) as an abuse of discretion. She further contends her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by waiving her request to recall her sentence for untimeliness. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Eileen G. Bruntz and respondent Russell E. Stover share two children and years of acrimony-fueled court contests following the demise of their romantic relationship. Bruntz challenges several orders related to Stover’s alleged failure over the ensuing years to fully pay $1,000 in monthly child support under an April 2007 support order, which contains a contested stipulated retroactivity provision.
She contends the court erred in (1) awarding Stover a child care credit of $441 per month from January 2007 to May 2011 because no motion to modify had been filed during that time; (2) failing to set aside her admissions that she incurred no child care costs from January 2007 to November 2013, the date on which the court deemed Stover’s requests for admissions admitted after Bruntz failed to timely respond to the discovery requests; (3) imposing discovery sanctions on her for her mistaken failure to respond to the discovery; (4) setting child support, with no child care add

T.M. was detained by the juvenile court because her parents were unable to safely care for her and their drug abuse put her at risk of serious harm. Following 12 months of reunification services, T.M.’s father, B.M. (Father), continued to use drugs and was unable to show he could properly care for her, despite his desire to reunify with his daughter. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a Welfare and Institutions Code Section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. Prior to the hearing, Father filed a section 388 modification petition requesting reinstatement of reunification services. The court denied the modification request and terminated Father’s parental rights, finding the permanent plan of adoption appropriate. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights and the denial of his section 388 petition. Because neither order was erroneous, we affirm.

In September 2016, police went to a home to inform the parents that one of their children had been shot and killed in a gang slaying. Police found two other children, 12-year-old Oliver P. and eight-year-old X.P., filthy. The children were covered with blisters and scabs, which they explained to be mosquito bites. Later, both children were treated at a hospital for scabies and lice.
Also in the garage were an 18-year-old sibling of the two minor children, and their father as well as two other adult men. There was no food in the garage and it had no running water or bathroom. Electricity was provided by an extension cord from the main house plugged into a socket hanging from the garage ceiling. The garage had numerous holes in its walls and floor. Beer cans, broken glass, debris and a pile of dirty clothes were found scattered about, and the garage smelled of urine. The two children were taken into custody and placed at Orangewood Children and Family Center.

In July 2014, Eric F. (the minor) pled no contest to one count of attempted grand theft (Pen. Code, §§ 487, subd. (c), 664), a felony at that time. In connection with his plea, the minor was required to submit a DNA sample to the state databank. (§§ 296, subd. (a)(1), 296.1.) Thereafter, the electorate passed the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) in November 2014, which reduced certain crimes—including theft of property valued at less than $950—from felonies to misdemeanors. (See People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091; § 490.2.) As a consequence, the minor petitioned to have his violation reduced to a misdemeanor and to have his DNA record expunged from the state database. The juvenile court reduced the minor’s violation to a misdemeanor, but denied his DNA expungement request. The minor’s motion for reconsideration of the DNA issue in light of Alejandro N. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209 (Alejandro N.) was similarly den

Ruling on a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the juvenile court found the allegation that the minor, Juan S., had committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) to be true. He now appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to find the robbery allegation true. More specifically, Juan argues there was not substantial evidence that he used force or fear to accomplish the robbery. We disagree and affirm the judgment.