500 matching results for "mk":
From CA Unpub Decisions
Plaintiff Julie Stothers Horner’s mother received retirement benefits from 1985 when her husband, an active trial judge, died until 2000 when she too passed away. Thirteen years later plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Judges’ Retirement System (JRS) for underpayment of the benefits paid to her mother. Plaintiff lost both the judicial and administrative proceedings. In the underlying lawsuit, she again seeks payment for the increased benefits she still insists her mother should have received, albeit on a different legal theory. The trial court held her claim was barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata. The court also imposed sanctions on plaintiff’s lawyer because he knew or should have known that the complaint and his pleadings defending the complaint were not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Father I.V. appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his son, S.W. He contends the juvenile court erred when it did not apply the relative caregiver exception to the termination of parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) and identify legal guardianship by S.W.’s maternal grandmother in Washington state as S.W.’s permanent plan. Substantial evidence that the maternal grandmother―the relative caregiver―was willing to adopt S.W. supports the court’s finding that the relative caregiver exception did not apply. We therefore affirm the judgment.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
In this appeal from the trial court’s denial of defendant James Kelly Norton (defendant’s) petition for recall of sentence pursuant to Proposition 36, defendant advances an argument that has been unanimously rejected by various published Court of Appeal decisions: that “armed” “during the commission of the current offense,” as used in a statutory provision that makes a petitioning defendant ineligible for Proposition 36 relief, means the firearm must have been used to facilitate a crime rather than being available for offensive or defensive use at the time the crime is committed. Following published authority, we reject defendant’s argument.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Mike R. (father) appeals from a single jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (d), that he should have known his son, Luke R. (child), was being sexually abused or was in danger of being sexually abused. Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support the finding. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) contends father’s appeal should be dismissed, because other jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b) remain in effect, making the question raised in father’s appeal nonjusticiable. We agree with the Department, and we dismiss father’s appeal.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
A juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over an 18-month-old and a three-month-old after their parents admitted that they had engaged in domestic violence and the court concluded that father had a history of substance abuse. Father challenges the court’s jurisdictional finding regarding substance abuse, its order removing the children from his care, and its dispositional orders requiring him to drug test and attend counseling regarding substance abuse. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding father attacks, the court’s removal order, and its case plan-related orders. We accordingly affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
A jury convicted Mario Welch (defendant) of operating a chop shop and receiving stolen property. During sentencing, neither the trial court nor defense counsel recognized that defendant was eligible for a “split sentence” (that is, a sentence that is part jail and part community release). Although defendant has forfeited this claim of error by not requesting a split sentence during his sentencing hearing, and although the record reveals no possible tactical reason for not doing so, we ultimately conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the trial court would have imposed a split sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Eric Deshawn Holliday appeals from a judgment sentencing him to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison, plus a determinate term of 44 years and four months, following a bifurcated jury and court trial. The jury convicted him of attempted first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), three counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and found gang allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and firearm allegations (§§ 12022.5, 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)) as to certain counts to be true. The trial court found that defendant had suffered prior felony convictions and served prior prison terms. (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (b).)
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the true finding on the gang allegations is not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) reversal of the gang enhancement is required under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) due to the admissi |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Several weeks after William Littlejohn (defendant) and his girlfriend broke up, he approached her at a recycling center, put a gun in her face, told her, “Bitch, I’ve got you,” and then pistol whipped her. Defendant then drew the same gun at police trying to stop him for questioning a few days later. A jury convicted him of several crimes related to each incident, and the court sentenced him to 20 years in prison. On appeal, defendant raises one evidentiary issue, several sentencing issues and asks us to review the transcript from the in camera Pitchess hearing. None of these arguments calls into question the validity of defendant’s convictions, but the trial court did commit several sentencing errors. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions but modify his sentence.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Respondent Feridoun Dardashti filed this action for quiet title against his son, appellant Mehardad Dardashti, alleging that appellant had forged his signature on a grant deed transferring ownership of his home to appellant. Following a bench trial, the court agreed and found the deed void. On appeal, appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mental examination of respondent, admitting certain hearsay testimony, and curtailing his testimony about the parties’ mutual check-writing authority. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Westminster Park is a public park located in the Venice neighborhood of respondent City of Los Angeles (the City). In 2016, at the request of the city council, the City’s Board of Recreation and Park Commissioners (Board) voted to convert a defunct senior citizens’ center at Westminster Park to a facility that would provide storage and other services to the homeless population. Petitioners Venice Kids Count, Heidi Roberts, and Katrina Glusac (collectively, petitioners) sought a writ of mandate to set aside the Board’s approval of the project because it allegedly violates the City’s zoning ordinance. We consider whether the Board, to which the city charter grants authority to “operate and control” park property, had authority to approve the converted use notwithstanding the City’s zoning ordinance.
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegations in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging that the minor, G.V., committed two counts of felony assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared G.V. a ward of the court and returned her to the custody of her guardian on probation, with conditions including that she report any “police contacts” to her probation officer and that she not move out of Monterey County or leave the State of California without the permission of the court or her probation officer.
On appeal, G.V. contends the juvenile court erred in its ruling at the jurisdictional hearing because it misunderstood the legal elements of section 245, subdivision (a)(4). G.V. also argues that the juvenile court erred at the dispositional hearing by imposing the two probation conditions described above. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Frank Stephenson pleaded no contest to transportation of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years, with the concluding 1,095 days of the term to be served on mandatory supervision. His conditions of mandatory supervision included that he not possess “any weapons,” that he not be “adjacent to any school campus,” and that he pay a $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). (Capitalization omitted.)
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From CA Unpub Decisions
Defendant Eva Symone Christian pleaded no contest to possessing a loaded firearm while under the influence of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (e)) and carrying a loaded firearm in public (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)). After the trial court denied her motion to withdraw her pleas, the court placed defendant on probation with various terms and conditions, including that she serve 180 days in county jail.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred, in connection with her motion to withdraw her pleas, by refusing to allow expert testimony regarding human trafficking and its effects on her. She argues that the expert testimony was relevant to her claim that she was unduly coerced into pleading no contest. Defendant seeks a remand for a new hearing on her motion to withdraw her pleas, with the opportunity to present expert testimony at the hearing. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order of probation. |
From CA Unpub Decisions
A jury found defendant Theodore Anthony Quezada guilty of assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (a knife) (Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1) and attempted criminal threats (§§ 422, 664) (a lesser included offense of count 2). The jury found true that defendant had personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in committing the assault within the meaning of sections 667 and 1192.7. The trial court found the allegations of three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i); 1170.12) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) to be true. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law and two consecutive five-year enhancement terms as to each conviction.
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