CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant concedes that this appeal is taken from an order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Such orders are nonappealable. (Matter of Zany (1913) 164 Cal. 724, 726 727; People v. Ryan (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 144, 149.)
Upon the denial by a superior court of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petitioners remedy is to file a petition in the court of appeal. (Matter of Zany, supra, 164 Cal. 724, 726 727.)
The appeal in the above entitled action is dismissed.

Plaintiffs Bryan Tran and Bryan Tran, M.D., Inc., appeal from a judgment of dismissal following the trial courts decision to sustain defendants demurrer without leave to amend. Tran argues he is entitled to pursue an action for damages relating to the termination of hospital staff privileges. Defendants state that an action for damages cannot be maintained because Trans privileges were terminated because he failed to meet hospital qualifications under a rule of general application to the entire medical staff. Court agree and affirm.

Defendant seeks relief from a default judgment totaling $34,507.86. Defendant argues the judgment was improper because its answer to a superseded complaint was sufficient, the plaintiff could not maintain the action and the trial court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff was an unlicensed contractor, the judgment violates the one final judgment rule and was in excess of the amount sought in the complaint, and the judgment was supported by insufficient evidence. Because none of these arguments have merit, court affirm.

This is a dispute between Oso Valley Greenbelt Association and several of its members over the proper composition of its board of directors in 2005. Simply put, two elections were held, two boards were created, and a dispute arose as to which board, and thus which electees, had been properly elected board members. A judgment was entered which, among other things, found appellants were not the properly elected board and permanently enjoined them from engaging in certain specific actions, such as representing themselves as directors of the Association. An appeal was filed. The parties have now entered into a global settlement of the matter, including settlement of actions not a part of this appeal, and wish to put the entire matter behind them pursuant to the terms of that settlement. Accordingly, the parties filed a joint application and stipulation for reversal of the injunctive relief portion of the judgment only pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8).Based on the motion and accompanying documents, court find that there is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal of the injunctive portion of the judgment, and that the reasons of the parties for requesting reversal of that portion outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from its nullification and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement. Therefore, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties: (1) Paragraph 3 of the judgment filed April 12, 2006, including subparagraphs (a) through (g), is reversed and the matter is remanded to the superior court to strike Paragraph 3 of the judgment; (2) the remainder of the appeal is dismissed with prejudice; (3) in the interests of justice each side shall bear its own costs and attorney fees on appeal; and (4) the clerk shall issue the remittitur forthwith.

Rudy Renya filed a notice of appeal with this court following convictions for two counts of aggravated assault against the same victim (counts one and three) (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)) (subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code), one count of domestic battery with corporal injury with prior conviction (count two) ( 273.5, subd. (a)), and one count of criminal threats (count four) ( 422). Count four alleged great bodily injury, and count three specified the assault involved the use of a deadly weapon. The information also alleged four strike priors, two prison priors, and two serious felony priors.We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) . Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case. Court therefore fail to find any arguable issues, particularly any that defendant might have raised without a certificate of probable cause. Court therefore affirm.

Petitioner Palomar Pomerado Health (Palomar) seeks extraordinary relief from an order denying its motion to transfer this case to San Diego County. Finding plain error, court issue a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance directing the trial court to grant the motion to transfer.

This case presents a tortured saga of the parties attempts to settle plaintiffs employment discrimination and wrongful termination lawsuit filed in 1999. On several occasions throughout the litigation, the parties settled the case and then disputed the terms of the agreement, which have evolved over the course of these events. As much as we would like to end this saga, court conclude that under the circumstances presented here, neither of the two orders from which plaintiff has appealed is appealable. The first order was from the trial courts denial of plaintiffs second motion to enforce the settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 a clearly nonappealable order. The second order under appeal was from the trial courts grant of defendants second motion under the same section. While orders enforcing a settlement under section 664.6 are often treated as or converted to final judgments, in this particular case, the order called for further judicial action. Whats more, it did not finally adjudicate the rights of the parties for judgment purposes by ending the litigation. Accordingly, court dismiss the appeal.

The father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights as to his youngest child, L. B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.) He cites no error arising out of the section 366.26 hearing. Instead he contends that he was denied fair and adequate reunification services and that the social services agency violated his rights by providing the court with inaccurate information as to his criminal record, and by denying him the opportunity to retake a drug test. These are not issues that can be properly raised in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights. Issues regarding reunification services can be raised only in a petition for an extraordinary writ. ( 366.26, subd. (l).) No such petition was filed in this case. However, since it appears from the record that the father was not properly noticed, under section 366.26, subdivision (l)(3), of his rights to proceed by extraordinary writ, Court consider his claims in this appeal. Court find that the courts order denying services was fully supported by the record and Court find no reversible errors. Court therefore affirm the order terminating parental rights.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, 11378, 11364, 11357, subd. (b).) On appeal, she contends that the superior court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. She further challenges a jury instruction given on the meaning of "sale" in possession for sale, and she asserts sentencing error in the order that she pay attorney fees as a condition of probation. Court find the last contention to be meritorious and reverse on that ground alone.

A petition was filed, alleging that Humberto J., a minor (15 years old at the time of the jurisdictional hearing), came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged that on May 7, 2006, the minor violated Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(4) (unlawful carrying of a concealed dirk or dagger), a felony. A second count was later added, namely, the malicious defacing of property ( 594, subd. (a)(1)), a misdemeanor. The minor moved to suppress evidence relative to the felony charge. The court denied the motion, and the minor thereafter admitted the concealed weapon charge and that he had violated probation; the misdemeanor count was dismissed. The court ordered that the minor remain a ward of the juvenile court. Court conclude that the court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

In January 2006, defendant Setha Keo was charged with one count of forgery and one count of grand theft. He was provided with the services of a public defender. Both counts were later dismissed for insufficient evidence on the motion of the district attorney. Under Penal Code section 987.8, the trial court then ordered defendant to pay $2,500 for services of the public defender at the rate of $35 per month. Defendant contends on appeal that the court erred by ordering the payment of fees without a determination of his ability to pay those fees. Court agree that the record discloses no finding by the court of defendants ability to pay fees, and that even if the court were to have made such an implied finding, there is no substantial evidence in the record that would support it. Court accordingly reverse to the extent the court ordered defendant to pay attorney fees and remand the matter to the trial court to enable it to either make the determination as required by section 987.8 regarding defendants ability to pay or strike the order.

Cynthia B. (mother) and David C. (father) (collectively parents) appeal from the juvenile courts orders terminating their parental rights to their daughters Angelina C. (case number JD16028) and Christina C. (case number JD16029) (collectively the girls) and freeing them for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395.) Father also appeals from the courts further order denying his petition to modify a prior order of the court ( 388, subd. (a)). Court affirm the orders.

Elisa H. appeals from the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to L. H. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 She describes the issue presented in this appeal as "Whether the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception to adoption was triggered where an eight year old child wanted to both live with her caretakers and continue the relationship she had with a mother she loved; especially in light of the court's recognition of the strength of the parent/child relationship and favoring open adoption." Court affirm.

This appeal is from a judgment following nearly 20 years of protracted and convoluted litigation arising out of a partnership agreement between Frederick Kennerley and Larry Allred to develop several lots in Danville, California. Over the course of the litigation there have been several bankruptcies, an action on a bond, an irrevocable trust, assignments of a number of claims and at least one divorce. Ultimately, the litigation boiled down to the disposition of proceeds from the sale of one of the lots: Lot 4. Allred, who had been charged with the responsibility of winding up the partnership, had used his own funds to purchase Lot 4 from the mortgage company. He then transferred title to himself, and subsequently transferred the property to his former wife, Shirley Allred. The superior court later ruled Allred had acted improperly in connection with those transfers. In a separate, derivative action, a different judge set aside the transfer to Shirley Allred. (Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, 1998, No. C96-04401.) In the end, the court in these proceedings ordered the sale of Lot 4, ordering further that the proceeds from the sale be distributed in the following manner: (1) $106,000 to Allred to repay him for the sum spent to prevent foreclosure on Lot 4, plus taxes and interest; (2) $175,383.36 to an irrevocable trust that had been established by Rebecca Kennerley (the Trust) as the owner of a judgment against the partnership; (3) $37,931.50 to the Trust on the theory that it had purchased Kennerleys right to attorney fees, and (4) $15,000 to the Trust on the theory it had obtained Kennerleys right to wages.
Allred appeals, contending, in part, the court erred by concluding he was not entitled to purchase Lot 4 for himself, and also by ruling additional sums owed to him could not be set off against the sums to be paid to the Trust. Allred also contends the court erred by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence that the $175,383.36 obligation to the Trust was owed by a entity other than the partnership. He contends the court erred by finding the judgment creating the debt had in fact been transferred to the Trust, arguing further the court should have allowed him to introduce evidence the Trusts attorney at one time had taken a position inconsistent with that finding. He contends the court erred by finding the Trust was entitled to the sum representing attorney fees. Finally, he contends the evidence does not support an implied finding Kennerley had transferred his right to attorney fees and wages to the Trust.
Court affirm.