CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
|
A jury convicted appellant of kidnapping to commit rape (count 1) (Pen. Code, 209, subd. (b)(1))[1]; attempted murder (count 2) ( 664/187, subd. (a)); criminal threats (count 3) ( 422); and assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation and a violation of sections 264.1, 288, and 289 (count 4) ( 220). With respect to count 3, the jury found true the allegations that the threatened crime, on its face and under the circumstances in which it was made, was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the victim a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and that the victim was reasonably in sustained fear for her safety and for the safety of her immediate family. Appellant appeals on the grounds that: (1) the trial court violated appellants right to due process under the federal and California Constitutions by excluding relevant and admissible evidence of statements made by the alleged victim after her trial testimony, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in specifying that one of appellants prior convictions was for manslaughter after the trial court had ordered the nature of the offense to be sanitized.
The judgment is affirmed. |
|
Defendant appeals from judgment entered following his no contest plea to one count of selling or transporting cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to prison for 23 years and contends the trial court had no authority to impose a more severe sanction for nonappearance than that which was agreed to in the plea agreement by the parties. For reasons stated in the opinion, court affirm the judgment.
|
|
A jury convicted Les Govea of first-degree murder (count 1), three counts of carjacking with personal firearm use (counts 2 to 4), and evading police while driving with willful disregard of others (count 5). (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 189; 215, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b); Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a); all further section references are to the Penal Code.) The jury also found that the murder resulted from Goveas personal discharge of a firearm proximately causing death. (12022.53, subd. (d).) In a bifurcated trial after a jury waiver the court found that Govea had two serious and strike and one prison term prior felony convictions. ( 667, subds. (a) (i), 1170.12; 667.5, subd. (b).) The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 135 years-to-life, including, in addition to the base term for the murder, a consecutive 25 years to life term for intentionally discharging a firearm causing death.Govea appeals, contending that the court erred in (I) refusing his request to instruct the jury regarding heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter ( 192, subd. (a)) as a lesser included crime of murder, and (II) imposing a consecutive 25 years to life term for intentionally discharging a firearm causing death ( 12022.53, subd. (d)) in addition to the base term for the murder in which the firearm was discharged. He argues that because he committed the murder by shooting the victim, such sentence violates section 654s prohibition on multiple punishment for the same act.
Court reject the contentions and affirm the judgment. |
|
Appellant was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of first degree burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459 and one count of receiving stolen property in violation of section 496, subdivision (a). Appellant admitted that he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12 (the "three strikes" law) and section 667, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of 14 years and 4 months in state prison.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion for self-representation, consolidating the burglary and receiving stolen property counts and denying the public defender's motion for a mistrial and appointment of new counsel. Court affirm the judgment of conviction. |
|
Appellant John Blagg was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of first degree burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459 and one count of receiving stolen property in violation of section 496, subdivision (a). Appellant admitted that he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12 (the "three strikes" law) and section 667, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of 14 years and 4 months in state prison.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion for self representation, consolidating the burglary and receiving stolen property counts and denying the public defender's motion for a mistrial and appointment of new counsel. Court affirm the judgment of conviction. |
|
A jury convicted appellant Carlos Calderon of second degree commercial burglary in violation of Penal Code[1]section 459 (count 1), petty theft with a prior in violation of section 666 (count 2), and second degree burglary of a vehicle in violation of section 459 (count 3). The trial court subsequently found true the allegation that appellant had suffered a 1995 conviction for robbery in case No. PA021730.
The court sentenced appellant to the midterm of two years on count 1, doubled to four years due to the strike conviction. The court imposed the same sentence on count 2 and ordered it to be served concurrently. The court imposed a consecutive midterm sentence of eight months on count 3, doubled to 16 months due to the prior strike conviction. Appellants total sentence is five years four months. Appellant appeals on the grounds that: (1) his conviction in count 1 must be reversed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the elements of commercial burglary; (2) his sentence in count 2 should have been stayed pursuant to section 654; (3) the prior strike allegation must be reversed because the trial court improperly required appellant to admit his prior strike conviction when it accepted appellants admission to this conviction for purposes of stipulating to a prior theft conviction under section 666; (4) appellants conviction for petty theft with a prior (count 2) must be reversed because the People did not present any evidence to the jury that appellant had served any custody time related to his prior theft conviction; (5) appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to conscientiously research the law related to petty theft with a prior allegation; and (6) the errors appellant has set out cumulatively deprived appellant of due process and a fundamentally fair trial. The judgment is modified to strike the concurrent sentence in count 2 and to order the trial court to stay the sentence in count 2 pursuant to section 654. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the modified sentence and to forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections. |
|
This is a family law proceeding involving a mothers postjudgment order to show cause (OSC) to modify child support. The issue presented is whether the mothers former counsel had standing to seek an award from the father for the attorney fees she incurred in connection with the proceeding.
In 2001, before the parties separated, the father met with an attorney from Trope and Trope (Trope) and obtained advice about filing for divorce. During a one hour meeting, the issue of child support was discussed. The father did not retain the firm. In 2003, the trial court entered a judgment for legal separation, fixing the amount of child support. In 2005, Trope, representing the mother, filed the present OSC, seeking an increase in child support. The father moved to disqualify Trope based upon the 2001 consultation. The trial court granted the motion, finding a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Trope filed a motion seeking attorney fees from the father. The mother did not object to the motion. The father opposed it, arguing that Trope did not have standing to bring the motion and, in addition, the firms ethical violation precluded an award of fees. The trial court ruled that Trope had not acted unethically in undertaking to represent the mother, so the firms conduct did not bar or limit recovery. But the court concluded that Trope lacked standing to bring the motion because the mother had not expressly consented to it. Court conclude that Trope had standing to seek attorney fees from the father because the mother consented, at least impliedly, to the bringing of the motion. Further, on remand, the trial court shall decide whether the reason for Tropes disqualification was serious, such that the firm should be denied some or all of its fees. If a fee award, partial or whole, is appropriate, the trial court must then decide whether the father should pay some or all of it. In that regard, the court shall determine whether the amount sought by Trope is reasonably necessary and whether payment by the father would be just and reasonable in light of the relative circumstances of the parties. Court therefore reverse the order and remand for further proceedings. |
|
Appellant appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of attempted murder under Penal Code sections 664/187, subdivision (a). The jury found true the allegations that the attempted murders were premeditated ( 664, subd. (a)), that appellant personally used a handgun ( 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1)), and that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). Court affirm.
|
|
This is the second time this case, which arises out of defendant and appellant plea of no contest to the charge of second degree burglary and admission of certain enhancements, has come before us on appeal. Defendant contends he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. Court disagree and affirm.
|
|
Arlance Dion Daniels appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on count 1 possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)) and count 2 possession of a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, 11364) with admissions that he suffered a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (d)) and five prior felony convictions for which he served separate prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to prison for six years.
On the merits, even if disclosure was required under Penal Code section 1054.1, subdivision (f), the prosecutor disclosed the anticipated testimony as soon he learned about it; therefore, no discovery violation occurred. Even if a discovery violation occurred, appellant never sought the usual remedy, a continuance, and exclusion of the anticipated testimony would have been improper since other remedies had not been exhausted. Finally, there was no prejudice from any discovery violation; therefore, reversal of the judgment is not warranted. |
|
Plaintiffs Use Preservation Defense Fund and Anne Hoffman (collectively Land Use) sued Los Angeles County (County) and its Board of Supervisors (Board) seeking a writ of mandate preventing the County from enforcing a recently enacted zoning ordinance that restricted development in the Santa Monica Mountains by imposing limitations on grading and development on significant ridgelines. Land Use alleged the new zoning ordinance was void because it was inconsistent with the Countys applicable general plan based on a Grandfather Clause in the plan that states, Existing legal lots are not affected and may be developedfollowing current development requirementsregardless of lot size. Land Use also contended that the ordinance was void because the County had failed to prepare a supplemental environmental impact report (Supplemental Report) prior to enacting the ordinance, pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
Land Use renews on appeal both of the arguments it made in the trial court concerning the ordinances alleged inconsistency with the general plan and the Countys failure to prepare a Supplemental Report. After reviewing the relevant portions of the administrative record, we hold that (1) the Countys consistency determination was not arbitrary or capricious and that the Grandfather Clause cannot reasonably be interpreted to foreclose the applicability of future zoning regulations, and (2) substantial evidence supported the Countys determination that a Supplemental Report was not required under CEQA. Court therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
|
Mother appeals from the judgment and orders declaring her son, Tylor M., a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. She contends substantial evidence does not support the findings that Tylor comes within the dependency courts jurisdiction. Court conclude substantial evidence supports the findings and affirm the judgment and orders.
|
|
Plaintiff appeals following an order of dismissal for failure to diligently prosecute his case against defendant Park West Family Partnership (and related defendants, collectively referred to as Park West). Contrary to Poredoss contentions, the record read in its proper context does not establish that the trial court thought it had no choice but to grant the motion for terminating sanctions, and the court did not abuse its broad discretion in dismissing the action rather than imposing some lesser sanction. The judgment is affirmed.
|
Actions
Category Stats
Listings: 77266
Regular: 77266
Last listing added: 06:28:2023
Regular: 77266
Last listing added: 06:28:2023
