CA Unpub Decisions

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Dominic Quintana pled no contest to attempted murder (Pen. Code, 187, 664) and admitted enhancement allegations that in committing that offense, he personally inflicted great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon, viz., a knife ( 12022, subd. (b)). The court imposed a prison term of 11 years, consisting of the 7 year midterm on the substantive offense, 3 years on the great bodily injury enhancement and 1 year on the weapon enhancement.
Appellants appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (Peoplev.Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Appellant has not responded to this courts invitation to submit additional briefing.

Jesse R., Sr., appeals from orders terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to his three children. In large part, he claims the court never found him to be an unfit parent so that the termination order violated his due process rights. Appellant also contends the court should have found termination would be detrimental to the children based on his relationship with them. Finally, appellant argues the court should have appointed each child separate counsel due to what appellant perceives to be a conflict of interest at the termination stage. On review, court affirm.

Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450-8.452 [formerly rule 38-38.1]) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court denying him reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to his son C. He also contends the juvenile court erred in failing to ask him whether he had any American Indian heritage, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) While court affirm the courts dispositional orders and findings, we agree the court erred in failing to comply with ICWA. Accordingly, court remand the matter directing respondent to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and to comply with the ICWA.

Appellant concedes that this appeal is taken from an order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Such orders are nonappealable. (Matter of Zany (1913) 164 Cal. 724, 726-727; People v. Ryan (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 144, 149.)
Upon the denial by a superior court of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petitioners remedy is to file a petition in the court of appeal. (Matter of Zany, supra, 164 Cal. 724, 726-727.)
The appeal in the above entitled action is dismissed.

Andrew A., now 16 years old, was charged with possession of a knife on school grounds. The petition alleged the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found true all allegations in the petition. Andrew argues on appeal there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement. Specifically, he argues there was insufficient evidence he possessed the knife for the benefit of a criminal street gang, or of the gangs primary activities. Court affirm.

The trial court refused to grant relief to extend the time to file a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction. Petitioner is a small Massachusetts corporation, which was named as a Doe defendant in a wrongful death case almost two years after the lawsuit was originally filed, and which missed the deadline to respond to the complaint and challenge jurisdiction in California by two weeks. The person responsible for ensuring the summons and complaint served on the corporation were forwarded to the corporations insurance broker did not do so because of severe, emergency family crises and tragedy, involving the sudden death of her brother and the serious illness of her mother, both of which required her time and attention for several months. The corporations failure to timely respond to the complaint was excusable neglect as a matter of law, and Theodore and Sandra Premer, plaintiffs and real parties in interest, would not suffer any prejudice if the trial court granted the relief sought. Therefore, court issue a peremptory writ directing the trial court to grant the requested relief.

Defendant Timothy Edward Lewis was found guilty by a jury of one count of possessing a completed check with intent to defraud (Pen. Code, 475, subd. (c)) and two counts of forging checks (Pen. Code, 470, subd. (a)). On appeal he raises numerous contentions concerning the admissibility of certain incriminating extrajudicial statements by Valerie Williams, an alleged collaborator in the offenses, who was not available to testify at trial. We hold that defendants right to confront his accusers was violated when the trial court admitted evidence of incriminating statements Williams made to a deputy district attorney immediately prior to, but not introduced in evidence at, defendants preliminary hearing. Since her testimony at that hearing was entirely exculpatory, and since no evidence of the incriminating statements was introduced there, cross-examination of her concerning those alleged statements would have been prohibited by Proposition 115. Since defendant was thus statutorily barred from confronting Williams concerning those alleged statements, his constitutional rights were violated by their admission at trial. Further, the court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of defendants prior convictions on the ground that his attorney had opened the door to character evidence by asking defendants employer whether he had terminated defendants employment as of a specified date. Court hold that the constitutional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, court reverse the judgment.

Defendant appeals a judgment following his guilty plea after the trial court denied his motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.
On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion because the affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to establish probable cause for the search of his house. In addition, defendant argues the good faith exception does not cure the defects in the affidavit. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellants Devon L. and Crystal C. appeal from an order of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights to their two year old son Julius L. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395). They contend the juvenile court failed to provide proper notice as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to a failure to update his registration as a sex offender within five days of his birthday pursuant to Penal Code section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(C)(iii), and admitted one of the two strike priors ( 667, subds. (b) (i), 1170.12) charged in the complaint in exchange for a prison term of no more than 32 months. The second strike prior and a prison prior ( 667.5, subd. (b)) were dismissed at sentencing.
Before sentencing, defense counsel moved the court pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike the admitted strike prior. The court refused and sentenced defendant to 32 months in state prison. This appeal ensued. Court appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts but raises no specific issues. Court notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days, but have received nothing from defendant.
Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 (Kelly), court have reviewed the record and concur with appellate counsels assessment of the case. The judgment is affirmed.

Symons Corporation (Symons) appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of its insurers Federal Insurance Company, American International Surplus Lines Insurance Company, International Insurance Company, and Westchester Fire Insurance Company. The trial court concluded Symons was unable to demonstrate that damages awarded in an Iowa federal court action were awarded for an advertising injury covered by the insuring policies. Court affirm.

This case involves a dispute between a mother and her adult son over ownership of the family home. Seventy eight year old Edith Madrona claims she is the sole owner of the house and that her son, Rhainell Madrona, defrauded her into granting him a joint tenancy interest in the property. Rhainell, 47 years old, contends that his mother tried to fraudulently remove him from title. Mrs. Madrona portrays herself as a loving parent victimized by a perfidious son; Rhainell characterizes the case as a mothers betrayal.
The trial court nonsuited Mrs. Madronas claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and financial abuse, and quieted title jointly in Mrs. Madrona and her son as joint tenants. Court find that Mrs. Madrona presented sufficient evidence to allow her fraud claim to go to a jury. Because those issues are critical to the judgment as a whole, court reverse and remand for a new trial.

Mother and Louis B. (Father), parents of Louis B., Jr. (Lou), born in 1999, and Justice B., born in 2003, separately appeal from the Alameda County Juvenile Courts jurisdiction and disposition orders by which their two sons were removed from their home. They contend that the juvenile court erred in allowing telephone testimony and relying on outdated psychological evaluations, and that there was insufficient evidence supporting the courts findings. In addition, Mother claims the juvenile court erred in ordering her to sign a release of information for her daughter, who is not involved in this proceeding. Father claims the juvenile court failed to properly exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 and that the court committed prejudicial misconduct. All claims are without merit and, therefore, court affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Kenneth J. Howard appeals a judgment after a bench trial in favor of his former employer, defendant and respondent Christopher B. Dolan. Appellant argues the trial court erred in concluding respondent did not engage in unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200. He further contends the court erred in finding the evidence insufficient for his fraud cause of action. Court disagree and affirm.