CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals a judgment following conviction of assault with a deadly weapon and assault. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1) & 240.) Court affirm.

Appellant appeals from a judgment entered after the jury found him guilty of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a).) The jury also found true the allegations that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death ( 12022.53, subd. (d)), personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (c)), and was personally armed with a firearm. ( 12022, subd. (a)(1).)The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant appeals from judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, count 1 (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and disobeying a domestic relations court order, a misdemeanor, count 3 (Pen. Code, 273.6, subd. (a)). The jury additionally found appellant had suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) and 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and suffered two prior convictions and served prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to prison for a total of five years, consisting of the middle term of two years doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus one year for the prior prison term enhancement. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist and that appellant has, by virtue of counsels compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant pleaded guilty to the sale of a controlled substance, to possessing cocaine base for sale, and admitted six prior convictions and two additional enhancements based on the prior convictions. The trial court suspended his sentence of 15 years four months and placed appellant on probation. Six months later, he was found to be in violation of probation and was sentenced. His notice of appeal was filed three days late; on August 15, 2005, we granted appellants application to be relieved from this default. The appeal is limited to issues arising from the revocation of probation; Court affirm.

Joanna V. appeals the dependency court order summarily denying her petition for modification under section 388 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as to her three children, Amanda, Jacob, and Mary. Her childrens presumed father is not a party to the appeal. Court find no abuse of discretion, and affirm.

Defendant appeals from the order made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental rights to minors Andrea F. and Jesus F. She contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to determine sua sponte that a conflict existed because a single attorney represented her five children. Court affirm. Appellant waived this issue by failing to raise it below. But even absent waiver, the record reveals no conflict of interest in the childrens representation that affected the termination of appellants parental rights.

Defendant appeals the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to the sale or transportation of cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)). Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Velasquez to three years in state prison, then referred him to the California Rehabilitation Center (C.R.C.). Court dismiss Velasquezs appeal as inoperative for failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause.

Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to carrying a loaded firearm and admitted one prior felony conviction. He was sentenced to the low term of 32 months, which was doubled by the prior felony conviction. The court imposed restitution and parole revocation fines and ordered appellant to pay direct victim restitution; appellant was given presentence credits. Appellants motion to suppress was denied. He appeals from the judgment, limiting his contention on appeal to the motion to suppress.
The judgment is affirmed.

A plaintiff who brought a petition for injunctive relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 appeals a judgment denying the petition and awarding attorney fees to the defendant. Section 527.6, subdivision (i) gives the trial court discretion to award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party. The plaintiff claims error because the trial court, in awarding attorney fees to the prevailing defendant, did not make the further determination that plaintiffs action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious. Plaintiff provides no authority that the trial court must make this additional determination. The trial court denied plaintiffs application for an injunction because plaintiff had not established, by clear and convincing evidence, that future harm was highly probable. Therefore the trial court properly found that the defendant was the prevailing party. Court find no abuse of discretion in the attorney fee award, and affirm the judgment.

Defendant, also known as Peter Miller and Mike Fernando, appeals from the judgment entered upon his convictions by jury of four counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459). The jury also found to be true as to each count the allegations that all of the victims were 65 years of age or older within the meaning of section 667.9, subdivision (a) and that another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of the burglary within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21). The trial court found to be true the allegation that appellant had suffered two prior felony convictions within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivision (a) and subdivisions (b) through (i). The court sentenced appellant to an aggregate prison term of 144 years to life. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion.
Court affirm.

International Fidelity Insurance Company (International) appeals from a summary judgment ordering forfeiture of its bail bond. International contends that the court lost jurisdiction when it failed to declare a forfeiture of the bond in open court. (Pen. Code, 1305, subd. (a).) Court affirm.

After the trial court denied appellants motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1) and possession of ammunition ( 12316, subd. (b)(1)) (count 2). Appellant also admitted two prior strike convictions within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i).
The trial court granted appellants Romero[2] motion and struck the prior conviction allegations. The court sentenced appellant to state prison for the low term of 16 months in count 1 and a concurrent term of 16 months in count 2. Appellant appeals on the ground that the arresting officer exceeded the scope of appellants consent when he searched the trunk of appellants car and opened a closed shoe box lying in the trunk. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant pled no contest to grand theft (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (c)). He was placed on probation, which he subsequently violated on three separate occasions, the last of which resulted in revocation of probation and imposition of the midterm sentence of two years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends the court abused its discretion in revoking probation and imposing the midterm prison sentence. Court affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Michael Thomas Anderson pled no contest to possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11383, subd. (c)(1)) and admitted a prior conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c). The trial court sentenced defendant to nine years in prison, imposed various fines and fees including a restitution fine of $1,800, and suspended an additional restitution fine of $1,800 pending successful completion of parole.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have granted his suppression motion, and the imposition of the $1,800 restitution and parole revocation fines violated the plea agreement. Court reject the contentions and affirm.