CA Unpub Decisions

In this personal injury action, plaintiff appeals a judgment on a jury verdict for defendant, and a postjudgment order denying his motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial.
Court affirm the judgment and the order.

The minor appeals from the juvenile court's denial of his motion to modify his sentence. On appeal, the minor asserts the juvenile court erred when it refused to grant him a continuance to seek retained counsel. Court affirm.

A decision as to a Petition for Extraordinary Writ, mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating reunification services and scheduling a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.

A decision regarding an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of sale, transportation or offer to sell a controlled substance.

Appellant appeals from a judgment entered on October 4, 2005, denying petition for writ of mandate to declare unconstitutional and enjoin enforcement of the identification card provisions of the Medical Marijuana Program, set forth in division 10, chapter 6, article 2.5, of the Health and Safety Code section 11362.7 et seq. Appellant's timely notice of appeal was filed on December 2, 2005.

An appeal from the judgment entered following revocation of probation previously granted after appellant's plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance.

Approximately four months after petitioner, Alnardo Burgos, was sentenced, the superior court denied his motion for a return of property. Burgos contends the trial court abused its discretion when it determined the property was an instrument of the crime for which he pleaded guilty and denied the motion. The People concede the petition has merit and Court also agree. Accordingly, the petition is granted.

Plaintiffs and a purported class of similarly situated students in a hemodialysis technician educational program (collectively Otero) appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court granted a special motion to dismiss their claim under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, 1750 et seq.)(CLRA), sustained demurrers without leave to amend to other causes of action and after Otero failed to timely amend as to the remaining causes of action. Court affirm.

A modification decision.

Owner of several companies involved in the carpet distribution business (collectively, clients), hired attorneys to defend clients against an unfair business practices lawsuit (underlying litigation). The parties signed a written retainer agreement providing for binding arbitration to resolve any disputes between them. During eight months of litigation, attorneys claimed to have provided approximately $360,000 in legal services and incurred $65,000 in costs, of which clients had paid approximately $85,000. During that eight month period, after consulting with Etess, Howard recorded a deed of trust in attorneys favor on Idaho realty owned by one of Howards companies. A dispute arose between the parties regarding attorneys fees in the underlying litigation. Clients hired current counsel to replace attorneys as their lawyers who eventually secured a judgment in clients favor in the underlying litigation. (That judgment is not before Court in this appeal.)
The parties agreed to arbitrate their fee dispute before a Los Angeles County Bar Association panel. Attorneys proposed that the arbitration be binding but clients would not agree. At a contested hearing, the arbitration panel concluded that the arbitration was binding and that attorneys were entitled to $85,000 in fees and costs, the amount clients already had paid.
Attorneys then filed this lawsuit, alleging causes of action for breach of contract, common counts, account stated, book account, quantum meruit, and fraud, and seeking economic and punitive damages. Clients cross-complained, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and slander of title regarding the trust deed, and seeking declaratory relief expunging the trust deed, reconveying their interest in the Idaho property, quieting their title thereto, and determining that the arbitration award barred attorneys claims. Clients sought economic and punitive damages.
The parties agreed that the court first would try their respective equitable claims, but, both below and on appeal, disputed whether that agreement included attorneys quantum meruit claim and whether attorneys waived their right to a jury trial of the quantum meruit claim. The case proceeded as a bench trial, including attorneys quantum meruit claim. The court found for clients on the breach of fiduciary duty and slander of title claims, awarding them $250,000 in economic and $300,000 in punitive damages. The court also ordered attorneys to reconvey their interest in the Idaho realty. Regarding attorneys quantum meruit claim, the court found that the value of attorneys legal services was approximately $45,000, ordered them to refund $40,000 previously paid to clients, and found that as a result attorneys other causes of action were moot because they were not entitled to any damages thereon. The court also found that the arbitration was binding and barred attorneys claims.
Attorneys appeal, contending that (I) the arbitration was not binding, and thus did not bar their lawsuit; (II) they were entitled to a jury trial on their contract and quantum meruit causes of action and did not waive that right; (III) the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that clients suffered any economic damages, and as a result they were not entitled to either economic or punitive damages; and (IV) the court lacked jurisdiction to affect the trust deed on realty located in Idaho. Attorneys also challenge many of the courts evidentiary rulings and claim the court displayed bias against them and preference for clients.
Court agree with contentions (I) (III), but reject contention (IV). Court reverse that portion of the judgment for clients on the amended complaint and remand for a new trial. Court reverse that portion of the judgment for clients on the breach of fiduciary duty and slander of title claims in the cross complaint and remand for the trial court to enter judgment for attorneys thereon. Court affirm that portion of the judgment on the cross-complaint ordering attorneys to reconvey their interest in the Idaho realty. Because of these conclusions Court do not address attorneys remaining contentions.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions for first degree murder and assault with a firearm. Falcon was sentenced to a term of 50 years to life in prison.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1) admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness; (2) admitting, during the Peoples rebuttal case, evidence of his statements to police; (3) declining to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 8.73, regarding provocation; and (4) instructing with a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.52, regarding flight. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which we consider concurrently with his direct appeal, Falcon contends his attorney was ineffective in a variety of ways. Discerning no reversible error, Court affirm the judgment and deny the writ petition.

This lawsuit arises from a 1976 workplace injury suffered by Raul Rodriguez, who passed away in 2005. The plaintiffs in the present action are Maria Rodriguez (Rauls ex wife), Bertha Rodriguez (Rauls wife at the time of his death), Monica Rodriguez (Rauls daughter), Osbaldo Rodriguez (Rauls son), and Stephanie Marie Felix (Berthas daughter and Rauls stepdaughter). Plaintiffs third amended complaint alleges claims for breach of contract, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death against Firemans Fund Insurance Company, Tuftco Corporation (Tuftco), Gowin Card, Inc. (Gowin), and Tuftco Sales Corporation (Sales). All defendants demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrers, some with leave to amend and some without. After plaintiffs elected not to amend their complaint further, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiffs appeal. Court affirm.

On January 27, 2005, an information was filed charging appellant in count 1 with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211), and in count 2 with possession of a firearm as a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)). It alleged under count 1 that appellant had personally used a handgun during the robbery ( 12022.53, subd. (b)), and under count 2 that appellant had a prior felony conviction for robbery; in addition, it alleged that appellant had three prior convictions within the scope of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170. 12, subds. (a)-(d)). Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations.
Trial was by jury. At trial, appellant stipulated to the truth of the special allegation under count 2. On July 25, 2005, the jury found appellant guilty as charged under both counts, and found the special allegation under count 1 to be true. Following trial, appellant admitted the prior convictions alleged under the Three Strikes law. The trial court imposed a total sentence of 35 years to life under count 1, and stayed punishment under count 2 ( 654). The judgment is affirmed.

The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed an information charging defendant and appellant Tarayne Rolison (defendant) with one count of violating Health and Safety Code section 11351.5, possession for sale of cocaine base. The information alleged that defendant committed the offense for the benefit of and in association with a criminal street gang within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A).[1]It further alleged that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). It also alleged that defendant had been convicted of two prior felonies within the meaning of section 1203, subdivision (e)(4).
On the Peoples motion and pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court amended the information by interlineation to add Count 2 charging defendant with a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351, possession for sale of a controlled substance (powder cocaine).[2] The special allegations of Count 1 under sections 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A), and sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) were made applicable to Count 2. Defendant pleaded guilty to Count 2 and admitted the special allegations. Count 1 was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of six years in state prison, comprised of the low term of two years, doubled to four years based on the prior strike conviction, plus two additional years pursuant to the gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A). He was awarded 440 days of total custody credit, comprised of 294 days of actual custody credit and 146 days of conduct credit.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal and a request for a certificate of probable cause. The trial court denied defendants request for a certificate of probable cause.
The judgment is affirmed.