CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant was convicted of one count of first degree burglary. He contends that his detention violated the Fourth Amendment because it was based solely on an uncorroborated tip from an anonymous informant. Appellant further argues that the victim's identification of him and his confession should have been suppressed as they are the fruits of the illegal detention. Court do not agree with appellant's characterization of the underlying facts of the detention. Court find that the detention was legal, as the police were acting on information from the victim of a crime that had just occurred, when they spoke to the informant on the street. Court therefore affirm.

Appellant was declared a ward of the juvenile court and placed home on probation after the court sustained a petition alleging appellant had unlawfully driven or taken a vehicle. Appellant contends two of her probation conditions are unconstitutional and the court failed to exercise its discretion when setting her maximum period of confinement. Court affirm the order as modified.

Minor was declared a ward of the juvenile court and ordered home on probation, for committing attempted robbery. Appellant was almost 14 years old at the time of the incident. Appellant contends: (1) There was insufficient evidence that she appreciated the wrongfulness of her act, or, alternatively, her trial counsel should have sought appointment of an expert on that issue. (2) Impermissibly suggestive procedures were used when the victim identified her. (3) Certain probation conditions are unreasonable or must be modified.

Appellants appeal from two trial court orders imposing monetary sanctions against them and in favor of respondents.

Appellant appeals from his conviction of possession for sale of cocaine base. The trial court found true allegations of two prior convictions of serious or violent felonies. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to traverse the affidavit in support of the search warrant and suppress evidence; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury; (3) trial counsel was ineffective; (4) the trial court committed numerous errors with respect to his prior convictions; (5) the trial court committed numerous sentencing errors; and (6) the trial court erred in failing to halt the sentencing hearing and appoint counsel. Court affirm.

A criminal law decision regarding murder, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, robberies and assaults. Appellants raise numerous claims on appeal. Court agree with appellants' claim of misjoinder and instructional error with respect to the conspiracy alleged in count three but find these and other alleged errors harmless.

Appellant appeals from the order of wardship entered following the juvenile court's determination that appellant committed second degree robbery and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. Appellant was placed in the camp community placement program for a period not to exceed nine years.

This action is one for construction defects arising from a home improvement project in 1991. The trial court found the present action barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and dismissed the action. Court affirm.

Petitioner's claim for permanent disability benefits was denied because plaintiff had received a prior permanent disability award for an overlapping disability. Petitioner argues that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that a statutory presumption barred his recovery. Court agree and vacate the order.

Appellant appeals from an order dismissing her paternity action, and from an order denying her request for a statement of decision. Appellant contends the trial court misapplied the presumption of paternity that is set forth in Family Code section 7540. Court agree the court should have issued a statement of decision and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs' appeal from an adverse judgment requires us to decide whether a consortium of former asbestos producers who settled claims through the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR) are jointly and severally liable for the shares of the defaulting CCR members.

On February 24, 2006, an information was filed by the Santa Clara District Attorney alleging that defendant Robert Clifton Stancil resisted, delayed, and obstructed a peace officer in the discharge of his duties, a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1)) and drove and took a vehicle, a felony (Veh. Code, 10851. subd. (a)). Defendant waived his right to a preliminary examination and pleaded no contest on April 24, 2006, to resisting, delaying and obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties, a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1)), and unauthorized use or theft of a vehicle, a felony (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)). Defendant was placed on formal probation for three years on condition that he serve the stipulated term of 90 days in jail with credit for 12 days, along with additional terms and conditions. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and we appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court.
Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelley (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, Court have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that there is no arguable issue on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a judgment following pleas of guilty and imposition of a ten year state prison term: the upper term of eight years on count one, and a two year consecutive term on count two. His counsel raised no issues and asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to appellant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; see Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259.) Upon review of the record we found no arguable issues, although we ordered an amendment of the abstract of judgment to require AIDS testing. We subsequently granted defendants petition for rehearing to consider the impact of the decision in Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely), upon defendants sentence. We concluded that under Blakely the upper term imposed upon defendant must be vacated, but otherwise affirmed the judgment as amended. The California Supreme Court then transferred the case back to this Court for reconsideration in light of People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238 (Black). In accordance with the opinion in Black Court found no error in the imposition of upper and consecutive terms under the California Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL), and therefore vacated our prior opinion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), misdemeanor assault (Pen. Code, 240), and making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, 422).[1] He received a four-year upper term for assault with a deadly weapon, a three-year concurrent upper term for the conviction of making a criminal threat, and 180 days in county jail for the misdemeanor assault conviction. In a prior appeal we reversed the conviction of making a criminal threat for lack of supporting evidence of the victims sustained fear, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. Bound by the California Supreme Court opinion in People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238 (Black), we concluded that defendant was not denied his due process rights to a jury trial and finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under [Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296] by the trial courts imposition of an upper term.
The United States Supreme Court then reversed Black in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856](Cunningham), and concluded, Contrary to the Black courts holding, our decisions from Apprendi[] to Booker[] point to the middle term specified in Californias statutes, not the upper term, as the relevant statutory maximum. Because the DSL authorizes the judge, not the jury, to find the facts permitting an upper term sentence, the system cannot withstand measurement against our Sixth Amendment precedent. (Cunningham, supra, 166 L.Ed.2d 856, 876.) This case has now been remanded to us for further consideration in light of Cunningham. Court conclude that no prejudicial sentencing error occurred and affirm the judgment.