CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Gregory Smith appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual penetration with a foreign object (Pen. Code,[1] 289, subd. (a)(1)) (count one), forcible rape ( 261, subd. (a)(2)) (count two), and receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)) (count three). He contends on appeal that the prosecutor made improper arguments to the jury, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court committed instructional and sentencing error. Court order the sentence modified to strike one 5-year enhancement, and affirm in all other respects.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, alleging that the trial court erred in denying him any presentence conduct credits. Court agree and order the abstract of judgment corrected accordingly.

Defendant Adam Sabastian Lancina pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, and was sentenced to the felony term of three years in state prison. (Pen. Code, former 290, subd. (a)(1)(A).)[1] Failure to register under section 290 is punishable as either a misdemeanor, if the registration requirement is based on a misdemeanor conviction, or a felony, if the registration requirement is based on a felony conviction. ( 290, former subd. (g)(1) & (2).) The complaint alleged a felony violation and listed three prior felony convictions, but inconsistently said defendant was required to register based on an unspecified misdemeanor conviction. Defendant concedes that everyone in the trial court, including himself, thought he was pleading to a felony violation of section 290. Nevertheless, defendant argues that we must construe his plea as a plea to a misdemeanor, and reduce his sentence. Court disagree, and affirm the judgment and sentence.

Margot R. Solomon in propria persona appeals from the judgment on reserved issues in her marital dissolution action with Robert A. DeGoff. Court find no reversible error in the case and affirm the judgment.

Joselyn M., now age 14, and brother J. M., now age 10, were first taken into custody by the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) in February 2001. After both parents failed to reunify, the childrens paternal grandmother, Betty C., was appointed their legal guardian and dependency jurisdiction was dismissed. Betty died in 2006 and, the following year, the juvenile court reinstated dependency proceedings and subsequently set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] in order to implement a new permanent plan for the children. John M., the childrens father, seeks review by extraordinary writ of a juvenile court order setting the section 366.26 hearing, claiming that procedural irregularities may have violated his due process rights and that he may have been deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Court deny the writ on the merits.

Johnny J. appeals from an order of wardship entered following true findings on allegations of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1);[1]count 1), making a criminal threat ( 422; count 2), and assault with a deadly weapon ( 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and further allegations that both assaults were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The minor also admitted misdemeanor vandalism ( 594, subd. (a)), which was alleged in a separate petition. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the true findings on count 3 and on the gang allegations, section 654 bars the consecutive maximum terms of confinement that were imposed on him, and the juvenile court erred in failing to determine whether his assault offenses were felonies or misdemeanors and in imposing overbroad conditions of probation.
Court reverse the true findings on count 3 and on the gang allegations with directions to dismiss them. Court further conclude that the juvenile court erred in failing to determine whether the count 1 assault was a felony or a misdemeanor and in imposing overbroad conditions of probation. In all other respects, Court affirm.

Efren Silva Martinez appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of possession for sale of cocaine base. (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5.) The court sentenced appellant to prison for four years. Appellant claims trial errors occurred. Court affirm the judgment.

Ebony B., a minor, appeals from the order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) entered following determinations that, as alleged in one petition (petition A), she committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211), as alleged in another petition (petition B), she committed count 1 - attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211, 664) and two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211; counts 2 and 3), and, as to a third petition (also petition B), that she committed a lesser offense of petty theft (Pen. Code, 484, subd. (a)). The court ordered appellant placed in camp for six months. Appellant claims trial errors occurred. Court affirm the order of wardship.

The trial court granted a special motion to strike the complaint in a legal malpractice case. Ron Hacker and 1538 Cahuenga Partners, LLC (collectively 1538) sued Jacqueline Fabe, a lawyer who worked for 1538 for a short time. After Fabe quit, she filed an administrative claim for unpaid wages. 1538 then filed this lawsuit against Fabe alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and legal malpractice/negligence. Fabe filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Fabe asserted that 1538s civil action arose from her protected act of filing an unpaid wages claim. The trial court granted the motion, but denied Fabe attorneys fees. Court conclude that 1538s complaint does not arise from Fabes protected activity, as defined by the anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, the trial court should have denied the special motion to strike. In light of this conclusion, Fabes cross-appeal about attorneys fees is moot.

This appeal arises from a judgment in favor of defendants entered after the trial court granted motion for summary judgment of defendants United Parcel Service (UPS), Mail Boxes Etc., Inc. (MBE), and Rocky Romanella as to all causes of action alleged by plaintiffs Gil I. McDougal, Inc. (sometimes McDougal), Sanford Industries, Inc. (sometimes Sanford), and Martin Senoff, Inc. (sometimes Senoff). Court conclude that because plaintiffs have created numerous triable issues of fact, summary judgment should be reversed.

The origin of this case is a suit that plaintiff filed in the United States District Court, Central District of California. The defendants represented plaintiff for a time in that federal case and then successfully moved to withdraw from their representation. We address the question whether a federal courts decision to permit an attorney to withdraw from representing a client in a federal case can be the basis of a collateral estoppel defense when that same client sues the attorney in a California state court and alleges that the attorney breached their federal case retainer agreement by withdrawing from representation.
Court also conclude that the demurrers to plaintiffs other causes of action were properly sustained without leave to amend. Additionally, all but one of the discovery issues raised by plaintiff in this appeal are either moot or have not been properly briefed by plaintiff, and as for the one discovery issue that Court address on its merits, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial courts decision on that discovery matter. Court therefore affirm the judgment of dismissal.

A modification decision.

Jermaine G. appeals from the order continuing wardship entered following his admission of felony unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a).) He contends that the juvenile court prejudicially erred in denying his motion for a supplemental expert examination. Court affirm.

Former husband William Travis Campbell appeals an order, entered more than six years after the dissolution of his marriage to former wife Alexandria Campbell,[1] ordering Travis to pay private school tuition and expenses of the former spouses two children and ordering him to pay $15,000 of Andrias attorneys fees and costs. Court conclude that because Travis did not show changed financial circumstances, the trial courts denial of his application to be relieved of his obligation to pay his childrens private school tuition and expenses was not an abuse of discretion. Court also conclude that Travis has not shown that the attorneys fee award was an abuse of discretion. Court affirm the order.