CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant contends on appeal that (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon; (2) the court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that proof of defendants gang membership and knowledge that gang fights commonly involve the use of weapons is insufficient to prove that he knew that one of his companions intended to commit an assault with a deadly weapon; (3) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct; (4) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutorial misconduct; (5) the court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence a CD, its cover, and the transcript of some of its lyrics; (6) the court abused its discretion by admitting certain gang expert testimony; (7) the court prejudicially erred when instructing the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (8) there is insufficient evidence to support the criminal street gang enhancement; (9) the cumulative effect of the above errors requires reversal of the conviction; and (10) the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by imposing the upper term. As we find no error requiring reversal, Court affirm the judgment.

A tenant was evicted by his landlord for nonpayment of rent. The landlord filed an unlawful detainer action and obtained a judgment against him. The tenant, in propria persona, filed a personal injury action against his landlord in which he alleged discriminatory housing practices. The landlord filed a demurrer, which the trial court sustained with leave to amend. The tenant filed a first amended complaint and landlord again demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Court affirm.

Appellants, former chaplains at Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County and an entity incorporated by them,[1]appeal from the judgment of the Alameda County Superior Court entered against them and in favor of respondents County of Alameda, and five County Sheriffs Office employees. The judgment followed the sustaining of demurrers to appellants causes of action for alleged violations of state laws regarding wage and hour requirements covering overtime, meal breaks and rest breaks, as well as to three fraud causes of action (intentional misrepresentation, concealment, and false promise). Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting respondents demurrers to these causes of action.
Specifically, appellants contend the trial court erred in ruling that Labor Code sections 510, 512, 226.7 and 1194 do not apply to charter counties such as the County of Alameda in the circumstances presented. Appellants also contend the court erred in sustaining the demurrer as to their fraud causes of action, arguing that the complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite corruption and malice to overcome the qualified immunity provided by Government Code section 822.2. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of sexual penetration with a foreign object (Pen. Code, 289, subd. (a)),[1] three counts of forcible rape ( 261, subd. (a)(2)), kidnapping to commit rape ( 209, subd. (b)(1)), robbery ( 211), and sodomy by use of force ( 286, subd. (c)(2)), along with associated enhancements for commission of sex offenses upon multiple victims ( 667.61, subd. (e)(5)), commission of multiple sex offenses upon each victim ( 667.6, subd. (c)), commission of multiple violent sex offenses against separate victims ( 667.6, subd. (d)), and kidnapping that substantially increased risk of harm to the victim ( 667.61, subd. (d)(2)). The trial court found that defendant suffered prior convictions ( 261.5, subd. (d), 484/666, 667, subd. (a)(1), 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and served a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)). He received a determinate term of 42 years, and an indeterminate term of 90 years to life in state prison.
In this appeal, defendant claims that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 (hereafter section 352) to exclude prior convictions as impeachment evidence. We conclude that the record shows the trial court properly weighed the probative value of the impeachment evidence against its prejudicial effect, and did not err by admitting two of defendants prior convictions to impeach his testimony. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

In this proceeding initiated under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,[1]G. B., appeals dispositional orders entered July 20, 2007, by the Alameda County Superior Court, Juvenile Division. He challenges in particular his commitment to the California Youth Authoritynow the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). (See Gov. Code, 12838.3.) As discussed below, Court affirm, finding no abuse of discretion in the juvenile courts commitment order.

A jury found defendant Lamon Raney guilty of unlawfully attempting to drive or take a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a), Pen. Code, 664.)[1] Defendant then admitted two of the prior convictions alleged in the information. The trial court sentenced him to two years in prison, one of which was based on the prior prison term arising from the two convictions.[2] Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional rights by failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial on the prior convictions and prison term and of the penal consequences of his admission. Court affirm the judgment of guilt, reverse the judgment on the enhancement allegations, and remand for further proceedings.

Maxlyn Cadlo and heirs of Anthony Cadlo, deceased, appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of respondent Metalclad Insulation Corporation (Metalclad). Appellants contend that collateral estoppel dictates summary reversal of the judgment and an order directing the court to proceed to trial on the issue of damages only. Court agree the judgment must be vacated and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DefendantEmmanuel Darnell Kemp appeals from an order revoking his probation, following a contested probation violation hearing. Counsel has asked for our independent review of the record. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel also informed defendant that he had the right to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. Defendant has not done so. The order is affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant Edwin Gail Donahue, Sr., pled guilty in case No. CR072331 to driving under the influence with a prior conviction (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5), and admitted a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c).); and pled guilty in case No. CR066482 to escape from jail while charged with a felony (Pen. Code, 4532, subd. (b)(1)), and admitted a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c).) The cases were combined for sentencing and defendant was sentenced to seven years four months in state prison. Counsel has advised that examination of the record reveals no arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel has informed defendant that he may personally file a supplemental opening brief, but defendant has not done so. Court conclude there are no arguable issues and affirm.

After jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, the Solano County juvenile court sustained two counts of a four-count petition against appellant. It adjudged appellant a ward of the court, placed him in the custody of his mother albeit with the supervision of the probation department, and ordered him to serve the time he had already served in juvenile hall. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, appellant appeals and asks this court to examine the record and determine if there are any issues presented by the record that are deserving of further briefing and, then, review by this court. Court have done so, find none, and hence affirm the juvenile courts order.

Defendant Crusader Insurance Company appeals the judgment in favor of plaintiff Golden Eagle Insurance Company for equitable contribution. Golden Eagle succinctly summarizes the issue before us as follows: "In this action for equitable contribution or indemnity, the parties dispute an issue of first impression in the California courts: whether an insurer can obtain an equitable recovery for providing a defense under a third-party liability insurance policy against a non-participating insurer in a situation where the insurance companies dispute whether they insure the same entity." Court answer that question in the negative, and so reverse the judgment.

Darnell Johnson sued respondents Harold Greenberg, Hai Nguyen, Dennis Harkavy and Richard Rome, lawyers who had previously represented him in a real estate matter. Judgment was entered in respondents' favor after their demurrers to the second amended complaint were sustained without leave to amend. Court affirm.

Jeffrey Baida appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction, after a jury trial, of violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a), and the true findings, after a court trial, of one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 1170.12, subdivision (a) through (d) and section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) (the "Three-Strikes" law) and seven prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was sentenced to the middle term of four years in state prison for the sale of a controlled substance charge, doubled to eight years as a result of the Three Strikes law. The court imposed four one-year consecutive sentences for four of the prior prison terms, and imposed and stayed three one-year terms for the remaining prior prison terms. Court appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

Ulises G. (appellant), age 15, admitted that he fell within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that on May 6, 2007, he had violated Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1), a misdemeanor, proscribing resisting, obstructing a peace officer or E.M.T. discharging the duty of his office.[1] In an agreement with the People, upon appellants admission, the allegation of a violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f), was dismissed, and appellant was placed on six months of probation pursuant to section 725, subdivision (a), without a declaration of wardship. The orders under review are affirmed.