CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner, Steven Matthew McCone, was charged in a complaint with residential burglary. When his preliminary hearing was continued, he was released on his own recognizance. When the original complaint was dismissed and refiled, the court set bail in the amount of $50,000. According to petitioner, the order setting bail should be vacated because subdivision (c) of Penal Code section 1388 requires that he be released on his own recognizance. Real party concedes the issue and Court agree the petition should be granted.

Defendant James Suminto entered a negotiated plea of no contest to six counts of commercial burglary. The trial court placed defendant on three years probation and ordered him to pay victim restitution. After a contested hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay the victim approximately $289,000. On appeal, defendant challenges approximately $11,000 of that amount. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the challenged amount was not attributable to his burglaries given that it was incurred after his arrest and for the cost of upgrading the victims security system. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Samuel W. appeals from the order of the juvenile court of Del Norte County terminating his parental rights as to daughter S.W. in accordance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Appellant contends the order should be reversed because the juvenile court never made a determination that giving him custody would be detrimental to S. Appellant then doubles back to attack the dispositional order before the termination proceedings were commenced, arguing that he should be excused the usual rule that such an attack is barred by the time a termination order is entered, because the juvenile court did not advise him of his right to appeal from the dispositional order. On the assumption that he can make that attack, appellant contends the juvenile court erred at the dispositional hearing when it failed to proceed in accordance with section 361.2, the statute applicable to non-custodial parents. As a result, the juvenile court failed to inquire whether Samuel wished to assume custody of his daughter. Instead, it found that . . . family reunification services, which are intended for custodial parents, would be futile due to Samuels incarceration and ordered bypass of services, thereby setting the stage for termination of his parental rights.
Court conclude that appellant should be permitted to challenge the dispositional order. Court further conclude also that there was error in the failure to apply section 361.2, but that there was no prejudice to appellant from such error. Thus, Court reject both of appellants contentions on their merits, and affirm.

We affirm the trial courts ruling as to the first, second, sixth, and seventh causes of action. However, because appellant presented evidence of severe and pervasive harassment based on appellants age, and such evidence was sufficient to create a triable question of fact as to whether appellant was subjected to unlawful age harassment, we reverse the trial courts ruling as to the thirteenth cause of action.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication because: (1) there are triable issues of fact as to appellants first and second causes of action for medical leave discrimination; (2) there are triable issues of fact as to appellants sixth and seventh causes of action for disability discrimination; and (3) there are triable issues of fact as to appellants thirteenth cause of action for age harassment.
We affirm the trial courts ruling granting respondents summary adjudication motion as to the first, second, sixth, and seventh causes of action. However, Court reverse the judgment and the trial courts ruling granting respondents summary adjudication motion as to the thirteenth cause of action.

Troy Jackson (appellant) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of one count of petty theft with priors in violation of Penal Code,[1]sections 484, subdivision (a) and 666 (count 2). The trial court found true the allegations that appellant had suffered two prison priors within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced appellant to the midterm of two years in state prison in count 2. The court imposed an additional year for each of appellants two prior prison terms pursuant to sections 667.5, subdivision (b) for a total sentence of four years. The judgment is affirmed.

Dwain Edward King appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)). The trial court found to be true the allegations that defendant has suffered a prior felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d),[1]and six prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). It sentenced defendant to 12 years in state prison. Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to have a full and fair cross-examination of a key prosecution witness, thereby violating his state and federal constitutional rights to present a defense and confront the witnesses against him; (2) his state and federal constitutional rights were violated by the giving of erroneous jury instructions on: (a) reasonable doubt in accordance with CALCRIM No. 220, (b) the definitions of direct and circumstantial evidence in accordance with CALCRIM No. 223, (c) the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in accordance with CALCRIM No. 224, (d) determining the credibility of witnesses in accordance with CALCRIM No. 226, (e) the lack of a requirement to produce all witnesses and physical evidence in accordance with CALCRIM No. 300, and (f) defendants right not to testify in accordance with CALCRIM No. 355; (3) the instructional errors were individually and cumulatively prejudicial, depriving defendant of due process and a fair trial; and (4) defendant suffered ineffective assistance of counsel, if the instructional errors are found to have been forfeited by trial counsels failure to object. Court affirm.

Luis Alvarez Castaneda (defendant) appeals from a final judgment entered after a jury trial. Defendant was convicted of kidnapping to commit robbery (Pen. Code, 209, subd. (b)(1)), robbery ( 211), and carjacking (215, subd. (a)). Court direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment so that it accurately reflects defendants conviction, but affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Daniel S. appeals from an order of wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 upon a finding that he possessed a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). He was placed home on probation and contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding he possessed a controlled substance and that the court erred by imposing a maximum term of confinement. For reasons stated in the opinion, Court strike the maximum term of confinement and affirm the order of wardship.

Edward James Willard pled guilty in 1981 to one count each of robbery and second degree murder with a knife and was sentenced to state prison for an indeterminate term of 21 years to life with a minimum parole eligibility date of September 7, 1995. (Pen. Code, 211, 187, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b).) In 2006, the Board of Parole Hearings found for the eighth time that Willard is unsuitable for parole, and the matter is before us on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Court agree with Willard that the Boards decision is not supported by some evidence and, for this reason, grant the petition.

On September 12, 2007, a jury convicted David Vrana of possession of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). On October 2, 2007, Vrana admitted various prior convictions, including one strike conviction pursuant to Penal Code sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The court sentenced Vrana to the middle term of 2 years in prison, doubled it to four years for the strike conviction, imposed various fines and fees, denied his motions for a new trial and to strike his prior strike conviction, and credited him with 307 days in custody. Finding no error, Court affirm the judgment.

In these consolidated appeals, defendants raise claims that include sufficiency of the evidence, instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct, and sentencing error. We shall strike one of the robbery counts for Rangel and direct minor corrections to the clerks minutes and abstracts of judgment for Bustamante and Rangel. Otherwise, Court affirm all three judgments.

A jury found defendant Freddy Enrique Porras guilty of seven counts of forcible lewd acts with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (b)(1))[1]and found true a special circumstance allegation that the statute of limitations for three of those counts was extended pursuant to the version of section 803, subdivision (f) (hereafter 803(f)) in effect in 2006. The jury deadlocked on one count of forcible sodomy on a minor ( 269, subd. (a)(3), 286) and one count of forcible digital penetration ( 269, subd. (a)(5), 289), and the trial court declared a mistrial as to those counts. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 42 years in state prison, consisting of full, consecutive middle terms of six years for each of the seven counts of forcible lewd acts with a child. ( 667.6, subd. (d).) Defendant appeals, contending his prosecution for the three counts for which the statute of limitations was extended violated the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution. Alternatively, he claims there is no substantial evidence of corroboration of the victims allegations as required to extend the statute of limitations under section 803(f). Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Marc Joseph Dawson pled guilty to three counts of check forgery (Pen. Code, 470, subd. (d)) and one count of possessing blank checks with the intent to defraud ( 475, subd. (b)).[1] He agreed that all other charges 13 counts alleged in two separate informations be dismissed with a Harvey waiver.[2] The court sentenced defendant to five years in prison: the upper term of three years for the first count of check forgery and consecutive eight-month terms (one-third the middle term) for each of the three remaining counts.
On appeal, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because: (1) imposition of the upper term based on his parole status - a factor neither admitted by defendant nor found by a jury - violated his Sixth Amendment rights; (2) absent a jury finding that two of the check forgery counts involved different objectives, the court should have stayed the sentences under section 654; and (3) he did not waive or forfeit the question of his right to jury trial on his parole status or the question whether he had different objectives when he forged the checks over a period of several days. Court conclude there was no sentencing error and affirm the judgment.