CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Admasu Goshu Mekonnen appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial. Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the trial courts imposition of a one-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Court affirm.

On December 16, 2002, the Los Angeles District Attorney filed a 14-count criminal complaint charging appellant with six counts of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code[1] 459; counts one, five, seven, nine, eleven, thirteen.); seven counts of receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a); counts two, four, six, eight, ten, twelve, fourteen); and one count of second degree commercial burglary ( 459; count three.) It was further alleged as to counts one, two, and five through fourteen, that in 1995, in Los Angeles County case number KA028500, that appellant had suffered a conviction of a serious or violent felony (first degree burglary)( 1170.12, subds. (a)(d), ( 667, subds. (b)-(i))); as to counts one, five, seven, nine, eleven and thirteen, that in Los Angeles County case number KA028500, appellant suffered a conviction of a serious felony (667, subd. (a)(1)); and that as to counts one, two and five through fourteen, that appellant had suffered two prison priors (667.5, subd. (b).) The judgment (order denying the petition for writ of error coram nobis ) is affirmed.

We previously considered an order terminating jurisdiction over I.J.s half brother. (In re E.A. (Dec. 20, 2007, B197377) [nonpub. opn.].) In this appeal, we consider the termination of mothers parental rights over I.J., which followed a contested Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. (All undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Court reject mothers arguments that the court should have applied a section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception and should have allowed I.J. to testify as she requested. Court affirm the juvenile courts order terminating mothers parental rights over I.J.

A jury acquitted defendant Frank Trevizo of attempted murder and the lesser included crime of voluntary manslaughter but convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon and found he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, Deniz Chet Lopez. Consequently, the trial court found that defendant violated the conditions of his probation in two separate cases. He was sentenced to the upper term of four years, plus a consecutive term of three years for the great bodily injury enhancement; concurrent terms were imposed in the two other cases. On appeal, defendant contends (1) he established a claim of racial discrimination during voir dire (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69]; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (hereafter Batson/Wheeler), (2) destruction of juror questionnaires denied him his right to a full and fair review of the Batson/Wheeler issues, (3) the trial court erred prejudicially in admitting evidence of prior bad acts, and (4) imposition of the upper term violated his constitutional rights as set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435] (hereafter Apprendi), Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403] (hereafter Blakely), and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. ___ [166 L.Ed.2d 856] (hereafter Cunningham). Finding no reversible error, Court shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Thomas Joseph Cadotte pled guilty to one count of transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and a prior controlled substance conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations with a Harvey[1]waiver and a maximum sentence of 11 years in state prison. The court denied probation, sentenced defendant to nine years in state prison, awarded custody credits, and ordered that defendant pay fees and fines, including a $600 restitution fine (Pen. Code, 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a $600 parole revocation fine, stayed pending successful completion of parole (Pen. Code, 1202.45). On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the $600 restitution fine violated the plea agreement, and (2) the abstract of judgment must be amended to specifically identify each of the fees and fines imposed. Court affirm the judgment and shall direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to specify the fees and fines imposed.

Defendant Ramon Vance Fieseler pled no contest to transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)) and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, 14601.1, subd. (a)). Defendant also admitted one prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 1170.12 and one prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), both for first degree burglary.
Defendant was sentenced to seven years in prison, with an additional 30 days in jail to be served concurrently with his prison term. On appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss his prior felony conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). Court shall affirm.

Rufus Gray appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence. A jury found Gray guilty of carjacking, robbery, attempted kidnapping, kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, and other offenses. The jury also found true the special allegations that Gray personally discharged a firearm, personally used a firearm, and that he was armed with a firearm. The trial court sentenced Gray to a determinate term of 39 years and an indeterminate term of life with parole.
Court conclude that the majority of Gray's contentions are without merit. However, the People concede that Gray's conviction for simple kidnapping in count 7 must be reversed because it is a lesser included offense of kidnapping for robbery, for which Gray was convicted in count 5. Court agree that the kidnapping conviction must be reversed, and therefore reverse Gray's conviction for kidnapping on count 7. Court otherwise affirm the judgment as modified.

A jury convicted Francisco Bravo Muzquiz of assault with intent to commit sexual penetration by a foreign object (Pen. Code, 220, 289); attempted sexual penetration by a foreign object ( 289, subd. (a), 664); false imprisonment by violence ( 236, 237, subd. (a)); and misdemeanor sexual battery ( 243.4, subd. (e)(1)). Prior to trial, Muzquiz pled guilty to the charge of failing to register as a sex offender. (Former 290, subd. (g)(1).) The trial court sentenced Muzquiz to four years' imprisonment.
The attorney general concedes that Muzquiz's first argument has merit, and we agree. Muzquiz was improperly convicted of both the greater offense of assault with intent to commit sexual penetration by a foreign object and the lesser included offense of attempted sexual penetration by a foreign object. However, Court conclude that Muzquiz's remaining contentions lack merit. Accordingly, Court reverse the conviction on the lesser included offense of attempted sexual penetration by a foreign object, and Court affirm the remainder of the judgment.

The court sentenced Roque to a total term of six years eight months in prison, which consisted of the lower term of three years on count 1, and consecutive terms of eight months for count 3 and three years for the Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement. Roque contends (1) the consecutive sentences for counts 1 and 3 constitute double punishment in violation of Penal Code section 654, since he committed a single, indivisible act, and (2) the imposition of a full three-year term on the great bodily injury enhancement for count 3 violates section 1170.1, subdivision (a), and is thus unauthorized by law. The People concede the second issue and agree the matter must be remanded for resentencing. As to the first issue, Court affirm the judgment.

Ronald James Scott was charged with selling or furnishing cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352) and possessing cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5). The court suspended proceedings under Penal Code[1]section 1368 to determine whether Scott was mentally competent to stand trial. The court found Scott not mentally competent to stand trial and committed him to Patton State Hospital for three years. After 258 days in treatment, Scott's competency was restored. The proceedings were reinstated and Scott pleaded guilty to one count of furnishing cocaine base. The court sentenced Scott to a four year prison term. At sentencing, the court granted Scott credit for 404 actual days served under section 2900.5 and 72 conduct credit days under section 4019, for a total of 476 days time served. Scott appeals, contending he should have been awarded conduct credit for the 258 days he spent in Patton State Hospital. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Bashay Sigiti Ward of two counts of robbery. (Pen. Code, 211.)[1] Ward admitted that he had suffered a prison prior ( 667.5, subd. (b), 668), a serious felony prior ( 667, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)), and a strike prior ( 667, subds. (b) (i), 668, 1170.12). The trial court sentenced Ward to 14 years in prison.
Ward appeals contending that his convictions must be reversed because: (i) the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury that accomplice testimony should be viewed with caution and must be corroborated; (ii) the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding an impermissibly suggestive "showup" identification conducted shortly after the robbery; (iii) there was insufficient evidence to establish the "force or fear" element of one of the two counts of robbery; and (iv) the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct on the lesser offense of grand theft (person). As discussed below, these contentions are without merit.

Maria S. appeals the judgment terminating her parental rights over Jesus R., Eduardo R., and J.R. She contends that the juvenile court erred by declining to apply two exceptions to termination: the beneficial relationship exception and the sibling relationship exception, the latter concerning the three boys' relationships with one another and with their three older half brothers, Joe S., Abraham R., and Julio R. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A), (E).) Court affirm the judgment.

A.V. appeals the findings and orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
A.V.'s counsel also impliedly requests leave for him to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied. The appeal is dismissed.

Ken B. appeals the findings and orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
The appeal is dismissed.