CA Unpub Decisions

Jennifer R., the mother of M.M., appeals from the juvenile courts orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to modify a court order and terminating her parental rights following a selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26. Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in finding that she had not met her burden of establishing that reinstating services would be in M.s best interest and that the beneficial relationship exception to termination was applicable. Court disagree, and hence affirm.

Justin H. appeals from the juvenile courts dispositional order. His counsel has raised no issue on appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not filed a supplementary brief. Court find no arguable issues and affirm.

Hector S. (Hector) appeals after the trial court terminated his parental rights to L. S. He contends he did not receive proper notice of the disposition hearing, the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance of the selection and implementation hearing pending the results of a paternity test, and the court did not comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). Court affirm.

A jury found in favor of respondent Cal-City Construction, Inc. (Cal-City) in its legal malpractice action against appellant Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP (Wilson Elser). The evidence established that Wilson Elser was retained to represent Cal-City after the Los Angeles Unified School District (District) removed Cal-City on a construction project known as Belmont 2 and refused to make progress payments on a construction project known as Belmont 3. Wilson Elser advised Cal-City to walk off Belmont 3. Cal-City walked off and sued the District for breaching its contracts on both projects. Just prior to trial, Wilson Elser advised Cal-City that it should never have walked off Belmont 3, and that because it did so, its only option was to settle on unfavorable terms. Cal-City obtained a judgment against Wilson Elser for $2,478,500 plus costs. The award included $941,000 in damages related to the adverse settlement with the District, and $1,722,500 for lost future profits on the theory that Wilson Elsers negligence caused Cal-City to lose bonding capacity and forfeit projects that it was thereby prevented from bidding on. Wilson Elser moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, for partial JNOV regarding lost future profits. The motion was denied. Wilson Elser now appeals the judgment and the denial of the motion for JNOV and argues: (1) Cal-City failed to offer evidence that it would have obtained a better result in the underlying disputes but for Wilson Elsers negligence; and (2) Cal-Citys award for lost future profits was based on speculative evidence. Court conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding that Wilson Elser caused Cal-City damage in connection with the underlying disputes, and that the award of $941,000 must stand. However, Court also conclude that the trial court should have granted a partial JNOV as to lost future profits. Cal-Citys evidence of lost profits was speculative and uncertain. Court granted Cal-Citys petition for rehearing to amplify the law on this point, and to reject Cal-Citys contention that evidence in the record it did not previously cite calls for a different conclusion. Court affirm the judgment, but only after modifying it to remove the award of lost future profits.

A jury convicted appellant Kenneth Wayne Mills of aggravated mayhem and assault causing great bodily injury for putting out his roommates eye. On appeal, Mills argues the evidence is insufficient to support his prior prison term enhancement because he did not admit all of the enhancements elements. He also contends the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel to represent him during competency proceedings. We conclude substantial evidence supports the prior prison term enhancement. Mills admitted some of the elements, and evidence introduced at trial established the rest. However, the trial court violated Millss statutory and constitutional rights to counsel during competency proceedings. Because it also summarily adjudicated Millss competency without affording him a trial on the issue or obtaining a trial waiver, failed to appoint counsel for Mills when he raised the issue after trial, and improperly put the burden of proof of prejudice on Mills, Court remand for a retrospective competency hearing.

Joseph Brutto, Robert Orr, and Florence Butler, who are minority shareholders of Radiology Practice Management, Inc. (RPM), appeal from dismissal of their complaint against RPMs other shareholders after the trial court sustained the demurrer of those several dozen shareholders without leave to amend. Court reverse to allow appellant Brutto to amend the allegations of his cause of action for inducing breach of contract.

Defendant, Emilios Warner, appeals from his cocaine base possession for sale conviction (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5) and findings he was previously convicted of a serious felony and served a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (b)(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12.) Defendant argues: there was insufficient evidence to support his cocaine base possession conviction; the upper term was improperly imposed; and certain peace officer personnel records should have been disclosed. The Attorney General argues that additional fines and penalties should have been imposed. We conclude certain peace officer personnel records should have been disclosed and additional fines should have been imposed. We conditionally reverse the judgment in order to allow disclosure of certain documents to the defense. Defendant shall have the opportunity to demonstrate had the new matters been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability defendant would have secured a more favorable result. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Rudy Martinez was convicted by a jury of the attempted and premeditated murder of Hector R. but was exonerated by the jury of the attempted murders of Isaias H. and Oscar H. The jury also convicted appellant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury found great bodily injury and various firearm enhancements to be true but the jury found the allegation untrue that the attempted murder of Hector R. was for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for attempted murder and this was enhanced by a term of 25 years to life; the sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm is to run concurrently.
The judgment is affirmed.

Jeremy M. (appellant) appeals from the orders declaring wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) and committing him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, after a finding that he had committed second degree murder with the discharge of a firearm proximately causing death (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)). The juvenile court ordered the maximum period of confinement was 15 years. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 731, subd. (b).)
He contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of murder because appellants testimony that he acted in self-defense was uncontroverted, (2) the juvenile court improperly relied on profile and propensity evidence in reaching its verdict, thus depriving appellant of due process, and (3) appellants statement to the police, taken in the absence of a Miranda warning (Mirandav. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda)), was inadmissible in evidence. The contentions lack merit, and the orders under review are affirmed.

Defendant Ramile Lajon Thomas appeals from a judgment entered after he pled no contest to one count of sodomy by use of force (Pen. Code, 286, subd. (c)(2))[1]and admitted to inflicting great bodily injury in the commission of the offense. ( 12022.8.) The trial court found defendant was a minor who at the time of commission of the offense was at least 14 years of age and prior to the commission of offense had been found to be a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for the commission of an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (D). The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to state prison for a total of 11 years pursuant to the plea agreement.On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the statutory scheme created by Proposition 21 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 violates the equal protection clause of the federal and state Constitutions; and (2) his plea was not free, voluntary, and informed. We dismiss the appeal because defendant was required to, but did not, obtain a certificate of probable cause.

Appellant Helen Brown was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of grand theft by embezzlement exceeding $400 in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a), and 17 counts of forgery in violation of section 470, subdivision (d). The jury found true the allegations that appellant took more than $50,000 within the meaning of section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court sentenced her to a total term of 28 months in state prison, and imposed a restitution fine of $200, and a stayed parole revocation fine of $200. Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in restricting cross-examination of a prosecution witness and in her direct examination. Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

Johnny P. (appellant) appeals from the order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) based on a finding that he committed robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and the order placing him home on probation.
He contends: (1) the case should be remanded for a recalculation of predisposition custody credits, and (2) the conditions of probation, Nos. 15, 16, and 21, must be modified to impose a knowledge requirement.The juvenile court shall cause its clerk to correct the conditions of probation, Nos. 15 and 21, stated in the minute order of May 9, 2007, to reflect the above modifications in the juvenile courts disposition order. The clerk shall also delete the indication at No. 22 in that same minute order that appellant is entitled to 14 days of predisposition credit.

T.G. (mother) and Frankie D. (father) appeal[1]the denial of their petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[2]seeking to change an order placing Tiana D. (minor) with a legal guardian. Mother argues that the minor should have been returned to her custody. Father argues that the juvenile court erred when it denied his petition without a hearing. Court affirm.

Appellant Joe Diaz was charged with two counts of felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1) (section 12021(a)(1)), based on two handguns that were found in the trunk of his parked car. The information also alleged two prior felony convictions for the purpose of section 12021 and one prior strike conviction pursuant to the Three Strikes law. His motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 was denied. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, he pled no contest to the two prior convictions and the low term of 16 months in prison on one of the section 12021(a)(1) counts. The remaining allegations were dismissed. He was sentenced in accordance with the plea. He appealed. He has been released on bail throughout the trial and appellate proceedings. Appellant contests both the legality of the search and the constitutionality of section 12021(a)(1). Court find no error and affirm.